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This thesis tackles an issue of global importance, namely why we, 
as consumers, are not doing more to change our behaviour in the face of 
the threat posed by climate change. The scientific evidence for climate 
change is clear and unambiguous, yet there is serious concern about the 
public’s willingness to adapt their behaviour and lifestyles to ameliorate 
its effects.  This is puzzling in the light of the existing literature on self-
report attitudes to sustainability, conducted by a variety of governmental 
and other agencies, which suggests that the public are ready for behaviour 
change.  This interdisciplinary thesis explores the relationship between 
self-report measures of attitude, and measures of implicit attitude (not 
based on self-reports), and a number of aspects of consumer behaviour.  
These include visual attention to carbon labels in an experimental setting, 
consumer choice between products with various labels, including carbon 
labels, in a simulated shopping task, and choice between different aspects 
of lifestyle varying in carbon footprint.  The studies found that self-
reported attitudes were good predictors of self-reported behaviour, but not 
actual behaviour.  Implicit attitudes to carbon footprint were a better 
predictor of visual attention to carbon labels, and the choice of low carbon 
items in a simulated shopping task, especially under time pressure.  The 
thesis also considered whether we could change explicit/implicit attitudes 
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to carbon footprint and generate more sustainable lifestyle choices, using 
film content with a primary focus on emotion, information or both.  It 
showed that it is possible to influence both carbon attitudes and behaviour; 
however, these effects are short-lived.  The thesis argues that in the future 
we will need to design interventions aimed at changing both the explicit 
and implicit attitudes of younger children to produce the type of 
behavioural change that we need to combat global warming in any sort of 













Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Climate change and its challenges 
The scientific evidence that our climate is changing is now 
abundantly clear (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change, IPCC, 
2015).  Indeed, it has been pointed out by many climate scientists (and a 
diverse range of social commentators) that it is rare to see this degree of 
scientific consensus on anything (see Stocker et al., 2013).  There is also 
a growing consensus amongst climate scientists that human beings have 
played a significant role in this change in our climate through their 
patterns of behaviour (Cook et al., 2016).  The contribution of human 
activity to climate change has been highlighted many times over the past 
decade, including in the influential Stern review (2006) led by Lord Stern 
and conducted at the bequest of the U.K. government.  Stern’s language 
was, in many ways, apocalyptic: ‘Climate change threatens the basic 
elements of life for people around the world’ (p.vi).  He continued ‘A rise 
in global temperature will have: severe and widespread impacts, major 
risks to global food production, and more extreme fluctuations in weather, 
including droughts, flooding and storms’.  However, he also made a very 
significant point - ‘Human activities are a major driver of this rapid 
change in our climate…particularly patterns of consumption and energy 
use, driven by consumer demand for higher standards of living’.  In other 
words, we as consumers are playing a major role in the creation of this 
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problem, and it really is a problem of our own making.  Of course, once 
you accept this forceful and well-reasoned scientific argument, then if we 
are part of the problem, we must be part of the solution.  This point has 
not been lost on agencies like the United Nations and selected 
governments around the world.  This interdisciplinary thesis, spanning 
psychology, semiotics, media and, to some extent, sociology (with a 
detailed consideration of consumer habits) attempts to propose a way 
forward in dealing with this critical issue. 
Greenhouse gas emissions are affected by transportation and 
energy use, deforestation, changes to the patterns of land-use and, of 
course, consumer behaviour (IPCC, 2014).  As a consequence of climate 
change, weather conditions are becoming much more adverse.  There has 
been an increase in global temperature (Karl et al., 2015), the frequency 
of heat waves has increased in large parts of Europe (Haines, Kovats, 
Campbell-Lendrum & Corvalan, 2006), which are expected to become 
even more intense and more frequent in the coming years (Tobias & Diaz, 
2014).  Fourteen out of the sixteen hottest years in the U.K. occurred 
between 2000 and 2015.  Indeed, 2016 is reported as being the hottest year 
globally on record (The Guardian, 2017; World Meteorological 
Organisation, 2017).  By 2040 it is expected that heat waves will become 
the norm in the U.K., which will have a detrimental effect on mortality 
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rates - currently, 2000 people die per year in the U.K. alone due to heat-
related illnesses (see the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment Synthesis 
Report, 2016).  As well as increased temperatures, we are also 
experiencing heavier and prolonged periods of rainfall.  Indeed, it is 
predicted that extreme wet winters and severe floods are more likely to 
occur in the coming years (Pal et al., 2013; Schaller et al., 2016).  Natural 
disasters from these extreme weather condition are causing devastation 
worldwide (Fischer & Knuttie, 2014) and it is predicted that they are to 
become ‘the new normal’ (Bowen, 2015). 
Climate change is also causing irreversible change to coastlines.  
According to the recent UK Climate Change Risk Assessment (2016), 
melting ice glaciers and the increase in flooding has already significantly 
changed coastlines globally, and this change is expected to continue as a 
result of the changing climate.  Since the beginning of the 20th Century, 
the average sea level has risen by approximately 19cm, and since the 
1990s the rise in sea level has accelerated to a yearly rate of more than 
3mm (UK Climate Change Risk Assessment, 2016; IPCC, 2014).  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report (IPCC, 
2014) concluded that human factors are, in fact, the major driver of this 
rapid change in our climate.  These factors include the burning of fossil 
fuel for electricity and the running of cars, releasing carbon dioxide into 
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the air which, in turn, traps heat, ‘Human activities have changed and 
continue to change the Earth’s surface and atmospheric composition.  
Some of these changes have a direct or indirect impact on the energy 
balance of the Earth and are thus drivers of climate change’ (IPCC, 2013, 
p.18).   
It has, in reality, been clear for some time that human beings have 
played a major role in climate change, long before the Stern report, as 
documented by the various IPCC reports (IPCC 1990; 1996; 2001; 2007; 
2013; 2014).  But what has changed is that the level of scientific certainty 
has increased.  On the basis of the evidence available prior to 2008, 
Walker and King concluded that it was already clear that human beings 
were responsible for these dramatic changes.  They therefore argued that 
human beings needed to change their behaviour in order to ameliorate 
these effects ‘it’s as individuals that we live our lives and make our 
choices…. Now we will have to adapt our choices to new realities of the 
twenty-first century (2008, p.238).  The World Bank’s Annual World 
Development Report also recommended in 2010 that, ‘We must act now, 
because what we do today determines both the climate of tomorrow and 




1.2. Climate change campaigns and their limitations 
Despite these clear messages from influential organisations like 
the World Bank, the IPCC and world-leading academics, there seems to 
be very little by way of actual behaviour change on the part of the 
population as a whole.  However, some obvious things have changed; for 
example, carrier bag usage in U.K. supermarkets has reduced by 85% 
since the government introduced the 5 pence charge (The Guardian, 
2016).  The amount of electricity used for home lighting fell by 22% 
between 2000 and 2012 as more people began to use energy efficient 
lightbulbs in their homes (Boardman, 2014).  Nearly half of U.K. 
households use recycling bins provided by local councils to dispose of 
their waste, and the disposing of glass, plastic drinks cartons, aerosols and 
batteries in the general waste bin is significantly decreasing year on year 
(WRAP, 2016).  Indeed, according to the European Environment Agency 
(2013), recycling rates in the U.K. increased by 26.5% between 2001 and 
2010, which was faster than any other country in Europe.  This is largely 
due to local councils making it easier for residents to recycle their waste 
by issuing households with leaflets informing occupants of the recycling 
arrangements in the area, providing easy to access recycling bins and even 
offering reward schemes for those who do recycle (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2015).  But there are a lot of 
additional things that people could easily do that would take relatively 
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small effort, for example, buying local produce, walking to school instead 
of driving, turning down or reducing their use of heating.  Or, there are 
larger changes that people could make such as taking a holiday in the U.K. 
rather than flying abroad, installing solar panels on their houses or buying 
hybrid cars.  But people do not seem to be willing to make these changes 
(see Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014) - even the small ones, which themselves 
could have a very significant impact, leading to changes of a much larger 
magnitude, an effect known as ‘the spillover effect’ (see Thøgersen & 
Ölander, 2003).  For example, Thøgersen and Crompton (2009) explain 
that ‘If governments and environmental organisations are to persist in 
campaigning for individuals to adopt behaviour with small environmental 
impacts, at a time when fundamental changes in behaviour are urgently 
needed, this must be because there are good grounds to expect that these 
simple behavioural changes will lead to more far-reaching and 
environmentally significant changes’ (2009, p.143).  But the difficulty 
seems to lie in getting the message across to the general public and 
persuading them that it is possible to make a difference of the right 
magnitude by adjusting their own personal behaviour even in small ways.  
Indeed, the Department for Energy Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) report 
that ‘Some people think that climate change is confusing and is a problem 
for the future, not now.  They find it difficult to see how it relates to them 
personally, or realise that such a big problem can be affected by individual 
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action’ (2007, p.16).  Furthermore, although there is an increase in 
awareness of climate change (Capstick, Whitmarsh, Wouter Poortinga, 
Pidgeon & Upham, 2015) most people feel that climate change is not a 
direct threat to them personally (Lorenzonia, Nicholson-Coleb & 
Whitmarsh, 2007; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006).  Lorenzonia et al. (2007) 
report that ‘In the U.K., 52% of people believe that climate change will 
have ‘little’ or ‘no effect’ on them personally (BBC, 2004; see also 
Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Hillman, 1998).  The Energy Savings Trust 
(2004) found that 85% of U.K. residents believe the effects of climate 
change will not be seen for decades’ (Lorenzonia et al., 2007, p.447). 
The media, of course, plays a central role in getting such messages 
across to a general audience, and the way in which climate change is 
constructed and ‘framed’ in any media campaign can enhance the public’s 
knowledge, attitude and understanding (e.g. Weingart, Engels & 
Pansegrau, 2000; Stamm, Clark & Eblacas, 2000; Sampei & Aoyagi-Usui, 
2009; Sharples, 2010) with potential knock-on effects for behaviour.  The 
concept of ‘framing’ in the mass media is basically the construction of a 
whole series of ideas represented in a coherent way so that the audience 
will be able to identify and form an integrated opinion and, in turn, act 
upon this in the most appropriate way.  Framing is ‘a way of organizing 
ideas and defining a phenomenon in order to resonate with people’s core 
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values and assumptions’ (O’Neill, Hulme, Turnpenny & Screen, 2010, 
p.997). 
There have been a whole series of government campaigns with the 
single intention of promoting pro-environmental behaviour by changing 
the public’s perception of climate change (which, in turn, was anticipated 
to change their attitude and behaviour).  These particular campaigns were 
based on the assumption that the public would simply need more 
information in order to act in a pro-environmental way.  Campaigns have 
used leaflets, billboards, television commercials and newspapers.  One 
important example of such a campaign was ‘Act On CO2’, which was 
launched in 2007.  The campaign introduced a series of magazine and 
television adverts to impact upon public awareness, these were designed 
to get people to reduce their carbon footprint through home energy use 
e.g. switching off appliances, installing low energy light bulbs, fitting the 
correct amount and type of insulation etc.  These early adverts aimed to 
encourage individuals to do their bit by tying in pro-environmental 
behaviour with saving money.  For example, one particular advert 
included the caption ‘Simple actions reduce both fuel bills and CO2 
emissions.  Making your home as energy efficient as possible could save 
you over three hundred pounds a year.  Save money, save energy…’ (Act 
On CO2, 2007).  Gatersleben and Vlek (1998) emphasise that in order to 
engage the public in pro-environmental behaviour and environmentally 
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friendly lifestyles, products need to be readily available as well as 
financially desirable.  Sir Terry Leahy, the former CEO of Tesco also 
regarded money saving and price as an important factor when it came to 
sustainable lifestyles.  He vowed to make green choices affordable and 
maintained that ‘we must empower everyone - not just the enlightened or 
the affluent’ (Leahy, 2007).  
However, in 2010, Act On CO2 launched a ‘Bedtime Story’ advert, 
which came in for some staunch criticism from a variety of sources 
including the Climate Change Communication Advisory Group and the 
general public (see Corner & Randall, 2011).  The advert portrays a father 
reading a bedtime story to his daughter about the seriousness of climate 
change, emphasising the implications and consequences of climate 
change for the next generation (see Figure 1.1).  The daughter then asks if 
there is going to be a happy ending to the story.  The advert ends with a 
voiceover telling the audience that ‘it is up to us how the story ends’ 
emphasising that the future of the planet is now down to the viewer.  The 
message is essentially that we are responsible for what is going to happen 
both in the story and in real life.  However, the viewers thought that this 
particular campaign was inappropriate and that children should not be 
allowed to watch the commercial.  It was criticised for not communicating 
the message effectively, for being too negative and for not offering a 
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support intervention to break down the barriers that allow people to adopt 
a new low carbon lifestyle.  It had what psychologists call ‘low response 
efficacy’ (see the International Global Action Plan, 2010).  Response 
efficacy refers to the belief that the behaviour advocated will actually 
make a difference to the proposed threat and a low response efficacy 
means that you do not think that the behaviour will make a difference to 
the proposed threat (a more detailed description is provided later in this 
section).  The campaign was also heavily criticized for using fear to 
promote change that some claimed ‘was not supported by the available 
empirical evidence’ (Corner & Randall, 2011).  The commercial was 
subsequently moved to after the 9 o’clock water shed. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Screen grab of the ‘Bedtime Story’ Act On CO2 campaign. 
 
 
Another magazine campaign, again commissioned by ‘Act On 
CO2’, parodied certain nursery rhymes, illustrating them with doomed 
13 
 
images to portray the negative effects of climate change.  One particular 
advert showed three men in a bath tub floating in water surrounded by 
houses and cars which were partially submerged under the water with the 
words ‘Rub a dub dub, three men in a tub, a necessary course of action 
due to flash flooding caused by climate change’.  The text then continued 
‘Climate change is happening.  Temperatures and sea levels are rising.  
Extreme weather events such as storms, floods and heat waves will 
become more frequent and intense.  If we carry on at this rate, life in 25 
years could be very different’ (see Figure 1.2).  A second magazine advert 
showed a young boy and girl at the top of a hill looking down a water well 
searching for water, which was not there, with the words ‘Jack and Jill 
could not fetch a pail of water because extreme weather due to climate 
change had caused a drought’ (see Figure 1.3).  Both adverts warned that 
‘it’s our children who’ll really pay the price of climate change’.  However, 
these adverts were banned by the Advertising Standards Agency because 
the wording was too strong for children and they were frightening them.  
They stated that the adverts ‘should have been phrased more tentatively’ 
and advised that they ‘should not appear again in their current form’ 
(Advertising Standards Agency, 2010).  It is unclear whether these 







So what does it take for an advert to be effective without offending 
the public?  Why are fear and shock tactics appropriate for some 
campaigns and not for others?  They clearly have been used successfully 
in some campaigns in other domains, including smoking.  For example, 
in 2004 a £4m anti-smoking campaign was launched across the U.K. using 
various advertising mediums.  The campaign used strong imagery 
depicting fat oozing out of a smoker's artery.  This was one of the British 
Heart Foundation's most successful campaigns to date.  The adverts, 
showing a cigarette which is used to represent a smoker’s artery with the 
words ‘Give up before you clog up’, appeared in magazines, newspapers, 
on television and on billboards across the country in a bid to make 




smokers aware of the danger of cigarettes.  In the first month of the 
campaign a total of 10,000 people called the charity's smoking health line 
and a further 62,000 visited its website in search of tips to give up smoking 
and a total of 14,000 people gave up smoking as a result of this (very 
visual) campaign. The Department of Health brought out another hard-
hitting anti-smoking shock campaign in 2012.  This time the campaign 
used dramatic imagery of tumours growing on cigarettes as they were 
being smoked (see Figure 1.4).  The message behind this campaign was 
that ‘Every 15 cigarettes you smoke cause a mutation that can become 
cancer’.  This campaign helped reduce smoking rates in the U.K. to their 
lowest level of 18.4% (Department of Health, 2014).  So it would seem 
that it is acceptable (and effective) to scare people into changing smoking 
habits, and campaigns like these do actually have the desired end result in 
that they encourage people to stop smoking.  But when it comes to climate 
change the advertising companies receive numerous complaints about 
their campaign forcing them to change it.  Perhaps the reason for this is 
because people know how to change their behaviour when it comes to 
warnings about smoking and health (they ‘simply’ need to stop smoking), 
but when it comes to climate change it is significantly more complicated 
at the individual level.  People do not know what they personally have to 
do to save the planet or to prevent climate change.  It is not as obvious and 
people do not see the immediate benefits or the immediate threat of 
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climate change.  Sundblad, Biel and Gärling (2007) point out that if 
messages regarding climate change included the risk to personal health, 
people would be more motivated to seek out information and perhaps be 
more motivated to engage in pro-environmental behaviour.  However, 
they also acknowledge that there is a very low understanding of health 
related risks connected to climate change amongst the public. 
 
 




So how can we create a successful campaign to engage the 
audience and bring about a positive change in behaviour?  A successful 
campaign needs to have three major components if it is to effectively instil 
an appropriate response (Witte & Allen, 2000).  The first major 
component is the depiction of a real life threat.  For example, the portrayal 
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of the devastating effects of climate change, or the example of the tumours 
caused by smoking.  The campaign needs to convey successfully the 
severity of the threat to the individual and it needs to be apparent and 
obvious for the individual to understand why they personally will be 
affected (van der Linden, Maibach & Leiserowitz, 2015; Witte, 1992, 
1998).  Secondly, it needs to provoke an emotional response within the 
individual, and the danger posed to them needs to be evident because 
emotion often precedes and directs action (Damasio, 1994).  The third 
component is that there needs to be a belief amongst the audience that 
something can be done about the problem and that they must be convinced 
that their responses will be effective in the resolution of the problem.  In 
other words, there needs to be perceived ‘response-efficacy’ and ‘self-
efficacy’ in order for a campaign to be successful (Witte, 1992; Rogers, 
1983).  ‘Response efficacy’ relates to a person's beliefs as to whether the 
recommended action steps will actually avoid or negate the threat.  ‘Self-
efficacy’ refers to beliefs about one’s ability to carry out activities in 
question.  In other words, the individual needs to believe that the proposed 
steps will successfully deal with the threat and they then need to believe 
that they are capable of carrying out that particular response.  ‘People need 
to be able to feel that they can do something about the problem and, that 
it is worth doing something’ (Howell, 2011, p.3).  It is also important to 
avoid maladaptive behaviour such as ‘denial’, ‘withdrawal’, ‘avoidance’ 
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etc. (see Witte, 1992).  In order to avoid such behaviours, threat and fear 
campaigns need to include high-efficacy messages including information 
and advice about ways in which the public should change their behaviour 
in order to avoid the actual threat posed - this component seemed to be 
missing from the Act On CO2 campaign (Lewis, Watson & White, 2010; 
Moser & Dilling, 2004; Witte & Allen, 2000).  The Protection Motivation 
Theory (Rogers, 1975) suggests that behaviour change on a personal level 
will only take place when people are confident that their actual specific 
behaviour will reduce the particular threat.   
However, climate change campaigns to date may have gone wrong 
on a number of different levels. Shanahan (2007) argues that framing 
climate change in such a negative way could prove extremely 
disempowering.  For example, the portrayal of Jack and Jill not able to 
find water due to the drought caused by climate change, and the example 
of three men in a tub floating in water surrounded by submerged houses 
and cars due to a flash flood, do not give us a positive image of what the 
future could hold for our planet.  They are only reinforcing the negative 
effects of climate change and giving us a glimpse of what a negative future 
might be like.  There is also no attempt to provide ideas of how to go about 
making positive changes.  This is a depressing and de-motivating outlook.  
Spence and Pidgeon (2010) suggest that framing climate change in a 
positive way as opposed to focusing on the negative aspects encourages 
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positive pro-environmental behaviour.  In addition, presenting examples 
of the positive outcomes of engaging in pro-environmental behaviour, 
rather than presenting negative consequences of not engaging in pro-
environmental behaviour, will encourage people to start making the small 
changes that are necessary.  Morton, Rabinovich, Marshall and 
Bretschneider (2011) found that, compared to negative framing, positive 
framing evoked an increased intention to act in a more sustainable way 
even when there was a higher uncertainty about the outcome of climate 
change. 
So clearly there are important issues to consider when planning a 
campaign designed to change behaviour with respect to climate change.  
One such issue that we have not yet considered is the ‘level’ at which we 
should aim the campaign.  Should the campaign be aimed at the country 
as a whole, specific socio-economic groups or ‘communities’ (either 
virtual - identified in terms of shared values, or real - local councils, 
villages) but more focussed than a national campaign, for example, in 
terms of the media they consume?  Then there is the issue of the level (or 
granularity) of the recommended actions.  Should this be aimed at 
countries (high carbon taxes, transport infrastructure, a levy for plastic 
bags), communities (car share, local public transport, local congestion 
taxes), families (meat free Fridays, green points for shopping) or 
individuals, with their specific everyday choices?   
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1.3.  Some core psychological issues 
1.3.1. Psychological salience  
So if we assume that behaviour change in this area is urgently 
required and that this will necessitate a concerted campaign, one of the 
first questions we have to ask is at which of these levels such campaigns 
should operate?  For example, supermarkets have tried to promote more 
sustainable lifestyles through a variety of initiatives aimed at the 
behaviour of the individual consumer as well as family groups.  Tesco was 
one of the earliest major retailers in the U.K. to embrace the ‘green 
movement’ and spent millions on labelling their products with carbon 
footprint information to guide individual consumer choice.  In 2007, the 
former CEO of Tesco, Sir Terry Leahy, said that there had to be a 
‘revolution in green consumption’.  He pledged that with the help of ‘The 
Carbon Trust’, Tesco would put carbon labels on 70,000 of their own 
brand products.  So, aiming their new campaign at individual consumers, 
Tesco proceeded to mark many of their own brand products with a carbon 
footprint label.  The label included a symbol of a black footprint in which 
the carbon value of the particular item was embedded, alongside it was a 
small box of information about what exactly had been calculated e.g. ‘The 
carbon footprint of this product is the total carbon dioxide (CO2) and other 
greenhouse gases emitted during its life, including production, use and 
disposal’ and then another box saying ‘We have committed to reduce this 
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carbon footprint’.  However, Tesco made many psychological 
assumptions when creating this campaign, which do need to be examined. 
Firstly, they assumed that the campaign should target the 
individual (or the family unit).  Secondly, they assumed that they could 
gain some insight into the individual consumer, based on traditional 
market research, to make the campaign effective.  Indeed, the whole 
initiative was premised on the assumption that they could ‘read’ 
consumers well enough to make this campaign work.  Thirdly, they 
assumed that they could use traditional self-report attitudinal measures, as 
a core element of this market research, to allow them to do this.  Fourthly, 
they assumed that these self-report attitudinal measures could tell, with 
some level of accuracy, that consumers had the right underlying ‘attitude’ 
(or ‘predisposition to act’, Allport, 1935) to behave in a specific pro-
environmental way and, therefore, that they were ready to change their 
behaviour in this regard.  Fifthly, they assumed that consumers understood 
what the value of carbon footprint meant (e.g. if the value was particularly 
high or low and what the implications of that were).  Sixthly, they assumed 
that in any icons used to communicate carbon footprint (in addition to the 
numerical values included), like black carbon footprints, would 
communicate effectively to consumers and, of course, that consumers 
would pay sufficient visual attention to these carbon labels in real time, 
so that they could impact on choice.  Many of these assumptions, however, 
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can be seriously questioned.  For example, let us consider the assumption 
about carbon labels and visual attention.  Tesco clearly assumed that these 
labels would have the same influence on consumer behaviour as calorie 
and fat content labels did, which they had previously introduced (Leahy, 
2007).  But consumers have a higher degree of knowledge about calories 
and fat content and these labels are much more emotionally salient to the 
consumer (see Beattie, 2012).  Measures of calories and fat have an 
obvious effect on our bodies and people know that if they eat high calorie 
foods that they will gain weight and, in some cases, feel unhealthy in the 
days following.  They also know that by eating fatty foods, they will be 
increasing their risk of serious health issues such as heart attacks, high 
cholesterol or obesity.  We have also been given information about our 
required Guideline Daily Amount (GDA) and are advised to avoid 
exceeding this GDA if we want to stay healthy.  But when it comes to 
carbon footprint labels, there are no readily available populist guidelines 
as to what should be considered ‘high’ or ‘low’ for the average consumer.  
There are no recommended daily or weekly amounts of carbon that we 
should not exceed and there are no immediate health risks that we are 
faced with if we do happen to exceed this amount.  This makes carbon 
footprint a clearly more problematic concept to communicate effectively.   
In the first study of its kind, in terms of visual attention to carbon 
footprint, Beattie, McGuire and Sale (2010) used eye-tracking to examine 
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participants’ eye gaze whilst viewing a variety of products (a light bulb, 
orange juice and detergent), each with a carbon label clearly displayed on 
the back of the product.  Each product was photographed against a matt 
black background (see Figure 1.5, 1.6 ,1.7, 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10) with the 
front and back in a single shot, represented as one image.  There were two 
images per product, for example, in the case of the light bulb, one image 
displayed the front of bulb to the right, back of bulb to the left - view 1; 
another image displayed the front of the bulb to the left, back of the bulb 
to the right - view 2, in order to control for natural biases in patterns of 
left-right looking.  The study found that the carbon label was the focus of 
the first fixation (defined as the first 200 ms gaze fixation, in other words 
5 consecutive 40 ms fixations), in only 7% of all cases.  In other words, 
participants were not directing their attention to this label in the first 
instance.  It was also found that participants were not looking at the label 
in the first 5 seconds, which is accepted as the critical time frame when it 
comes to attention and choice in supermarket shopping (see Louw & 
Kimber, 2007; Young, 2004).  Participants spent more time fixating on 
the carbon footprint of the light bulb than any of the other products tested, 
and they spent longer focusing on the carbon footprint in this one isolated 
case than any other point of interest, e.g. the product image, the wattage, 
the product name etc. However, in the case of the orange juice, 
participants spent very little time fixating on the carbon footprint and more 
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time fixating on price, product image and the fact that the oranges were 
‘picked and processed within 24 hours’. A similar pattern emerged in the 
case of the detergent, where participants spent least time looking at the 
carbon footprint, focusing instead on the product instructions, the fact that 
it was dermatologically tested and also that you could wash at 30 degrees 
with this product.  In terms of the sequential order of where participants 
looked at the products - in only 4 out of the 60 cases (10 participants x 6 
slides) did participants focus first on the carbon footprint.  None of the 
participants focused on the accompanying carbon footprint information 
first.  So probably, due to a lack of consumer awareness and knowledge, 
people were not paying attention to carbon footprint information on these 
labels. Tesco discontinued the practice of carbon labelling in 2012 
(Bennett, 2015).  They blamed market pressures and the fact that other 
retailers had not followed their example, however, lack of psychological 











   
Figure 1.5: Light bulb - view 1.                 Figure 1.6: Light bulb - view 2. 
 
   
Figure1.7: Orange juice - view 1.           Figure 1.8: Orange juice - view 2. 





Figure 1.9: Detergent - view 1.              Figure 1.10: Detergent - view 2. 
(Figures 1.5 – 1.10: Images of products used in the eye-tracking study1) 
 
                                            




When it comes to the issue of understanding the individual 
consumer, there is potentially an even more critical issue centring on the 
basic concept of attitudes, which formed the intellectual bedrock of the 
Tesco campaign.  When Leahy (2007) announced that, ‘The green 
movement must become a mass movement in green consumption’ and that 
‘we must empower everyone - not just the enlightened or the affluent’, he 
clearly believed that the market was ready for this green consumer 
‘revolution’.  His proposed solution was to break down the barriers of 
price and information.  In other words, he was arguing, from a marketing 
and business point of view, that we must make green choices affordable 
and give the consumer the right information in the supermarket itself to 
make informed decisions to produce a ‘revolutionary’ change in our 
patterns of consumption.  His belief was shaped by numerous market 
research campaigns, leading him to the conclusion that ‘Customers want 
to do more in the fight against climate change if only we can make it easier 
and more affordable’.  These market research surveys had reported that 
‘70% of people agree that if there is no change in the world, we will soon 
experience a major environmental crisis’ and ‘78% of people say that they 
are prepared to change their behaviour to help limit climate change’ 
(Downing & Ballantyne, 2007).  These findings were being reported very 
consistently.  Thus, the British Social Attitudes survey (2012) revealed 
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that 76% of people ‘believe climate change is happening and that humans 
are, at least partly, responsible’.  More recently, the Department of Energy 
and Climate Change (2015) in the U.K. said that 66% of people ‘reported 
feeling very or fairly concerned about climate change’ based on a survey 
using 1,981 face-to-face home interviews.  The Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) have argued, like Leahy, 
that ‘Policy action needs to be rooted in understanding and awareness of 
consumer behaviour’ (2008, p. 22).  Like Leahy, they concluded that 
‘Many people are willing to do more to limit their environmental impact, 
they have a much lower level of understanding about what they can do 
and what would make a difference’ (2008, p.28).  In both cases with Leahy 
and with Defra this was based solely on self-reports of attitudes that had 
essentially not changed in terms of their measurement since the 1930s 
with Gordon Allport, when he borrowed the techniques of Rensis Likert 
(hence the ‘Likert’ Scale).  Self-reported attitudes, of course, are based on 
the assumptions that we know what our attitude is (that is to say it is 
conscious), that we can report it when required, and we do this with little 
or no modification due to any possible constraints of social desirability 
(where most people know that ‘green is good’).  Unfortunately, each of 
these assumptions can be seriously questioned, and it has been suggested 
that much of our attitudes are unconscious, not reportable and that self-
reported attitudes are subject to major social desirability issues (see 
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Beattie, 2010; 2013).  Psychologists often refer to these self-reported 
attitudes as ‘explicit’ attitudes, and refer to those attitudes held 
unconsciously as ‘implicit’ attitudes.  How they relate, either together or 
separately, and how they influence behaviour is a major focus of the 
present PhD.    
Tesco had, of course, felt that they were being psychologically 
sophisticated basing their approach to sustainability on the available 
empirical evidence about the ‘characteristics’ of individuals, in particular, 
their attitudes and values.  They did not seem to realise that without a 
consideration of core psychological issues, like motivation, emotion, 
values and attitudes, campaigns like carbon labelling were designed to fail 
from the very beginning.  In other words, such campaigns might fail 
because of a failure to consider important psychological variables within 
the individual.  Of course, this does place considerable emphasis on the 
individual as the primary site for research in this domain and means that 
we will have to come to terms with some of these complex psychological 
issues.  In the words of the World Development Report (2010) 
‘Individuals, as citizens and consumers, will determine the planet’s future.  
Although an increasing number of people know about climate change and 
believe action is needed, too few make it a priority, and too many fail to 
act when they have the opportunity’ (World Development Report, 2010, 
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p. xxi).  However, when there are so many ways in which people could 
help by modifying their behaviour, why are the vast majority of people 
not making it their main concern?  Moreover, what does this tell us about 
our psychological appraisals of readiness to change?  For example, in a 
survey conducted across 17 countries worldwide, Britain was ranked third 
from bottom when it came to the general public’s concern about climate 
change.  The survey, which questioned over 18,000 people revealed that 
Britain held a shared concern of just 10.8% closely followed by the USA 
(9.2%) and Saudi Arabia with just 5.7% of respondents listing it as their 
main concern (YouGovUK, 2016).  In another U.K. survey completed by 
3600 individuals, it was reported that 75% of respondents acknowledged 
that ‘using a car less’ and ‘flying less’ would have a ‘medium or major 
impact’ on the reduction of carbon emissions.  Yet, in the same survey, it 
was reported that less than a quarter of the respondents believed that 
people are willing to take appropriate action to reduce their personal 
carbon footprint (Defra, 2007). 
Market research surveys have suggested for years that people do 
have the right underlying attitudes to the environment, and that people are 
now ready to act in more sustainable ways, as we have seen (Downing & 
Ballantyne, 2007).  Other surveys have reported that ‘84% say retailers 
should do more to reduce the impact of production and transportation of 
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their products on climate change’ (Ipsos MORI, 2008).  Another reported 
that ‘69% of consumers in China are willing to change their lifestyle to 
help reduce climate change’ (see also Beattie, 2010).  However, the focus 
of this market research throughout is exclusively on explicit attitudes, 
which unfortunately may be biased (‘green’ consumer choices are after all 
generally perceived as ‘considerate’ and ‘caring’, see Beattie, 2010, p.36), 
and may not be reliable measures of our actual thoughts and values.  None 
of these market research surveys have attempted to measure or gauge 
‘implicit’ attitudes. 
However, Beattie (2010) pointed out that there is nothing in 
Allport’s formal definition of an attitude (namely, ‘a learned 
predisposition to think, feel and behave towards a person, or object, in a 
particular way’) that actually excludes an unconscious, implicit 
component.  Attitudes influence and direct our beliefs and behaviour 
(Eiser & van der Pligt, 2015); they are formed as a result of experience 
and learning (Fazio & Zanna, 1981).  There is no a priori reason (one 
could argue) as to why this should all be conscious and open to 
introspection.  Some psychologists now argue that much of our behaviour 
is actually guided by these implicit rather than explicit attitudes (Friese, 
Hofmann & Wänke, 2008).  They also argue that measuring implicit 
attitudes is likely to have greater predictive validity in terms of 
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spontaneous behaviour, like much of everyday shopping behaviour, or 
behaviour that is subject to social desirability, than explicit attitudes 
(Beattie, 2010; 2012; Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner, 2002; Dovidio, 
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson & Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton 
& Williams, 1995).  These implicit attitudes are thought to operate 
subconsciously and therefore are not reportable in the normal way and 
may well not relate closely to the component, which is available to 
conscious reflection (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  It has also been posited 
that implicit attitudes develop slowly over a period of time (Rydell & 
McConnell, 2006) and need to be measured in different ways to explicit 
attitudes (Brunel, Tietje & Greenwald, 2004).  However, these implicit 
attitudes may have a major impact on the everyday behaviour of 
consumers in a range of contexts.  There is some evidence that implicit 
attitude are harder to change than explicit attitudes (Bohner & Dickel, 
2011) because they are formed more gradually over time.  Explicit 
attitudes, on the other hand, are actually formed through consciously 
available information (Vogel & Wänke, 2016) and may change relatively 
quickly according to many theorists (see Visser & Cooper, 2003, for a 
review of the literature on attitude change).  Research has shown that there 
may well be a major ‘dissociation’ between implicit and explicit attitudes 
with little or no correlation between the two measures (Beattie, 2010; 
Beattie, 2013; Rudman, 2004).   
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In terms of measurement, Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz 
(1998) introduced a computerised classification task known as the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) to measure implicit attitudes.  This test 
has now been widely acknowledged as a reliable and valid measure of 
implicit attitudes towards a given target concept.  The basic premise 
behind the IAT is that when categorising items into two sets of paired 
concepts (for example, ‘Flower’ and ‘Insect’, ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’), if the 
paired concepts are strongly associated in the mind (e.g. ‘Flower’ and 
‘Good’ as opposed to ‘Insect’ and ‘Good’), then participants should be 
able to categorise the stimuli (e.g. names of flowers) faster (and with 
fewer errors) into these combined sets (‘Flower’/ ‘Good’) than if the 
paired concepts are not strongly associated (e.g. ‘Flower’/ ‘Bad’).  In this 
classic research, Greenwald et al. (1998) tested 32 participants’ implicit 
attitudes towards flowers and insects.  They used words representing the 
names of 25 flowers including ‘daisy’, ‘marigold’, ‘poppy’ and ‘tulip’, 25 
insect names such as ‘cockroach’, ‘wasp’, ‘mosquito’ and ‘flee’, 25 
pleasant words including ‘love’, ‘peace’, ‘cheer’ and ‘happy’ and 25 
unpleasant words such as ‘filth’, ‘grief’, ‘death’ and ‘evil’.  They found 
that participants performed faster when the target concept ‘Flower’ was 
paired with ‘Pleasant’ and the target concept ‘Insect’ was paired with 
‘Unpleasant’.  In other words, participants held a stronger implicit 
preference to flowers over insects.  In the second experiment of this set, 
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Greenwald et al. tested participants’ implicit attitudes to ‘Musical 
Instruments’ and ‘Weapons’.  As before, they used 25 words as stimuli to 
represent musical instrument names including ‘cello’, ‘guitar’, ‘drum’ and 
‘piano’ and 25 words to represent the names of weapons including ‘knife’, 
‘sword’, ‘pistol’ and ‘gun’.  The pleasant and unpleasant words were 
identical to the words used in the previous IAT mentioned in the study 
above.  Their results revealed that participants found it easier to categorise 
the instrument words when the target concept ‘Musical Instruments’ was 
paired with ‘Pleasant’ and weapon words when the target concept 
‘Weapons’ was paired with ‘Unpleasant’.  Thus indicating a stronger 
implicit preference towards musical instruments over weapons.  These 
results were perhaps not surprising considering the expected universal 
associations to these particular target concepts. 
Greenwald et al. then expanded this research to look at implicit 
attitudes towards Korean Americans and Japanese Americans.  This was 
their third study of this particular set.  Here they used both Korean 
American participants and Japanese American participants.  In this IAT, 
as well as using 25 pleasant words (‘love’ etc.) and 25 unpleasant words 
(‘filth’ etc.) as in the previous IATs, they used Korean names and 
Japanese names (matched in length).  They found that the Korean 
participants were quicker at sorting the Korean names into the correct 
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category when the target concept ‘Korean’ was paired with ‘Pleasant’, the 
Japanese participants, on the other hand, were quicker at sorting the 
Japanese names into the correct category when the target concept 
‘Japanese’ was paired with ‘Pleasant’.  The final experiment of this set 
tested 26 White American students’ implicit attitudes towards White and 
Black Americans.  They used 50 White American names, 25 male names 
including ‘Brandon’, ‘Ed’, and ‘Ged’ and 25 female names including 
‘Betsy’, ‘Katy’ and ‘Nancy’.  They also used 50 Black American names, 
25 of which were male including ‘Darnell’, ‘Lamar’ and ‘Malik’ and 25 
were female names ‘Ebony’, ‘Latisha’ and ‘Tawanda’.  The results 
revealed that this set of White Americans responded quicker when 
‘White’ was paired with ‘Pleasant’ than when ‘Black’ was paired with 
‘Pleasant’ and therefore held more positive implicit attitudes to White 
sounding names than Black sounding names.  This implicit bias can affect 
shortlisting decisions for jobs (Beattie, 2013) and may help explain racial 
and ethnic inequalities in the job market (Beattie, Cohen & McGuire, 
2013; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Segrest-Purkiss, Perrewé, Gillespie, 
Myers & Ferris, 2006; Son Hing, Chung-Yan, Hamilton & Zanna, 2008).  
1.3.3. Implicit attitudes and attitude change 
One important study that used the IAT in the assessment of 
implicit attitude change was carried out by Rydell, McConnell, Mackie 
and Strain (2006).  They had proposed that the implicit system and the 
35 
 
explicit system are sensitive to different types of information, and 
predicted that ‘implicit attitudes would be affected more by subliminally 
presented primes and that explicit attitudes would be affected by 
consciously accessible information’ (2006, p. 955).  In their experiment 
they told participants that they were going to be presented with 
information about a person named ‘Bob’ through a sequence of 
computerised learning trials.  Participants were seated in front of a 
computer monitor and asked to focus on a cross in the centre of the screen.  
After 200 milliseconds the cross was replaced by either a positive or 
negative word (depending which condition that they were in).  Each word 
appeared on the screen for 25 milliseconds and were subliminal primes 
e.g. love, party etc. (positive) or hate, death etc. (negative).  Immediately 
after the word appeared on the screen, a picture of Bob would replace it 
for 250 milliseconds.  This was classed as the priming phase.  Once the 
priming phase was completed, an image of Bob remained on the screen, 
in addition to this, information about Bob’s behaviour was also displayed 
supraliminally.  Participants were asked to press the appropriate response 
button dependent upon whether they believed that the behaviour was in 
keeping with Bob, or if they thought that it was uncharacteristic of Bob.  
Then for 5 seconds, participants received feedback reaffirming that this 
behaviour was indeed a characteristic of Bob.  Half of the participants in 
the first trial (time 1) were presented with 10 negative subliminal primes 
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but received positive supraliminal feedback about Bob’s behaviour.  
Whilst the other half of the participants were presented with subliminal 
positive primes, however they received negative supraliminal feedback 
about Bob’s behaviour.  This was then switched for the second trial (time 
2), so that participants who were presented with positive primes and 
negative feedback were now presented with negative primes and positive 
feedback and vice versa.  Explicit measures were taken after time 1 and 
then again after time 2, where participants were asked to rate how likeable 
Bob was on a scale of 1 (very unlikeable) to 9 (very likeable).  They were 
also asked to complete five 9-point differential scales describing Bob, a 
Feeling Thermometer and they were also asked to complete an IAT 
adapted to measure their implicit attitude towards Bob.  They completed 
the IAT and the explicit measures after time 1 and after time 2 to assess 
any changes in explicit and implicit attitudes.  The researchers  found that 
when participants were subliminally primed with negative words about 
Bob but received positive supraliminal feedback at time 1, and then 
primed with positive words at time 2 but received negative supraliminal 
feedback about Bob, participants’ implicit attitudes were more positive at 
time 2 compared to time 1 and their explicit attitudes were more negative 
at time 2 compared with time 1.  Similarly, when participants were 
subliminally primed with positive words about Bob and received negative 
supraliminal feedback at time 1 and then subliminally primed with 
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negative words at time 2 but received positive supraliminal feedback 
about Bob, participants’ implicit attitudes were more negative at time 2 
compared to time 1 and their explicit attitudes were more positive at time 
2 compared with time 1.  The results confirmed the hypothesis of Rydell 
et al. in that participants’ explicit attitudes ‘were formed and changed in 
response to consciously available information’ (2006, p.957) and that 
‘implicit attitudes were sensitive to associative information presented 
below conscious awareness’ (2006, p.957).  They concluded that implicit 
attitudes can be changed if information is accessible but only if it is below 
the level of conscious awareness.   
1.3.4. The possible origins of implicit attitudes 
The current theoretical understanding is that implicit attitudes 
have a different source and develop in different ways compared to explicit 
attitudes.  Rudman (2004) argued that implicit attitudes ‘stem from 
different sources and, therefore, should be conceptualized as distinct 
constructs’ (2004, p.79).  She maintains that implicit attitudes derive from 
past experiences which have been forgotten over time, whereas explicit 
attitudes are influenced by recent events and are therefore more accessible 
in terms of memory.  One example, which Rudman uses to illustrate this 
is smokers’ explicit and implicit attitudes towards smoking.  Rudman 
suggests that for the vast majority of people, their very first experiences 
of smoking are actually quite unpleasant - the taste of the cigarette, the 
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nausea, the cough and the bad breath (see Rudman & Heppen, 2001).  
However, as people become more used to smoking, they focus on, and 
therefore appreciate the more positive aspects of the whole experience - 
the relaxation, the bonding between smokers, the cool image instilled 
through years of advertising, the reduction in hunger pangs, (and its 
positive effects on weight control).  With this in mind, she argues that 
smokers should have implicit attitudes to smoking that are much more 
negative than their explicit attitudes and this is consistent with what the 
research demonstrates (Rudman & Heppen, 2001).   
Rudman also suggests that much of what happens in our early 
social environment, which is critical to the development of implicit 
attitudes, is pre-verbal and not acquired in the normal way using language 
and propositional reasoning.  She writes that ‘These lessons form the 
foundation on which later learning is built and may also serve as a non-
conscious source for related evaluations and actions’.  This was consistent 
with Rudman and Goodwin’s findings (2004) who investigated the 
relationship between gender related attitudes and ‘pre-verbal attachment 
to caregivers’.  They found that male and female participants who were 
brought up by their mothers held a more positive implicit attitude towards 
women than they did to men.  They also found that those participants who 
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held an implicit preference towards women, also implicitly preferred their 
mothers to their fathers.  
  Therefore, Rudman and others suggest that early experiences are 
crucial to the development of implicit attitudes.  However, she also 
maintains that this is not the whole story - also critical is the role of 
emotion.  Rudman writes that ‘implicit attitudes are more sensitive to 
affective experiences than are explicit attitudes’ (2004, p.80).  One 
example of this is our implicit attitude to people from different racial or 
ethnic backgrounds.  In this domain, our implicit attitudes seem to be 
associated with increased activation in the amygdala, which of course, is 
crucial to the control of emotion.  Fiske (2005) for example demonstrated 
that the amygdala, which works as the vigilance system of the human 
brain, responds more when faces from a different racial group to our own 
are presented on a computer screen compared to when faces from our own 
racial group are presented (see also Hart, Whalen, Shin, McInerney, 
Fischer & Rauch, 2000).  In the words of Fiske ‘the brain’s burglar alarm 
habituates faster to members of the in-group.  This differential amygdala 
response correlates with implicit evaluation of racial groups’ (2005, p.48).   
Rudman and her colleagues have also reviewed evidence which 
found that White people, who signed up for diversity training, displayed 
a reduced anti-Black bias and this was true for both explicit and implicit 
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attitudes.  However, the reduction in the negative implicit attitudes was 
connected to aspects of the emotional experience namely a reduction in 
fear, and an increased liking of the people from a different ethnic group.  
The reduction in negative explicit attitude, on the other hand, was related 
to knowledge-based phenomena, for example, an improved awareness of 
bias and a personal motivation to overcome possible prejudice.  On the 
basis of this and related evidence, Rudman concludes that implicit 
attitudes are more connected to emotional responses and therefore the 
changes in implicit attitudes require a certain amount of what has been 
called ‘emotional reconditioning’.  Her research showed that changes in 
explicit attitude are more to do with changes in cognitive and motivational 
factors.   
But Rudman says that if we are to really understand the 
development of implicit attitudes, it is not enough to just consider early 
experiences, even early pre-verbal experiences, but that we must consider 
the role of emotion in the development of implicit attitudes - we also need 
to look more broadly at the culture as a whole.  Rudman suggests that 
aspects of our culture and our language, the media portrayals of Black and 
White, for example, our literature, our newspapers, our TV news, our 
educational system, all of the things that contribute to our culture, play a 
role in the development of implicit attitudes to race.  In addition, what is 
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interesting about culture is that all citizens, regardless of their own race or 
ethnicity, are exposed to some common elements.  She says that this is the 
reason why both White and Black people show an anti-Black bias on 
implicit measures but do not do so on explicit measures.  Moreover, she 
says that this all makes considerable sense because in American culture, 
there is a cultural representation of Blacks that is not as positive as Whites, 
and this cultural representation has been internalised by people of 
different racial and ethnic backgrounds. 
This is a very contentious point, but she says it helps explain why 
Black people, regardless of how hard they try, cannot overcome this 
unconscious cultural bias against their own racial or ethnic groups.  
Beattie (2013) speculated about how specific aspects of the culture may 
contribute to this, even in the language that we use with some terms, which 
include the word ‘black’ (for example, ‘black sheep’, ‘black magic’, 
‘black mark’, ‘blackmail’).  These terms are much more negative than 
those terms which include the word ‘white’, (for example ‘white knight’, 
‘white lie’, ‘white witch’, etc. see Beattie, 2013, p. 186).  Beattie’s 
conclusion is that, although there does appear to be a slight tendency for 
‘black’ to be found in more expressions with negative connotations than 
‘white’, he queries how prevalent this is throughout the English language 
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as a whole and says that this really does need to be empirically 
determined.  
But in effect, what Rudman is saying is that the possible sources 
of influence on the development and trajectory of implicit attitudes are 
really quite diverse - from aspects of the most primitive parts of the human 
brain (the amygdala), through our very early experiences of which we 
have no memory, through to our broadest cultural understandings.  Of 
course, it could be that all three types of factors play some role in the 
development of implicit attitudes here.  Nevertheless, the most obvious 
implication of the Rudman review is that we need more research to detail 
how each of these factors can interact in the development of implicit 
attitudes in different domains.  The reason this is so urgent is that if we 
are hoping to change implicit attitudes then we will need a better 
understanding of where they come from in the first place.  
1.3.5. The Implicit Association Test and sustainability 
Few studies have attempted to measure implicit attitudes towards 
sustainability (but see Beattie & Sale, 2009; 2011; Vantomme, Geuens, 
De Houwer & De Pelsmacker, 2005; Richetin, Mattavelli & Perugini, 
2016).  Beattie and Sale (2009) used a sustainability IAT to measure 
implicit attitudes towards low and high carbon footprint products.  They 
found that, although most of their participants showed a relatively positive 
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implicit attitude to low carbon footprint items, when comparing these 
results to participants’ explicit attitudes (using a Likert Scale and a Feeling 
Thermometer) they found that there was no significant correlation 
between the explicit and implicit attitudinal measures.  In other words, the 
explicit and implicit attitudes appeared to be ‘dissociated’ and a 
significant proportion of individuals reported themselves as being much 
more green on the explicit measure than what resulted in their implicit 
scores.  These results are consistent with previous research comparing the 
two attitudinal measures.  Nosek and Hansen (2008) conducted a meta-
analysis of 81 studies and found that implicit attitudes and explicit 
attitudes were only moderately correlated (Hofmann, Gawronski, 
Gschwender, Le & Schmitt, 2005).  Another study by Nosek (2005) 
looked at the relationship between explicit and implicit attitudes in over 
50 domains.  He too found a low correlation between the two attitudinal 
measures varying from near to zero for some domains including attitudes 
to ‘thin’ and ‘fat’, to approximately 0.70 in other domains including ‘pro-
choice/pro-life’ attitudes.   
 Of course, when we consider issues to do with sustainability, 
social desirability is likely to be a major factor (see Beattie, 2010, p. 37) 
and explicit measures may not be reliable predictors of behaviour.  In 
these situations, the IAT could potentially be a much better predictor of 
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behaviour, especially when people are making quick and non-reflective 
decisions.  One study looked at explicit and implicit attitudes toward 
fictitious environmentally friendly cleaning products (Vantomme et al., 
2005).  Vantomme and colleagues introduced participants to two fictitious 
green and non-green brand names using a ‘learning phase’ pairing the 
individual brand names with brand characteristics ‘green product: 
minimal packaging, recyclable, green label and a price premium; for the 
traditional product: attractive packaging, non-recyclable, extensive 
media-support and standard price’ (2005, p. 223).  Participants then 
completed an IAT, which enabled the researchers to test participants’ 
implicit attitudes to these fictitious cleaning products.  Participants were 
also asked to complete various explicit measures including explicit 
attitudes to the fictitious cleaning products, intention to purchase the green 
fictitious cleaning products and a behavioural intention measure towards 
real multi-purpose cleaning products including an eco-labelled brand, two 
popular brands, and a less popular brand.  They found that participants’ 
explicit attitudes towards the fictitious products were positive for both the 
green and the non-green products.  Their implicit attitudes were more 
positive to the green cleaning brand than the non-green cleaning product.  
The IAT scores correlated with ‘intention to buy’ measures, in that those 
with a positive implicit attitude to the green products were more likely to 
express an intention to purchase the green products than the non-green 
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products.  However, the explicit attitude measures did not correlate with 
intention to purchase.  In the case of the real multi-purpose products, it 
was only implicit attitudes that correlated with intention to purchase the 
eco-brand.  Explicit attitudes did not predict intention to purchase in this 
regard.  Furthermore, implicit attitudes did not correlate with explicit 
attitudes.   
Beattie and Sale (2011) tested participants’ implicit and explicit 
attitudes towards high and low carbon footprint products in order to 
investigate which measure best predicted the choice of a high or low 
carbon footprint goody bag under two conditions - time pressure and no 
time pressure.  These goody bags were given to participants as a reward 
for taking part in the study.  They found that implicit attitudes did actually 
predict the choice of the low carbon goody bags.  However, this prediction 
was only true when it came to participants choosing the goody bag under 
time pressure.  This was not the case when participants were told they had 
as much time as they liked to choose a goody bag.  Explicit attitudes did 
not predict behaviour in either conditions.  
Another study that attempted to investigate the relationship 
between implicit attitudes and actual shopping behaviour was by Panzone, 
Hilton, Sale & Cohen (2016).  Panzone et al. conducted their study across 
900 Tesco customers via the Dunhumby Shopper Thoughts Panel.  
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Participants were first asked to complete an online IAT that was designed 
to measure underlying attitudes to sustainable and unsustainable items.  
Participants were also asked to complete a 13-item explicit attitude 
questionnaire, which assessed reported attitudes towards sustainability on 
a Likert scale.  Items included ‘I monitor my carbon footprint’, ‘I am 
willing to pay extra for environmentally friendly products’ and ‘I try to 
buy products that have minimal amount of packaging’.  In order to obtain 
the data for actual shopping behaviour, Panzone et al. used the Tesco 
Club-Card data, which records all purchases at Tesco made by the 
individual cardholder.  Their results found that implicit attitudes, 
measured using the sustainability IAT, did not predict the sustainable 
consumer behaviour of their participants, although the IAT did predict one 
important behavioural measure - the share of expenditure allocated to 
bottled water, in that those with a positive implicit attitude towards 
sustainability did actually buy less.  This was an important finding 
because, there is, of course, a low carbon alternative, namely tap water.  
Bottled water is expensive, high in carbon footprint and unnecessary.  
Measures of explicit attitude, including measures of ‘Green Consumer 
Attitude’ and ‘Sustainable Food Preference’ ‘did not predict aggregate 
consumer behaviour’ (Panzone et al., 2016, p. 15).  This study will be 
critiqued in more detail in Chapter 3.  
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1.4. Measures of Implicit Attitudes 
So when it comes to climate change, if we are going to attempt to 
understand and change consumers’ patterns of consumption, it would 
seem to be very important to understand (and analyse) both explicit and 
implicit attitudes towards environmental features of products.  But should 
we restrict ourselves to measuring implicit attitudes just using the IAT? 
Over the last twenty years, there has been an increase in the 
interest of understanding implicit processes, and the use of implicit 
measuring tools in research for predicting behavior has become much 
more popular.  The attraction of utilising these implicit measures in 
research is that they access people’s implicit social cognition without the 
need of self-report questionnaires and therefore they avoid (or lessen) any 
biases that could be subject to social desirability (Gawronski & De 
Houwer, 2014; Gawronski & Payne, 2010).  Since the popularity of the 
measurement of implicit attitudes, there have been several tools 
introduced.  The most commonly used methods are described below: 
1.4.1. Affective Priming Task (APT) 
The Affective Priming Task (also known as the Evaluative 
Priming Task), was developed by Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell and Kardes 
(1986).  This was one of the first reaction time tasks designed to measure 
implicit attitudes and has influenced many reaction time tasks since its 
creation (see De Houwer, 2003; Musch & Klauer, 2003).  In the Affective 
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Priming Task there are two target categories in the lower left and right-
hand side of the computer screen (for example ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’).  Two 
stimuli are presented sequentially on a computer screen.  The first 
stimulus is a prime (either a positive or a negative prime), for example, a 
‘flower’ (positive prime) or ‘insect’ (negative prime) and the second 
stimulus is the attribute category, for example, the word ‘happy’.  
Participants are required to sort the second stimulus (the attribute) into the 
correct category as quick as possible.  The basic premise behind the 
Affective Priming Task is that the participants should find it easier to sort 
the attribute stimuli into the correct category when it has the same valence 
as the prime.  So for example, if the prime was ‘flower’ and the attribute 
was ‘happy’ the participant should be able to categorise it more quickly 
in the ‘Good’ category than if the prime was a negative prime (for 
example, an image of an insect and the attribute was ‘happy’ (see De 
Houwer, 2003; Fazio et al., 1995). 
1.4.2. Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST) 
The Extrinsic Affective Simon Task was designed by De Houwer 
and largely influenced by the IAT (De Houwer, 2003).  It was originally 
designed to measure implicit attitudes and self-esteem (Teige, Schnabel, 
Banse & Asendorpf, 2004), but it has since been used to measure a variety 
of attitudes in different domains including implicit prejudice (Degner & 
Wentura, 2008) and implicit attitudes to alcohol (De Jong, Wiers, van de 
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Braak & Huijding, 2007).  In a standard EAST there are three blocks – 
two practice blocks and one critical block.  In the first block, good and 
bad words (that are white in colour) appear on the screen.  When the words 
are white, participants are asked to focus solely on the meaning of the 
words and to place them in the correct category – either ‘Good’ (for 
example on the right side) or ‘Bad’ (for example on the left side) using 
the assigned keys on the keyboard for left or right.  As with all other 
implicit measures, participants are required to do this as quickly as 
possible making as few mistakes as possible.  In the second block, 
coloured words appear on the screen and participants are required to place 
the words in the correct category in accordance with their colour rather 
than their meaning, for example left for green coloured words and right 
for blue coloured words.  If the EAST was testing implicit attitudes to 
‘flowers’ and ‘insects’, the words in this particular block would be names 
of flowers and insects.  In the third block, words appear on the screen 
(either white or coloured), and participants have to categorize words by 
their meaning (white words) or by their colour, for example, right side for 
blue, left side for green and their meaning is irrelevant. 
 The basic premise behind the EAST is that once the participants 
have completed the first block, they will extrinsically associate ‘good’ 
with one side of the screen (in this example - right) and ‘bad’ with the left 
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side (in the case of this particular example).  Therefore, those with a 
positive implicit attitude towards flowers will find it easier to categorise 
the flower words when coloured in blue (on the right side of the screen) 
because the colour blue will be extrinsically associated with good as 
opposed to when the insect words are coloured in blue. 
1.4.3. Implicit Association Test (IAT)  
The IAT, as has been noted, was originally developed by 
Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz (1998).  This is the most popular test 
used to measure implicit attitudes (see De Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007).  
The IAT usually consists of seven blocks, however there are shorter 
versions using just five blocks (see for example Egloff, Schwerdtfeger & 
Schmukle, 2005; and the Brief Implicit Association Test (BIAT), which 
is detailed below).  Each block in the standard IAT consists of between 20 
and 40 trials.  In Block 1, there are two target concepts positioned in the 
top left and right-hand side of the screen, for example ‘Flower’ (top left) 
and ‘Insect’ (top right).  Images of flowers and insects appear 
consecutively in the centre of the screen and the participant places them 
in the correct category by using the correct response key (‘Z’ if it belongs 
in the left category, or ‘M’ if it belongs in the right category). In Block 2, 
the target concepts then change to ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’.  Stimuli are 
presented in the centre of a computer screen (good words and bad words: 
‘happy’, ‘sad’, ‘angry’ etc.).  Again, participants are required to decide 
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upon whether the word in the centre of the screen is good or bad by 
pressing a specified key on the left side of the keyboard (‘Z’) or right side 
of the keyboard (‘M’).   In Block 3 the categories are then paired, so for 
example ‘Flower’ might be paired with ‘Good’ and ‘Insect’ might be 
paired with ‘Bad’.  Participants are asked to categorise the good and bad 
words that appear in the centre of the screen, and categorise the images of 
insects and flowers that appear in the centre of the screen as quickly as 
possible without making any mistakes.  Those participants who have a 
positive implicit attitude towards flowers and a negative implicit attitude 
towards insects would find this example block relatively easy because 
‘Flower’ is paired with ‘Good’ and ‘Insect’ is paired with ‘Bad’.  Blocks 
4 and 5 mirror those of Blocks 1 and 2, however, the target concepts are 
on opposite sides to the previous blocks.  For example, if ‘Good’ was on 
the left side of the screen and ‘Bad’ was on the right in Blocks 1 and 2, 
‘Bad’ would now be on the left side and ‘Good’ would now be on the 
right.  In Block 6 and Block 7 the paired categories are swapped and 
‘Good’ would now be paired with ‘Insect’ and ‘Bad’ would now be paired 
with ‘Flower’.  Those with a positive implicit attitude towards flowers and 
a negative implicit attitude towards insects would find this block more 
difficult than the previous pairings in Block 3 and Block 4.  The basic 
premise behind the IAT is that it measures speed of associations between 
the different paired concepts and provides researchers with a difference or 
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‘D’ score in accordance with Greenwald et al.’s (2003) improved scoring 
algorithm (see page 131-133 for a summary of the improved algorithm 
and an interpretation of the D scores resulting from the IAT). 
1.4.4. Brief Implicit Association Test (BIAT) 
The Brief Implicit Association Test is a shorter version of the 
Implicit Association Test and generally consists of just four blocks as 
opposed to seven blocks in the traditional IAT (Sriram & Greenwald, 
2009).  In each block there are just two categories displayed at the top 
middle of the computer screen (as opposed to 4 in the IAT).  So for 
example, in a BIAT that is testing for implicit preferences towards flowers 
and insects, the target categories shown on the computer screen at any one 
time might be ‘Good’ or ‘Bad’ and ‘Flower’ or ‘Insect’.  As before, stimuli 
are presented in the center of the screen and participants are asked to press 
the correct response key on the keyboard in order to categorize the stimuli 
correctly.  The participant is asked to press ‘I’ if the stimuli belongs to 
either of the targets categories displayed at the top of the screen (for 
example ‘Good’ or ‘Flower’), or ‘E’ if the stimuli belongs in either of the 
other categories not displayed on the screen (for example ‘Bad’ or 
‘Insect’).  Like in the standard IAT, the category pairs are swapped in each 
block and participants with a positive implicit attitude towards flowers 
would find it easier to categorize the images of flowers if the word 
‘Flower’ was paired with ‘Good’ than if the word ‘Flower was paired with 
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‘Bad’ and vice versa.  The participants are required to complete this task 
as quickly as possible making as few errors as possible.  
1.4.5. Single Target IAT (ST-IAT) 
The single target IAT is similar to the standard IAT and the BIAT, 
however, the ST-IAT only measures implicit attitudes to one category, for 
example, implicit attitudes towards flowers (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009).  
A typical trial in the ST-IAT would have the word ‘Good’ on one side of 
the screen and ‘Bad’ on the other.  If the test was measuring implicit 
attitudes towards flowers then the word ‘Flower’ (in Block 1) might be 
paired with ‘Good’, and the word ‘Bad’ would not be paired with 
anything.  In Block 2, the word ‘Flower’ might be paired with ‘Bad’, and 
the word ‘Good’ would not be paired with anything.  Good and bad words 
would be displayed consecutively in the centre of the screen and images 
of flowers would also be displayed in the centre of the screen.  The 
participant would have to put the word or image in the correct category as 
quickly as they can, making as fewer mistakes as possible (see Bluemke 
& Friese, 2008). 
1.4.6. Go-No-Go (GNAT)  
The Go-No-Go Association Task was developed by Nosek and 
Banaji (2001) and measures implicit associations towards a single target 
category rather than a comparison of implicit preference between two 
categories.  The basic design of the Go-No-Go Association Task is that 
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category items in the form of images or words (depending upon the design 
of the particular test) are displayed consecutively on the screen for a 
limited duration.  Participants are asked to press the allocated key (e.g. the 
space bar) if words (or images) are displayed that represent the category 
displayed on the computer screen (for example ‘Flowers’) and the 
participant must press the allocated key on the key board within a short 
space of time before the time runs out.  If the stimulus does not belong in 
the category, the participant does not press a key and waits for the next 
stimulus.  In another block, participants may be asked to press the space 
bar when words (or images) appear on the screen that are associated with 
the word ‘good’.  The Go-No-Go Association Task measures the strength 
of association between the categories, for example ‘Flowers and Good’ 
versus ‘Flowers and Bad’. 
1.4.7. The Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) 
In a typical AMP there are two target categories (on the top left and 
right side of the screen) e.g. ‘Pleasant’ on the top right and ‘Unpleasant’ 
on the top left.  Participants are instructed that images are going to appear 
in the centre of the computer screen followed by a Chinese character.  If 
the AMP were testing implicit attitudes towards flowers and insects, the 
images would be images of flowers and insects.  Participants are told that 
these images are put in place just to alert them that the Chinese character 
is about to appear in the centre of the screen.  Once the participant has 
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seen the Chinese character they must judge the character on whether they 
think that it is ‘Pleasant’ or ‘Unpleasant’ by pressing the allocated key for 
‘Pleasant’ (in this particular example on the right side, e.g. ‘M’) or 
‘Unpleasant’ (in this example on the left side, e.g. ‘Z’).  The basic premise 
of the AMP is that if the participant holds a positive implicit attitude 
towards flowers, they will rate the Chinese character that follows the 
images of flowers as more attractive than if the Chinese character follows 
an image of an insect. 
1.4.8. The Sorting Paired Features Task (SPFT) 
The Sorting Paired Features Task differs from other implicit 
measures as it measures associations to four different paired concepts in 
one response block.  There are four category pairs placed in the top left, 
top right, bottom left and bottom right of the computer screen.  For 
example, if the SPFT was measuring associations to flowers and insects 
the category pairs would be ‘Flower/Good’, ‘Flower/Bad’, ‘Insect/Good’ 
and ‘Insect/Bad’ all placed in a different corner of the computer screen.  
As with other implicit measures, participants are told that the response 
keys on the keyboards are associated with the positioning of each pairing 
located on the computer screen, for example ‘Q’ = top left, ‘P’ = top right, 
‘Z’ = bottom left and ‘M’ = bottom right.  For each trial an image and a 
word appear in the centre of the screen - for example an image of a flower 
along with the word ‘Pleasant’ (this example would belong in the 
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‘Flower/Good’ category) or an image of an insect with the word ‘Lovely’ 
(this example would belong in the ‘Insect/Good’ category).  If the 
participant finds that both stimuli presented (i.e. the word and the image) 
are strongly associated, they will find the categorization process easier 
and therefore, they will respond quicker than if the pairs are not strongly 
associated. 
1.5. Comparison of different implicit measures 
De Houwer and De Bruyker (2007) used both the IAT and the 
EAST in three separate studies to compare participants’ attitudes to 
political parties, food items and homosexuality.  In the first experiment, 
they tested 48 participants on both explicit and implicit measures.  
Participants had to rate on a 7-point scale how much they liked the Liberal 
and Democratic Flemish party (VLD) and how much they liked the 
coalition government party, which included the Socialists and the Green 
Party (CD&V).  They were then asked to complete an IAT and an EAST 
to measure their implicit attitudes to both of these parties.  In order to 
calculate a difference score for the explicit measures, the researchers 
subtracted the self-report liking of the VLD from the self-report liking of 
the CD&V.  They found that the D score (calculated using the IAT) 
significantly correlated with the difference score of the explicit measure.  
However, the VLD D Score (calculated from the EAST) did not correlate 
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significantly with the difference score from the self-reported liking of the 
VLD, nor did it correlate with the self-report liking of CD&V.  The 
researchers also found that there was no significant correlation between 
both implicit measures. 
The next analysis in this particular set of experiments focused on 
the comparison of the EAST and the IAT measuring participants’ implicit 
attitudes to sprouts and beer.  In this study, the researchers were testing 
the correlation between D scores resulting from the IAT, D scores 
resulting from the EAST and self-reported attitudes.  Again, participants 
were asked to rate on a 7-point scale how much they liked sprouts and 
how much they liked beer.  They were also asked how frequently they 
consumed both products on a 6-point scale from ‘never’ to ‘more than 
once a week’.  The researchers found that there was a strong correlation 
with the D Score from the IAT and the difference score from the self-
reported measure.  There was also a strong correlation between the D 
Score from the IAT and the frequency of consumption.  However, the D 
score resulting from the EAST did not significantly correlate with self-
reported measures of liking, nor did it correlate with the frequency of 
consumption of either of the products. 
The final experiment from this set tested the implicit attitudes of 
91 participants towards homosexuality.  Explicit attitudes were also 
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measured (a cognitive attitude scale and an affective attitude scale), along 
with a sexual orientation questionnaire where participants indicated their 
sexual identity and sexual behaviour on a 5-point scale ranging from 
‘exclusively heterosexual’ to ‘exclusively homosexual’.  In this 
experiment, the researchers found a significant positive correlation 
between the cognitive attitude scale and the affective attitude scale.  They 
found that there was a stronger correlation between the affective attitude 
scale and the D scores yielded from the IAT than the cognitive attitude 
scale and the D scores from the IAT. They also found that there was a 
significant correlation with IAT D scores and self-reported behaviour.  
The homosexual participants reacted faster when ‘Homosexual’ was 
paired with ‘Positive’ than when ‘Heterosexual’ was paired with 
‘Positive’, thus showing a more positive implicit attitude towards 
homosexuality than heterosexual, this yielded a positive D score.  
Heterosexual participants responded quicker when ‘Heterosexual’ was 
paired with ‘Positive’ than when ‘Homosexual’ was paired with ‘Positive’ 
and thus yielded a negative D score.  When it came to the EAST, there 
was no significant correlation between D score and explicit measures.  
There was no interaction effect between the category items and the groups 
taking the test.  There was also no correlation between the IAT D scores 
and the EAST D scores.  The authors concluded that ‘the IAT consistently 
outperformed the EAST as a measure of inter-individual differences’ 
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(2007, p.415).  The researchers found that the split-half reliability scores 
from the IAT were high, but for the EAST they were low.  When previous 
comparisons of implicit measures have been made in terms of reliability, 
the EAST was always lower in terms of reliability than the IAT (Teige, 
Schnabel, Banse & Asendorpf, 2004; Schmukle & Egloff, 2006). 
In a more recent study, Bar-Anan and Nosek (2014) tested seven 
implicit measures: the IAT, the BIAT, the Go-No-Go association task, the 
ST-IAT, the Affective Misattribution Procedure, the Sorting Paired 
Features Task and the Evaluative Priming Task.  They also used eleven 
direct attitude measures including self-reported preferences (towards 
‘Black’ people and ‘White’ people, towards ‘Democrats’ and 
‘Republicans’ and towards ‘Myself’ and ‘Others’) and Feeling 
Thermometers (towards ‘Black’ people and ‘White’ people, towards 
‘Democrats’ and ‘Republicans’ and towards ‘Myself’ and ‘Others’).  They 
used item ratings whereby participants rated how ‘warm’ or ‘cold’ they 
felt towards the stimuli presented in the implicit measures; the ‘speeded 
self-report’ where participants had to report their attitudes towards 
specific objects very quickly.  The Modern Racism Scale, which is a 
widely used self-report measure of explicit attitudes towards ethnicity was 
also used. Finally, the Rosenberg self-esteem test, which is a 10-item 
Likert scale designed to measure people’s ‘global self-worth’ was used.  
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For each implicit measure, the same stimuli were used, so for example, 
when the researchers were measuring implicit attitudes towards ethnicity, 
the stimuli they used in each implicit test were the same six images of 
White people’s faces and the same six images of Black people’s faces.  
The stimuli used to test people’s implicit attitudes towards politics across 
all implicit tests were always ‘Barack Obama’, ‘Hillary Clinton’, ‘Bill 
Clinton’, ‘Al Gore’ and ‘John Kerry’ (Democrats); and ‘George W Bush’, 
‘George H W Bush’, ‘Ronald Reagan’, ‘Condoleezza Rice’ and ‘Rudy 
Giuliani’ (Republicans).  Finally, for the self-esteem implicit measures, 
the words used in both categories were ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘mine’, ‘myself’, and 
and ‘my health (‘Self’ category) and ‘they’, ‘them’, ‘their’, ‘theirs’ and 
‘others’ (‘Other’ category).  The results deriving from all of the implicit 
measures (apart from the AMP) indicated that the participants (of mixed 
reported racial origins including American Indian, Asian, Black, 
Hispanic, White and multiracial) all shared an implicit preference for 
White people rather than Black people.  This result correlated with the 
explicit measures where participants had to indicate their preference for 
White people over Black people, and the Feeling Thermometer where 
participants had to rate how warm or cold they felt towards White and 
Black people.  However, when it came to rating their preference towards 
the individual stimuli used in the implicit measures, participants were 
more likely to report that they preferred the images of Black people rather 
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than the images of White people.  The results from the indirect measures 
also indicated that participants held an implicit preference towards 
Democrats rather than Republicans, which correlated with their explicit 
measures.  There was also a shared implicit preference for ‘Self’ over 
‘Others’ across all implicit measures and explicit measures. The 
researchers concluded that the IAT and the BIAT were better at detecting 
participants’ social identity.  The IAT was also most reliable in terms of 
internal consistency followed by the BIAT, and the BIAT proved to be the 
strongest in terms of test-retest reliability followed very closely by all 
other measures (apart from the EPT which had a low test-retest 
reliability).  The BIAT, GNAT and the IAT related more closely to all 
other measures and the AMP and EPT related to other indirect measures 
least.  The BIAT and IAT also correlated with explicit measures more so 
than the other indirect measures with the EPT correlating least.  Their 
conclusion was that ‘Of the seven indirect measures, the IAT and the 
BIAT showed the best psychometric qualities across topics’ and that the 
‘IAT has earned its status as the most popular tool because of its 
comparatively strong internal consistency, validity, and adaptability for a 
variety of research applications’ (2014, p.46). 
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1.6. Measuring implicit attitudes in children 
The IAT has also been adapted in various forms to measure the 
implicit attitudes of children as young as 6 (Baron & Banaji, 2006; 
Cvencek, Meltzoff & Greenwald, 2011; Dunham, Baron & Banaji, 2006; 
Rutland, Cameron, Milne & McGeorge, 2005; Steffens, Jelenec & Noack, 
2010).  One particular child friendly version of the IAT is known as 
‘FlexiTwins’ (a game version of the IAT).  The original FlexiTwins was 
designed to measure participants’ connectedness with nature associating 
‘self’ with ‘Nature’ or ‘Built’.  This adaptation was designed to avoid 
children being bored throughout the traditional IAT and served as an 
alternative to the Go-No-Go Association Test (GNAT) (Bruni & Schultz, 
2010).  FlexiTwins is a colourful, animated game designed to be fun and 
easily used across a wide range of ages.  Two frogs are located on either 
side of the screen, one on the bottom left side and one on the bottom right 
side with the target categories labelled below either frog, so for example 
‘Me’ on the left side ‘Other’ on the right.  As in the traditional IAT, stimuli 
are presented in the centre of the screen.  However, in order to make the 
game visually stimulating to children, the stimuli in FlexiTwins drops 
from the top of the screen (in this case words are used rather than images).  
Each word has to be caught by either the frog on the right-hand-side, or 
the frog on the left-hand-side (depending upon which side of the screen 
the child thinks the word belongs).  Before the game begins, participants 
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are asked to type their own name in a space provided on the computer 
screen.  In the first block, the categories are ‘Me’ versus ‘Other’.  In this 
block, random names of people drop down from the top of the screen.  
These are a combination of male and female names and include the 
participant’s own name.  When the participant’s name drops down they 
assign it to the ‘Me’ category and when somebody else’s name drops 
down they need to assign it to the ‘Other’ category.  In the second block 
the categories change to ‘Nature’ and ‘Built’.  In this block words 
representing built items such as ‘chair’, ‘car’ and ‘truck’ and also words 
representing nature including ‘tree’, ‘flower’ and ‘butterfly’ drop down 
from the top of the screen.  Here the children have to assign the items to 
the category of ‘Nature’ or ‘Built’.  In the third and fourth block, the 
categories are then paired.  So for example, on the left side of the screen, 
the word ‘Me’ would be paired with ‘Nature’ and on the right side of the 
screen the word ‘Other’ would be paired with ‘Built’.  The participant is 
required to assign the words representing nature and their own name to 
the left side of the screen and other people’s names and words 
representing built items in the right side of the screen.  In the fifth block, 
the categories swap sides, so for example if ‘Built’ was on the right side 
and ‘Nature’ was on the left side in the previous blocks, then ‘Built’ would 
now be on the left side and ‘Nature’ would now be on the right side.  In 
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the final two blocks the pairings then swap - here, ‘Built’ would now be 
paired with ‘Me’ and ‘Nature’ would now be paired with ‘Other’.   
The basic premise behind FlexiTwins is that if the participant 
shares an implicit connectedness to nature, they would find it easier to put 
the words representing nature in the ‘Nature’ category when ‘Nature’ is 
paired with ‘Me’ rather than when ‘Nature’ is paired with ‘Other’.  If the 
participant holds a stronger implicit connectedness to built environments, 
then they would find it easier to categorise the words representing built in 
the ‘Built’ category when ‘Built’ is paired with ‘Me’ than when ‘Built’ is 
paired with ‘Other’.  Each word has to be caught before it reaches the 
bottom of the screen.  If the word is not caught in time, it will remain at 
the bottom of the screen until the participant places it in the correct 
category.  Sound effects are used giving feedback for correct and incorrect 
responses making it appear more like a game.  Reminders are also built 
into the design of the game reminding participants they have to categorize 
the items as quickly and as accurately as possible.  Participants receive 
points for their correct responses and the quicker the classification the 
more points they receive.   
Bruni and Schultz (2010) conducted a study designed to test the 
reliability and validity of FlexiTwins.  Participants were asked to 
complete a series of explicit measures online including a questionnaire 
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measuring their personal explicit environmental concerns - a single item 
Likert scale taken from Dunlap, Gallup and Gallup (1992; 1993) asking 
participants to rate how concerned they personally feel about 
environmental issues on a scale of 0 (not at all concerned) to 10 (extremely 
concerned).  There was also an ‘Environmental Motives Scale’ where 
participants had to rate 12 items on a scale of 0 (not important) to 10 
(supreme importance).  The 12 items are divided into three categories - 
‘Egoistic’ concern which included items such as ‘me’, ‘my future’, ‘my 
lifestyle’ and ‘my health’, ‘Altruistic’ concern which included items such 
as ‘future generations’, ‘my community’, ‘all people’ and ‘all children’ 
and ‘Biospheric’ concern which included items such as ‘plants’, 
‘animals’, ‘marine life’ and ‘birds’.  Participants ‘Environmental Intent’ 
was also tested by questioning how frequently they considered the 
environment in their daily routine.  Participants had to respond on a scale 
of 0 (never) to 10 (always).  An ‘Inclusion of Nature in Self’ scale was 
also used to test how connected the individual feels towards nature.  After 
completing the explicit measures, participants were asked to complete the 
FlexiTwins game.  Results showed that there was a significant correlation 
between the FlexiTwins D Score and the Personal Environmental Concern 
scale.  There was also a significant correlation between the FlexiTwins D 
score and ‘Inclusion of Self in Nature’ scale.  FlexiTwins D score also 
significantly correlated to the responses on the Environmental Intent 
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question and when comparing the D score to the participants priorities of 
environmental protection versus economic growth.  However, there was 
no correlation between the D score and egoistic concern, altruistic concern 
or biospheric concern. 
Baron and Banaji (2006) also developed a child friendly version 
of the IAT to measure implicit ethnic bias in children from as young as 
the age of six.  They wanted to investigate the social-cognitive 
mechanisms that are present universally, and the ‘cultural processes that 
mark the development of these attitudes and preferences’ (2006, p.53).  In 
order to do this, they measured implicit racial biases in White North 
American middle-class children.  They chose this particular issue as there 
is ‘evidence that North American children achieve an adult like concept 
of this category by age 5’ (2006, p.53).  They report that children express 
out-group biases towards other children from the age of three; however, 
these reported biases start weakening by the age of seven, and gradually 
disappear by the time they reach 12.   
In order to validate this particular version of the IAT, they also 
measured children’s implicit attitudes to insects and flowers.  The idea 
behind this was that flowers and insects elicit distinctive implicit 
responses in that people tend to have a more positive response to flowers 
than they do towards insects.  They used 79 participants (39 males and 40 
67 
 
females) with the age ranging from 6 years and 1 month to 19 years.  They 
adapted the standard IAT so that it could be used by young children and 
used images of faces of Black and White children as stimuli.  In order to 
account for reading ability, they substituted the attribute words 
(‘pleasant’, ‘love’, ‘hate’ etc.) with a recording of a female voice saying 
the words through speakers inbuilt in the computer.  They used eight 
images in each test (four images of insects and four images of flowers in 
the flower/insect IAT, and four images of European American faces and 
four images of African American faces in the ethnic IAT).  Rather than 
using the keys ‘I’ and ‘E’ for left and right, they used two large ‘Jellybean’ 
buttons to counteract any issues regarding motor responses.  Surprisingly, 
the detection of implicit preferences were present in children as young as 
six.  Girls showed a preference for flowers as did the boys, however boys 
showed the preference to a lesser extent.  When it came to the ethnic IAT, 
6 year olds showed a pro-White implicit bias and their explicit attitudes 
correlated with their implicit attitude.  The same pattern emerged with the 
flower/insect IAT and the ethnic IAT in 10 year olds as it did with 6 year 
olds, which suggests that implicit biases remain relatively stable across 
time.  However, the explicit measure indicated a somewhat reduced ethnic 
bias but the bias was still prominent.  Adults showed a pro-White bias on 
the IAT; however, their explicit measure indicated an equal preference for 
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White and Black faces.  These results indicate that children aged six have 
already formed implicit biases when it comes to other social groups.   
1.7. Attentional focus and climate change 
The ability to access and measure implicit attitudes gives us 
possible new insights into the motivations which guide, and in some cases 
predict, human behaviour.  These new insights could prove to be critical 
when it comes to combating climate change.  However, the concept of 
implicit attitudes needs to be understood more fully in relation to other 
aspects of behaviour that these implicit attitudes might affect, such as the 
processing of information relating to climate change and how this may 
affect other pro-environmental behaviour (for example, the choice of low 
carbon products).   
As mentioned earlier, there have been many attempts at creating 
successful advertisement campaigns, newspaper campaigns, and films 
persuading people about the dangers of climate change, all aimed at 
promoting awareness with the intention to change people’s perceptions 
about climate change in the hope that people will change their behaviour.  
Beattie, Sale and McGuire (2011) played sections of Al Gore’s ‘An 
Inconvenient Truth’ to participants and found that the different clips 
produced a significant impact (to varying degrees) on how people felt 
about environmental issues (see also Beattie, 2010).  However, as 
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individuals, we are not all drawn to the same information.  We may not 
focus on the same images as other people, which could have major 
implications for the design of such campaigns and on the impact of these 
campaigns on individual behaviour (Xing & Isaacowitz, 2006).  For some 
people, the evidence of climate change may not be ‘obvious’ and this 
could potentially be a result of a different underlying implicit attitudes and 
its specific effects on attention. 
The link between implicit attitudes and attentional focus could be 
of immense theoretical importance when it comes to climate change.  This 
issue formed the basis for an eye-tracking study by Beattie and McGuire 
(2012).  By using eye-tracking technology, they were able to measure 
visual attention to different sets of images by tracking the movement of 
the eyes and measuring each period of fixation.  Eye movements provide, 
‘an unobtrusive, sensitive, real-time behavioural index of ongoing visual 
and cognitive processing’ (Henderson & Ferreira 2004, p.18), and gives 
us clear and reliable data on the allocation of attention (see also 
Holsanova, Holmberg & Holmqvist, 2008).  The basic operation of the 
eyes in processing information is as follows: ‘when we read, look at a 
scene, or search for an object, we continually make eye movements called 
saccades.  Between the saccades, our eyes remain relatively still during 
fixations for about 200-300 ms.  There are differences in these two 
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measures as a function of the particular task…Saccades are rapid 
movements of the eyes with velocities as high as 500º per second.  
Sensitivity to visual input is reduced during eye movements; this 
phenomenon is called saccadic suppression (Matin, 1974) …We do not 
obtain new information during a saccade, because the eyes are moving so 
quickly across the stable visual stimulus that only a blur would be 
perceived (Uttal & Smith, 1968) …As we look straight ahead, the visual 
field can be divided into three regions: foveal, parafoveal and peripheral.  
Although acuity is very good in the fovea (the central 2ºof vision), it is 
not nearly so good in the parafovea (which extends out to 5º either side of 
fixation), and it is even poorer in the periphery (the region beyond the 
parafovea).  Hence, we move our eyes so as to place the fovea on that part 
of the stimulus we want to see clearly’ (Rayner, 1998, p. 373-374). 
Beattie and McGuire (2012) examined how measures of both 
implicit and explicit attitudes to the environment related to unconscious 
patterns of eye movements towards or away from iconic images of 
environmental damage and climate change.  Participants’ implicit 
attitudes were measured using a carbon footprint IAT and their explicit 
attitudes using a Likert scale and a Feeling Thermometer’sign. Nine 
negative iconic representations of climate change/environmental damage 
were selected (based loosely on Al Gore’s film ‘An Inconvenient Truth’), 
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nine positive iconic images of nature were also selected and nine neutral 
images of everyday household objects.  Nine different stimulus slides 
were assembled; each contained three images from the three different sets, 
that is to say, one negative image, one positive image and one neutral 
image.  The images were always the same size.  The slides were shown 
for 10 seconds and then replaced by the next slide in the sequence.  
Participants were told simply that they were going to be shown a series of 
images, which were not specified in advance.  Each 40 ms frame was 
coded by a human observer in terms of where each of the participants were 










Figure 1.11:  The eye gaze of one participant with one stimulus array. The 
gaze here is directed at the negative image in the middle of the screen 




Participants were separated into a high/low explicit group and 
high/low implicit group using a median split.  The study found that 
participants with a strong positive implicit attitude to low carbon products 
looked significantly more at the negative images of climate change than 
the positive images of nature.  However, when it came to the low implicit 
group, there was no significant difference in terms of gaze fixation on the 
negative images versus the positive images.  When it came to the high and 
low explicit groups, again, there were no significant differences in where 
participants looked.  Gaze fixation within the first 200 ms of looking was 
then analysed, in order to see if there was any difference in the groups in 
terms of where they looked first.  The high implicit group spent a 
significantly higher proportion of time within the first 200 ms looking at 
the negative images of climate change than positive images of nature.  
Indeed, they looked at the negative images twice as much as the positive 
images.  However, there was no significant difference between the high 
and low explicit groups in terms of where they looked in the first 200 ms.  
This study clearly raises the possibility that an understanding of the 
operation of implicit attitudes and their effects on non-conscious 
behaviours like eye movements could be critical.  The research also 




1.8. Education, knowledge and personality factors 
So how might we embed these new insights from research on 
implicit attitudes into a broader cultural context?  From other research, we 
know that there are many potential factors at the social psychological, 
cultural and experiential level that can influence pro-environmental 
concern and behaviour.  These range from childhood experience, political 
worldviews, felt responsibility, age, religion and gender.  Hines, 
Hungerford and Tomera (1987) conducted a meta-analysis of 315 studies 
of responsible pro-environmental behaviour.  Their aim was to identify 
psychological variables that were linked to pro-environmental behaviour.  
They analysed the associations between four major psycho-social 
variables.  One psycho-social variable was the attitude-behaviour 
relationship (the individual’s feelings for, or against, particular aspects of 
the environment).  Another psycho-social variable was locus of control 
(the individual’s perception of whether they could bring about change 
through their own behaviour).  If the individual attributes change to others 
i.e. God, parents, government, as opposed to their own behaviour, this is 
deemed as an external locus of control.  However, if on the other hand, 
the individual believes that their actions will have an impact, this is 
deemed as an internal locus of control (Peyton & Miller, 1980).  Hines et 
al. (1987) also considered moral responsibility in their analysis of psycho-
social variables (the individual’s feelings that they are responsible to act 
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and bring about change) and pro-environmental behaviour (the 
individual’s intentions to act).  They found that ‘intention to act is merely 
an artefact of a number of other variables acting in combination (e.g., 
cognitive knowledge, cognitive skills, and personality factors)’ Hines et 
al., 1987 p.6.  
However, one major barrier to preventing pro-environmental 
behaviour is education and people knowing what they can do to help 
combat the effects of climate change.  If people do not know about the 
potential problems, or indeed know how to act in a positive way, then little 
can be done on a personal level to act in a pro-environmental way (Gifford 
& Nilson, 2014).  Hines et al. surmise that before an individual can take 
an environmentally friendly approach, they must have knowledge and 
awareness of the problem.  They must also possess knowledge of action 
strategies that will bring about change.  Hines et al. found a relationship 
between age and pro-environmental behaviour, ‘younger individuals were 
slightly more likely to have reported engaging in responsible 
environmental behaviours than were older individuals’ (1987, p.5).  
However, these are self-reported measures of behaviour rather than 
measures of actual behaviour and therefore may not be entirely reliable.  
Lyons and Breakwell (1994) also found that teenagers, who had more 
environmental knowledge, were more concerned about the environment.   
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Gifford, Hay and Boros (1983) found that in a Canadian 
university, students who were enrolled on an Environmental Education 
Program had ‘significantly greater knowledge, verbal commitment and 
actual commitment’ than students who were not enrolled on the 
Environmental Education Program.  Levine and Strube (2012) conducted 
a study looking at the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes 
to the environment, reported pro-environmental behaviour as well as their 
knowledge about environmental issues amongst 90 college students.  
They measured participants’ explicit attitudes to the environment using 
the New Ecological Paradigm Scale (NEP).  The NEP consists of 15 items 
where the participant has to state on a 5-point scale how strongly they 
agree with each statement.  Statements on the NEP included ‘Humans are 
severely abusing the environment’, ‘If things continue on their present 
course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe’ and 
‘When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous 
consequences’.  Participants then had to complete a 12-item questionnaire 
taken from the National Environmental Education and Training 
Foundation (NEETF)/Roper Survey (2000) - a multiple-choice test 
containing items designed to test basic environmental knowledge, for 
example, how electricity is generated, common causes of air pollution and 
what renewable resources are etc.  They then measured environmental 
intentions asking participants to complete a 9-item Intended Pro-
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Environment Behaviour measure stating how likely it was that they would 
perform different pro-environmental behaviours on a 5-point scale 
(adapted from Cordano, Welcomer & Scherer, 2003).  For example, one 
item asked how likely it was that the participant would ‘sign a petition to 
support stricter environmental law’.  Another item asked how likely it was 
that the participant would ‘participate in a protest against a company that 
is harming the environment’ and another asked how likely it was that the 
participant would ‘participate in events organized by environmental 
groups’ (see Corando et al., 2003, p. 28).  In order to measure 
environmentally friendly behaviour, participants were given a list of 
‘environmentally relevant actions’ and were asked to rate the frequency 
of engagement in such behaviours on a 5-point scale, for example, 
‘recycling, using public transportation, and turning off lights and 
electrical appliances when not in use’ (2012, p.316).  Levine and Strube 
(2012) then used an IAT to measure participants’ implicit attitudes to pro-
environmental behaviour.  Participants had to categorise target words such 
as ‘recycling’, ‘conservation’, ‘nature’, ‘ecology’ and ‘organic’, or 
industry words such as ‘pollution’, ‘deforestation’, ‘emissions’ and 
‘landfills’ into the category ‘environment’ or the category ‘industry’.  
They also used attribute words such as ‘love’, ‘wonderful’, ‘happy’ and 
‘joy’ for the category ‘Good’ and ‘agony’, ‘horrible’, ‘awful’ and ‘evil’ 
for the category ‘Bad’.  They found that participants had positive implicit 
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associations with ‘environmental’ words and negative associations with 
‘industry’ words.  There was no significant correlation with implicit 
attitudes and behaviour or intention.  Knowledge was significantly 
correlated with behaviour but not significantly correlated with intention.  
They found that when it came to environmental issues, men were more 
knowledgeable, but there was no significant difference in men and 
women’s explicit measures, implicit measures, intention or behaviour.  
However, when we consider these findings in the context of the 
literature on implicit processing and implicit attitudes, it may not be that 
surprising that participants held strong positive associations with 
‘environmental’ concepts and held a more negative association with the 
‘industry’ concepts due to the fact that the words ‘recycling’, 
‘conservation’, ‘nature’, ‘ecology’ and ‘organic’ all have obvious positive 
connotations.  Yet, the words used for the ‘industry’ concept have clear 
negative connotations e.g. ‘pollution’, ‘deforestation’, ‘emissions’ and 
‘landfills’ (rather than concepts like ‘cheaper products’, ‘convenience’, 
‘capitalist wealth’ which might have produced different results). 
Scannel and Grouzet (2010) point out that actual knowledge about 
climate change is the strongest predictor of intention to engage in pro-
environmental behaviour.  Similarly, Bord, O’Connor and Fisher (2000) 
conducted a large-scale survey looking at Americans’ knowledge of 
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climate change and intention to engage in pro-environmental behaviour.  
They too found that actual knowledge predicted intention to engage in 
behaviours that would lead to the possible mitigation of climate change.  
Similarly, Lazo, Kinnell and Fisher (2000) and O’Conner, Bord and 
Fisher (1999) found that the more knowledge people possess with regards 
to climate change, the more likely they are to accept mitigation policies.  
Knowledge is clearly not the sole predictor of behaviour change, there are 
other factors that need to be addressed such as habit (and other forms of 
‘mindless’ behaviour), but knowledge does play a major role when it 
comes to (conscious) intention to act.  People do not always associate 
certain events, for example, adverse weather conditions to the more 
abstract concept of climate change, so we may need to make people more 
aware of the connections in this domain.  This is clearly something that 
needs to be addressed. 
1.9. The media and mental representations of climate 
change in films 
The portrayal of climate change in films and television 
programmes also plays an important role in the mental representation of 
this concept.  Even though people are witnessing more extreme weather 
conditions such as floods, droughts, heat waves etc., it is the media who 
make the connection between these conditions and global warming 
(Corbett & Durfee, 2004).  There have been many popular films depicting 
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climate change in an attempt to make it more real, for example, ‘The Day 
after Tomorrow’, ‘The Age of Stupid’ and ‘An Inconvenient Truth’.  
These films were aimed at raising awareness about climate change and 
emphasising its devastating effects.  However, communicating climate 
change is a complex issue and unless depicted with a sense of ‘realism’ 
and ‘legitimacy’ it will not have the desired response (Lowe, Brown, 
Dessai, de França Doria, Haynes & Vincent, 2006).  Of course, we still 
have to consider the issues of perceived ‘response-efficacy’ and ‘self-
efficacy’.  There is always the danger that an audience will have difficulty 
in separating fact from fiction, which, in turn, will result in the viewer 
believing that the devastating effects of climate change are something of 
a fantasy and they will not happen in the real world and certainly will not 
happen to them personally.  The audience also needs to identify with the 
characters as well as the scenario in order for them to be persuaded and to 
be cognitively and emotionally affected (Kelman, 1961).  Cohen (2001) 
describes the process of identification with the characters as ‘a mechanism 
through which audience members experience reception and interpretation 
of the text from the inside, as if the events were happening to them’ (2001, 
p.245).  Oatley (2002) proposes that, in order to successfully identify with 
a character, one needs to ‘make a leap into another mind’ (2002 p.62).   
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Fictional narratives used in feature films and television 
programmes employ various effects to engage the audience on an 
emotional level rather than to merely entertain them.  They successfully 
affect people’s beliefs and attitudes concerning the subject approached in 
the narrative, especially when developed for education-entertainment 
(Wilkin, Valente, Murphy, Cody, Huang & Beck, 2007).  It has been 
suggested that viewers who feel psychologically involved and engaged by 
a narrative are persuaded more effectively by the message within that 
particular narrative (see Green & Brock, 2000).  Slater and Rouner (2002) 
suggest that, in order to understand the effects of narrative persuasion, 
identification with the characters is a necessary factor.  This is based on 
the assumption that the viewer understands arguments in relation to the 
message that is being conveyed. 
Some of these films mentioned have been criticised for being too 
extreme and unrealistic, which, in turn, has led to denial and reduced self-
efficacy, for example, ‘The Day After Tomorrow’, and they do not seem 
to evoke a long-term emotional response (see for example Lowe et al., 
2006).  This is a problem, because until we can provoke an emotional 
response towards climate change with a lasting effect, then we may not be 
able to get the audience to understand the perceived threat that is upon us.  
In the words of Weber (2006) ‘we should find ways to evoke visceral 
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reactions towards the risk of global warming, perhaps by simulation of its 
concrete future consequences for people’s home or other regions they visit 
or value’ (2006, p.1). 
One of the major problems here is that, to many people, global 
warming is very abstract.  Its scientific and statistical content inhibits 
people’s understanding and emotional responses (Beattie, Sale & 
McGuire, 2011).  The effects of climate change are not immediate, they 
take a relatively long time to become visible and require people to 
understand and believe the arguments of climate scientists.  People do not 
seem to understand or know enough about what they have to do to make 
a lasting effect.  As Kellstedt, Zahran and Veslitz (2008) commented ‘the 
lack of public outcry about global warming, then, is not because the public 
does not care enough about global warming; it is because they don’t know 
enough about it’ (p.114).  However, climate change is such a huge and 
complex topic that there is the danger that the more people know about 
something as catastrophic as global warming, the less personally 
responsible people may feel about it.  As a result, the feeling of 
responsibility and lowering perceived self-efficacy and response efficacy 
will be shifted on to others rather than themselves, having the opposite 
affect than intended (see Ross 1977; Lee & Beattie, 1998; 2000 for an 
analysis of defensive attributions).  A study by Kellsedt et al. (2008) 
82 
 
looked at exactly this effect.  They conducted a telephone survey asking 
people about their perceptions of the risks posed by climate change, their 
perceived efficacy to have an influence on climate change and their 
knowledge about climate change.  Their results revealed that those who 
knew more about global warming showed less concern.  However, Beattie 
et al. (2011) found that after showing participants short extracts from the 
film Al Gore’s award winning film ‘An Inconvenient Truth’, participants 
felt exactly the opposite to Kellstedt et al.’s findings.  Indeed, participants 
felt more motivated to do something about climate change and were less 
likely to feel that they had no control over climate change.  In Beattie et 
al.’s (2011) study, participants were shown seven clips that had previously 
been identified as being powerful and emotional.  The first clip was 
intended to highlight the fact that global warming is a serious issue and 
that all countries must unite if we are going to come up with a solution.  
The second clip was a slightly more positive clip, emphasising the fact 
that every small bit that people do in terms of pro-environmental 
behaviour can help, and that we can all do something about it.  The third 
clip was an image of our ‘small planet’ taken from space.  Al Gore was 
informing the audience that this is our only home and the entire history of 
our human race is contained on this small blue planet.  Clip 4 was 
describing the paradoxes caused by global warming, that not only has 
there has been an increase in floods, but also an increase in droughts.  Clip 
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5 was an animated clip of a polar bear stranded on a melting ice floe.  Clip 
6 was about the effects of population growth.  Finally, clip 7 was 
highlighting the effects of global warming on the rise in sea levels.  In this 
clip, Al Gore demonstrated what our coastlines would look like in the 
future showing land submerged by water.  Participants were then each 
given a shortened version of the UWIST Mood Adjective Checklist 
consisting of 21 items grouped into seven mood categories – ‘happiness’, 
‘sadness’, ‘anger’, ‘tension’, ‘calmness’, ‘energy’ and ‘tiredness’. 
Participants were also given a questionnaire designed to measure 
participants’ explicit attitudes and social cognitions towards climate 
change.  There were 30 statements grouped into five categories where 
participants had to rate on a 5-point scale the strength to which they agreed 
with each statement (1= strongly disagree; 3= neither agree nor disagree; 
5 = strongly agree.  The five categories were as follows: ‘Message 
acceptance’ (for example ‘I believe most of what was said in the 
message’) ‘Motivation’ (for example ‘I am prepared to do more to help 
reduce climate change’), ‘Empowerment’ (for example ‘I feel empowered 
in the fight against climate change’), ‘Shifting responsibility’ (for 
example ‘Climate change is a problem to be solved by future generations’) 
and ‘Fatalism’ (for example ‘I feel helpless in the fight against climate 
change’).  After watching each of the clips participants’ levels of 
happiness significantly dropped from their baseline happiness levels, 
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which were taken before watching the clips.  Levels of calmness also 
dropped after watching each of the clips.  However, participants’ level of 
anger and tension were not significantly affected.  When it came to the 
climate change attitude questionnaire, participants’ motivation increased 
after watching each of the clips.  Levels of empowerment increased 
significantly after watching each of the clips.  There was an increase in 
levels of fatalism after watching some of the clips.  Yet levels of ‘shifting 
responsibility’ were not significantly affected, nor were the scores for 
‘message acceptance’.  The results of this study showed that these clips 
had a significant effect on participants’ mood state as well as on 
participants’ explicit attitudes/social cognitions.   
It is important to emphasise that this experiment only measured 
participants’ explicit measures (something that will be corrected in this 
PhD thesis).  There was no attempt to measure implicit attitudes to the 
environment before or after watching any of these clips.  Furthermore, the 
explicit measurements were only taken immediately after watching each 
of the seven clips, there was no follow-up questionnaire months after to 
measure any long-term effects (like most studies in this domain).  There 
was also no attempt to measure actual behaviour change amongst 
participants.   
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If people are aware of the threat posed by climate change and are 
aware of the small things that they can do in terms of pro-environmental 
behaviour, they will feel empowered and are more likely to bring about 
change.  However, if they are subjected to footage of climate change on a 
catastrophic level, with no advice on how to go about change on a personal 
level, of course they will feel disempowered and feel it is somebody else’s 
problem.  Another suggestion pointed out by Scannel and Grouzet (2010) 
is that messages should portray the impact of climate change on a ‘local’ 
level rather than a ‘global’ level as individuals do not usually associate 
climate change as a local issue, they believe that it is a problem affecting 
other countries far reached from their own.  In doing so, this may be more 
effective in engaging people and perhaps then, they will have a more 
emotional response.  They will see examples of the effects of climate 
change and its impact on their local environment and will feel emotionally 
driven to do something about it.  If people see the effects on a global level, 
they will feel that firstly, the effects are too catastrophic for anything to 
be done, and secondly, that they will not be personally affected by it. 
Howell (2011) investigated the effects of ‘The Age of Stupid’, a 
92-minute futuristic feature film set in 2055 in a world that has suffered 
devastating effects resulting from climate change.  It is a low budget 
documentary film starring Pete Postlethwaite. Postlethwaite plays the last 
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man alive after the shattering effects of climate change have destroyed the 
earth.  In the opening scene, we are confronted with images of London 
under water, Las Vegas covered over with sand, the Taj Mahal destroyed 
and Sydney on fire.  The archivist, played by Postlethwaite, gathers 
archived footage and news clips and plays them to us (the audience) and 
we are able to follow six real life journeys of individual’s personal 
experiences of climate change, which are interwoven and broken up by 
actual news clips.  Postlethwaite plays the footage and watches it carefully 
asking the question ‘Why didn't we stop climate change when we had the 
chance?’  It is an informative, yet emotional film, which uses fear as a 
primary motivator.  But the main issue with this film is that does not seem 
to give the audience advice on how to go about making personal changes 
and after watching the film, we are actually no wiser as to how we should 
go about changing our behaviour.  Howell (2011) gave 213 filmgoers a 
questionnaire before seeing this particular film.  They were then given a 
questionnaire immediately after seeing the film and then again 10-14 
weeks after to see if the effects were lasting.  The questionnaires consisted 
of multiple-choice questions about participants’ level of concern about 
climate change, participants’ beliefs about climate change and 
participants’ motivation to do something about climate change.  They 
were also asked specific behavioural questions about raising awareness of 
climate change, home energy use, travel and food.  Participants showed 
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concern before watching the film and then had a slight increase in concern 
immediately after.  Levels of motivation increased after watching the film; 
however, these higher levels of motivation were not evident in the follow-
up 10-14 weeks after seeing the film.  There was evidence of behavioural 
changes amongst participants in this study, in that participants reported 
that they were ‘buying more local produce’ or that they had decided to 
take a holiday that did not involve flying.   
So how can we get people to remain motivated and do more?  
Watching a film is unlikely to have long-term lasting effects unless 
different types of attitudes are affected (something that will be 
investigated in chapter 6), and unless other initiatives are put in place, 
such as education programmes, if we are going to impact and attempt to 
change people’s behaviour by increasing self-efficacy and response 
efficacy.  According to Brant (2009), this particular film has been heavily 
criticized for presenting a very negative outlook and showing things that 
we should avoid, rather than creating a positive outlook and portraying a 
future that we could strive to achieve.  It also fails to show how we could 
go about changing our patterns of behaviour.  
Interestingly, Howell found that ‘21.9% of respondents stated that 
they ‘decided to reduce/cut out holiday flying long-term as a result of 
seeing the film’.  However, the questionnaires were self-report measures 
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so may not be a reliable or valid measure of actual behaviour, and may 
well be subject to social desirability.  So how can we get a better measure 
of behaviour?  It may be better to observe, wherever possible, actual 
behaviour (Steg & Vlek, 2009).  For example, Chao and Lam (2011) 
trained students to observe particular aspects of their roommates’ 
‘responsible environmental behaviour’ and compared these observations 
of actual behaviour with reports of ‘behavioural intention’ and ‘self-
reported behaviour’.  They found that ‘behaviour intention’ and ‘self-
reported behaviour’ (all subject to social desirability, of course) were 
significantly higher than the frequency of observed responsible 
environmental behaviour.  However, even the observation method itself 
can promote socially desirable behaviour when people know that they are 
being observed (the so-called Hawthorne effect - see Landsberger, 1958).  
Corral-Verdugo, Zaragoza and Guillen (1999) found a way around this 
problem by asking participants to provide quantifiable measures such as 
gas/meter readings, not subject to either social desirability or the 
Hawthorne effect.  However, it is quite difficult to ask people to provide 
energy bills etc. because it could be perceived as both personal and 
intrusive. 
No study thus far (to the best of the author’s knowledge) has set 
out to measure the effects of a film on implicit attitudes concerning 
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climate change.  However, changing people’s implicit attitudes and 
persuading people to change their behaviour through film has been 
successful in other domains such as smoking.  Dal Cin, Gibson, Zanna, 
Shumate and Fong (2007) investigated whether identification with a 
character in a film increased implicit associations of ‘self with smoking’ 
amongst 26 smokers and 26 non-smokers.  Participants completed a series 
of questionnaires, which included explicit measures of smoking, beliefs 
about smoking and personal intention to smoke.  They also completed a 
transportability scale assessing individual’s disposition to engage with a 
narrative (Dal Cin et al., 2004).  Participants were then asked to watch 36 
minute segments from the film ‘Die Hard’.  They were assigned to either 
of two conditions, a smoking condition where participants saw the main 
character smoking, or the non-smoking condition where participants did 
not see the main character smoking.  After watching the clips, the 
participants had to report how much they identified with the character.  
They were also asked how likely it was that they would smoke in the next 
few months, if they thought they might smoke more cigarettes in the future 
and if they would be less likely to be friends with somebody who smoked.  
Participants also had to estimate how popular smoking was amongst the 
population.  Participants completed a smoking IAT measuring 
associations between ‘self’ and ‘smoking’ by categorising pictures (some 
with smoking related items and some without) as ‘Smoking’ or ‘No 
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Smoking’ and words e.g. ‘me’, ‘mine’, ‘they’, ‘them’ as ‘Self-relevant’ or 
‘Not Self-relevant’.  Those participants who held a stronger association 
with the main character (both smokers and non-smokers) in the smoking 
condition had an enhanced implicit association between ‘Smoking’ and 
‘Self’.  Identification with the character in the smoking condition also 
predicted a greater intention to smoke.   
Smoking in films also predicts a greater likelihood of smoking 
based on self-report measures (see Hines, Saris & Throckmorton-Belzer, 
2000; Pechmann & Shih, 1999).  Gibson and Maurer (2000) found that 
after participants had viewed a film where certain characters were 
smoking, they had a more favourable explicit attitude towards smokers.  
Similarly, teenagers who liked specific actors who smoked had stronger 
intentions to smoke even though they had never smoked themselves 
(Tickle, Hull, Sargent, Dalton & Heatherton, 2006).   
So although there are experiments that suggest that implicit 
attitudes can be changed using appropriate techniques in a relatively short 
time frame, we need to ask whether this is applicable to implicit attitudes 





1.10. Children’s perception of climate change 
 
As discussed earlier, education is critical in the fight against 
climate change.  Therefore, if we are to tackle climate change, we need to 
educate the next generation because they, of course, are the future.  
Environmental education is intended to change the attitudes and 
behaviour of the learners and make them more aware of the consequences 
of their current behaviour (Zsóka, Szerényi, Széchy & Kocsis, 2013).  Yet 
attitudes towards the environment (both implicit and explicit) develop at 
an early age (Bryant & Hungerford, 1977) and once these attitudes are 
formed, they are much more difficult to change (Asunta, 2003) so it is 
important to target children at an early age.  Indeed, younger children are 
less likely to have developed harmful habits concerning environmental 
behaviour, they are more susceptible to learning new information, and can 
then effectively promote pro-environmental behaviour in others if they are 
educated in the correct way (Leeming & Porter, 1997).  If children are 
more aware of the behaviours they need to employ in order to tackle the 
problems of climate change and are willing to adapt their behaviour, they 
can potentially motivate siblings and those they live with (Damerell, 
Howe & Milner-Gulland, 2013).  Wilcox, Gillies, Wilcox and Reid (1981) 
found that children actually influenced their parents to give up smoking 
after they completed a project at school about lung health.  There is also 
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supporting evidence that children who are educated about environmental 
issues have influenced the behaviour of family members at home 
(Sutherland & Ham, 1992; Uzzell & Prtugal, 1994).   
However, in the past, environmental education has focused on 
scientific knowledge and not enough on the encouragement of pro-
environmental behaviour (Tsevreni, 2011) and there is little correlation 
between abstract environmental knowledge, scientific knowledge and 
actual pro-environmental behaviour (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; 
Finger, 1994).  A possible mechanism to encourage such behaviour is to 
focus on the empowerment of children by informing them of what 
alternative actions they should take rather than focusing on scientific 
knowledge and ecological issues.  Tsevreni (2011) took an alternative 
approach to educating children in Athens about the environment, putting 
emphasis on children’s willingness to engage and participate in a pro-
environmental community.  The participants consisted of 60 children aged 
between 9 and 12.  Tsevreni used methods such as storytelling, 
photography and drama as a way to explore pro-environmental behaviour 
in order for children to communicate their own experiences and 
perceptions with regard to the environment.  In doing this, children were 
encouraged to address issues through the expression of emotion.  The first 
task was to address issues through storytelling.  Children were asked to 
participate in a storytelling contest.  They were told to ‘Imagine that you 
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are an extra-terrestrial landing with your spacecraft on Athens: Describe 
what you like and what you do not like in the city; How do you imagine 
the city after 20 years? Which changes would you like to be made in the 
city?’ (2011, p.56).  The children were able to read each other’s stories 
and share ideas and thoughts about the future of the planet.  In the second 
task, children were provided with easy to use cameras and were asked to 
take photographs of their neighbourhood, paying attention to their 
favourite areas, areas they disliked and areas where they liked to play.  
Children were then asked to describe, in writing, why they took the 
pictures of the specific areas and what they would like to express through 
the images depicted in the photographs.  In the final stage, the children 
formed groups and expressed through drama, the positive and negative 
issues regarding the city.  After each activity, the children were asked to 
write about their feelings towards the environment and their experiences.  
At the start of the study, the children showed a lack of confidence in their 
ability to express their own thoughts and opinions and they did not display 
a ‘willingness to act’.  However, after engaging in such activities and 
having the freedom to express and analyse their ideas, a number of issues 
arose - many of the children felt that nobody would listen to them with 
regards to future plans of their own environment and the lack of power 
felt by the children proved that the children had a low sense of self-
efficacy.  Many of the children had negative thoughts about their 
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environment and were pessimistic about the future.  They brought up the 
issue of pollution caused by cars saying that they would like to see ‘less 
cars and more flowers and trees’.  But the main observation from this 
study was the increase in self-confidence that the children felt in their 
ability to express their own thought and opinions.  Indeed, this feeling of 
empowerment may well impact on actual behaviour (in terms of self-
efficacy). 
So, if children feel a sense of empowerment and are more 
confident in expressing their opinions regarding their environment, they 
can then influence the people around them and encourage changes at home 
‘As children learn about sustainability at school, they sometimes bring 
new ideas and actions to live more sustainably at home’ (Desjardins & 
Wakkary, 2011).  Damerell, Howe and Milner-Gulland (2013) found that 
children who were educated about the environment, transferred 
knowledge between peers which successfully encouraged positive 
changes in behaviour in the home.  They collected data from seven 
schools, all of which had all undertaken learning activities on wetlands.  
They compared data to eight other schools who had undertaken work on 
alternative projects.  Both sets of pupils completed questionnaires, as did 
the parents of pupils from both groups.  The children completed their 
questionnaires, addressing issues regarding ‘wetland’ whilst they were in 
school and then took a slightly different version of the questionnaire home 
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to their parents.  Not surprisingly, children who had undertaken the work 
on wetland scored higher on the questionnaire than those children who 
had studied alternative subjects.  Parents whose children had undertaken 
the wetland work also scored higher than the parents of the children who 
studied alternative subjects.  However, the most surprising result was that 
the children who had undertaken the wetland course had a positive 
influence on water use behaviour at home. 
1.11. Summary 
If we are to combat climate change then it could be argued that a 
better understanding of some of the psychological issues surrounding 
environmental attitudes and behaviour, and climate change, will be the 
key to its success.  We need to identify the psychological barriers.  This 
review of the literature on government and commercial initiatives to 
change our behaviour to climate change has highlighted the assumptions 
on which these campaigns were based.  In this introduction, the emergence 
of the concept of implicit, as well as explicit attitudes has been detailed, 
and how these implicit attitudes can be measured has been discussed.  The 
possible link between implicit attitudes and actual behaviour (as opposed 
to self-reported behaviour) in a number of domains has been outlined.  
Also discussed in the introduction is how these implicit attitudes develop 
in childhood and how they can be changed.  The review, as a whole, has 
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identified a range of critical issues where current psychological 
knowledge is in need of systematic and urgent development.  There have 
been many, very well publicised and meaningful campaigns, that have 
failed to deliver because they lacked an adequate understanding of some 
of the key psychological factors that underpin human action and consumer 
behaviour.  The goal of this PhD is to address some of these key issues.   
Empirical research is reported in four chapters (chapters 2-6).  In 
each case, the study has either been published, submitted for publication 
or a publication is in preparation.  Each chapter is, therefore, organised 
around a published piece of work or a piece of work currently in press or 
being prepared for publication.  The chapters in the thesis are modified 
versions of each of these papers.  This was necessary for a number of 
reasons - for reasons of redundancy and overlap (especially in aspects of 
the method sections) and for theoretical refinement and cohesion.  Each 
chapter begins with a scene setting introduction, indicative of the original 
introduction.      
   Chapter 2 explores the implications of implicit attitudes for 
unconscious, low level and habitual behaviours like visual attention, 
which is the bedrock of human action.  Earlier research (Beattie & 
McGuire, 2012) had identified how implicit attitudes predicted attention 
to iconic climate change images.  It reported that those with a strong 
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positive implicit attitude towards low carbon products spent significantly 
more time attending to negative images of climate change than positive 
images of nature in a ten second interval and this was observed even in 
the case of the first 200 milliseconds of looking.  But how does this apply 
to other stimuli including carbon footprint on products? Is there a 
relationship between implicit attitudes and visual attention here?  Do 
explicit attitudes predict visual attention in this context?  Again, earlier 
research had suggested that there is minimal visual attention to carbon 
footprint on products, given the competition with all of the other salient 
stimuli (price, energy, brand etc.).  Is this the case when we restrict our 
focus to those with positive implicit attitudes to low carbon? 
Chapter 3 explores the issue of the relationship between explicit 
and implicit attitudes and self-reported environmental behaviour, as well 
as actual consumer choice (including carbon choices) in a simulated 
shopping task.  The concept of time pressure is introduced as a variable to 
see how this affects consumer choice, when behaviour is more automatic.   
Chapter 4 introduces other core aspects of products including 
brand – well-known, value, luxury and organic/eco that clearly influence 
choice, and again considers the effects of time pressure on selection 
decisions.  The effects of implicit and explicit attitude on aspects of these 
choices are considered in a very fine-grained analysis.   
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Chapter 5 considers the effects of the presence of other on 
consumer choices when products are labelled in terms of their 
environmental impact.  This chapter introduces ‘costly signalling theory’ 
as a possible explanatory device for the choice of certain products.  
Chapter 6 investigates whether we can modify implicit attitude through 
film, by targeting informational or emotional routes (or whether in fact we 
need to do both).  It poses the critical (and often neglected questions) of 
how persistent any such change is, and what are the implications of any 
change in attitude for behaviour.  The final chapter, Chapter 7, is the 
general discussion which reflects on the implications of the work 
presented in this thesis and present a vision for future research, including 
the introduction of a proposed educational programme on climate change 


















Chapter 2: How implicit attitudes predict 
pre-conscious visual attention to carbon 
footprint information on products 
2.1. Introduction  
Enlisting the help of consumers in the fight against climate change 
is at the heart of many political and business agendae across the world 
(Walker & King, 2008) and central to the strategic vision of many leading 
multinational companies including organisations like Unilever, P&G and 
Tesco.  Many in the business and political spheres are optimistic about the 
chances of success here because there seems to be clear evidence, from 
self-report measures at least, that consumers are prepared to change their 
behaviour to help ameliorate the effects of climate change.  These self-
report attitude surveys repeatedly tell us that the public are aware of the 
environmental issues surrounding climate change and that they are 
prepared to modify their consumer habits.  For example, as already 
discussed, one survey reported that ‘70% of people agree that if there is 
no change in the world, we will soon experience a major environmental 
crisis’ (Downing & Ballantyne, 2007).  Another survey reported that ‘78% 
of people say that they are prepared to change their behaviour to help limit 
climate change’ and that ‘85% of consumers want more information about 
the environmental impacts of products they buy’ (Berry, Crossley & 
Jewell, 2008).  
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On the basis of such evidence many argue that one important 
weapon in the fight against climate change is the provision of carbon 
footprint information on products so that consumers can make informed 
decisions in the light of products’ environmental consequences.  In a 
speech in 2007, Terry Leahy, the then CEO of Tesco (the multinational 
supermarket chain), announced a call to arms to tackle the problem of 
climate change.  His message was simple.  He said that ‘The green 
movement must become a mass movement in green consumption’.  In 
order to achieve this goal Leahy argued that ‘we must empower everyone 
- not just the enlightened or the affluent’.  He believed that the market was 
ready for this green consumer ‘revolution’, and his proposed solution was 
to break down the barriers of price and information.  In other words, he 
was arguing, from a marketing and business point of view, that we must 
make green choices affordable and give the consumer the right 
information in the supermarket itself to make informed decisions to 
produce a ‘revolutionary’ change in our patterns of consumption. 
So in order to promote more sustainable lifestyles amongst their 
customers, Tesco, went on to embrace the ‘green movement’, spending 
millions on labelling their products with carbon footprint information.  He 
pledged that with the help of ‘The Carbon Trust’, Tesco would put carbon 
labels on 70,000 of their own brand products.  So, aiming their new 
campaign at individual consumers, Tesco proceeded to mark many of 
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their own brand products with a carbon footprint label.  The particular 
label included a symbol of a black footprint in which the carbon value of 
the particular item was embedded, and alongside it was a small box of 
information about what exactly had been calculated e.g. ‘The carbon 
footprint of this product is the total carbon dioxide (CO2) and other 
greenhouse gases emitted during its life, including production, use and 
disposal’ and then another box saying ‘We have committed to reduce this 
carbon footprint’.  But Tesco made many psychological assumptions 
when creating this campaign.  Firstly, they assumed that consumers had 
the right underlying attitude to act in a pro-environmental way and, 
therefore, that they were ready to change their behaviour.  They also 
presumed that consumers understood what the value of carbon footprint 
meant (e.g. if the value was high or low) and that consumers would pay 
sufficient visual attention to these labels in real time which, in turn, would 
affect their supermarket shopping behaviour.  Perhaps Tesco thought that 
these labels would have the same influence on consumer behaviour as 
calorie and fat content labels did.   
However, some academics were more cautious and argued that 
labels alone would not be ‘sufficient to meet frequently stated targets’.  
But even they agree that carbon labels ‘can play an important role in the 
near term’ (Vandenbergh, Deitz & Stern, 2011).  Others fall somewhere 
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in the middle; they have concluded that carbon labels have a very 
important role to play here because once consumers start to adapt their 
own behaviour in response to the carbon labels on products, then they will 
expect farmers, businesses, importers, manufacturers, multinationals, 
even governments to do more to reduce the carbon footprint of the 
products they, the consumers, require. 
This general approach clearly has significant appeal at a number 
of different levels.  It would seem to empower consumers to act in a 
positive way for the environment by providing them with basic knowledge 
and information.  In addition, it would allow them to behave in accordance 
with their underlying attitude towards the environment.   
However, this approach does make several major assumptions 
about consumers, their attitudes, the efficacy and importance of self-
report measures for predicting behaviour, the underlying values of 
consumers and the psychological salience of carbon labels, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, and all of which do require careful testing.  The first specific 
assumption that needs to be examined is that self-reports are the best way 
of measuring attitudes and the best predictors of actual consumer 
behaviour.  Research has consistently shown that such self-report attitudes 
may predict behaviour under certain situations, especially when people 
have the motivation and the opportunity to deliberate before making a 
behavioural choice (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & Williams, 1995), but they 
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are less good at predicting spontaneous behaviour under time pressure 
(Friese, Wänke & Plessner, 2006; Beattie, 2010; Beattie & Sale, 2011), or 
when consumers are under any sort of cognitive or emotional load (Gibson 
2008; Hofman, Rauch & Gawronski, 2007).  Unfortunately, time pressure, 
cognitive load (see Block & Morwitz, 1999), and the absence of any 
opportunity to deliberate, characterises much of everyday supermarket 
shopping (Beattie & Sale, 2011).  Supermarket shopping is rarely found 
to be a slow, deliberate, reflective process, the shopper passes about 300 
brands per minute (Rundh, 2007) and each individual choice is often quick 
and automatic (Zeithaml, 2008).  In such contexts, unconsciously held 
implicit attitudes might be a better predictor of actual consumer behaviour 
than explicit attitudes, where an implicit attitude is defined as ‘the 
introspectively unidentified…trace of past experience that mediates R’ 
[where R is the response – the favourable or unfavourable feeling, 
thought, or action towards the social object] (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, 
p.5).  In other words, habitual consumer behaviour without much 
opportunity or motivation to deliberate might be driven by processes not 
open to introspection and therefore not picked up by self-report measures.  
They require a different sort of measure.  In the words of Greenwald and 
Banaji (1995, p.5) ‘Investigations of implicit cognition require indirect 
measures, which neither inform the subject of what is being assessed nor 
request self-report concerning it’.  
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Despite numerous surveys of self-reported explicit attitude to the 
environment, few studies have attempted to measure implicit attitudes to 
the environment, or to more specific phenomena such as low carbon 
products, using measurement techniques like the implicit association test 
(IAT).  The IAT is now widely used in some domains in psychology, as 
discussed in the introduction.  Despite the plethora of research on self-
report attitudes to the environment we actually know very little about the 
nature of implicit attitudes in this important domain.  But the carbon 
labelling approach to ameliorating the effects of climate change seems to 
be based on the premise that the kinds of attitudes that predict actual 
consumer behaviour are going to be positive.  Given that such attitudes 
are likely to be implicit rather than explicit this needs to be explicitly 
tested.     
A second major assumption underlying the carbon labelling 
approach is that the carbon footprint image or icon is sufficiently salient 
to consumers that they will actually attend to it whilst shopping in 
supermarkets within the appropriate time frame.  Without minimal 
attention (and perhaps more than minimal attention given the amount of 
information actually represented in the carbon label), carbon footprint 
cannot possibly influence consumer choice.  However, shoppers pass 
brands every 1/5th second in supermarkets (Gelperowic & Beharrell, 
1994) and spend between 5 and 7 seconds looking at possible items for 
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purchases.  This means that the attention of the consumers’ needs to be 
highly selective.  We have known for some considerable time that 
attention reflects individual needs and values (Bruner & Goodman, 1947), 
but are consumer values towards the environment sufficiently positive 
here to direct attentional processes towards carbon labels?   Carbon 
footprint information has to compete in this cognitively rich environment 
with all of the other important types of information on products, including 
price, calories or energy, fat content, brand, special offers, sell-by date 
etc., all vying for the attention of the consumer.  So how salient is the 
carbon footprint on products to consumers?  
We know from other domains that some information labels on 
products can influence consumer choice presumably because of the ‘needs 
and values’ of the consumer.  The Guideline Daily Allowance (GDA) 
nutritional labelling scheme is one such example, and one frequently 
mentioned by the CEO of Tesco himself when Tesco launched its own 
carbon labelling scheme.  Tesco had found, by analysing its own club-
card data that sales of low fat meals increased when GDA was introduced 
whilst sales of high fat meals decreased.  This all occurred in a short time 
frame.  Beattie (2012) pointed out that ‘sales of their [Tesco’s] salmon en 
croute (with a GDA fat content of 53% and a saturated fat content of 91%) 
went down by 29% in the two-month period after GDA information was 
introduced, whereas sales of their vegetable curry (with a GDA fat content 
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of 25% and a saturated fat content of 20%) went up by 33%’ (p. 214).   
This real world example suggests that GDA information on food products 
was attended to and acted on; indeed the effects on consumer choice were 
fairly rapid.  The salience of nutritional labels for consumers is also 
backed up by experimental research in the area of visual processing of 
product labels using eye-tracking technology, where people’s patterns of 
eye movements and individual fixations are monitored as they look at 
products.  Such eye-tracking is viewed as ‘an unobtrusive, sensitive, real-
time behavioural index of ongoing visual and cognitive processing’ 
(Henderson & Ferreira, 2004, p.18), which provides accurate data on the 
allocation of attention (see Beattie et al., 2010).  Eye-tracking is an 
important technique in this research because there is evidence that self-
reported viewing of nutritional information tends to be higher than the 
objective figures as revealed by eye-tracking.  In other words, when it 
comes to certain types of behaviour you cannot rely on what people say. 
Beattie reviewed the evidence on this and concluded in the 
following terms: ‘Visschers, Hess and Siegrist (2010), using eye-tracking, 
found that 66% of their participants looked at the nutrition label on the 
front of cereal packets, and those packets with a simple design seemed to 
be more successful in drawing participants’ attention to the nutrition label.  
They also found that those participants who approached the task with a 
particular ‘health motivation’ spent more time viewing the nutritional 
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information than those participants who approached the task with a ‘taste 
motivation’.  Graham and Jeffery (2011) monitored adult participants 
viewing food items on a computer and found that calorie information was 
the most salient feature (71% of participants looked at this), with 61% 
looking at fat content and 40% at carbohydrate content. So the argument 
goes, carbon footprint could (and should) have a similar effect.  Indeed, a 
piece in the Economist in June 2011 reported encouraging signs of 
progress in the following words, ‘In Britain, a pioneer in carbon labelling, 
nine out of ten households bought products with carbon labels last 
year….and total sales of such products exceeded £2 billion’.  But what is 
interesting about the quote is that the missing words are “albeit mostly 
unwittingly”’ (Beattie, 2012, p. 215). 
Nevertheless, the plan then was for Tesco to include carbon 
footprint labels on each of its 70,000 own brand products.  Other major 
multinationals were to follow suit. 
However, in a controlled eye-tracking experiment (Beattie et al., 
2010), as outlined in the introduction, it was discovered that carbon 
footprint was unfortunately not like GDA nutritional information.  People 
were eye-tracked as they looked at images of various products with carbon 
labels (Tesco low energy light bulb, orange juice and ‘Non-Bio’ liquid 
detergent).  Each of these products had an array of competing information 
represented on their packaging.  The first analyses focused on level of 
108 
 
fixation in the first 5 seconds, the second 5 seconds, and also the first 
fixation period of 200 milliseconds (or 5 successive gaze points).  It was 
found that the pattern of visual attention varied considerably depending 
on the product type.  In the case of the clearly ‘green’ low energy light 
bulb, our participants looked at the carbon footprint (the carbon footprint 
icon plus the associated information) for a high proportion of the time (a 
mean of 65.3 frames across both right and left rotated views, or 26.1% of 
the time). See Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: An example of one participant’s gaze at the carbon footprint 
label on the low energy light bulb (from Beattie, 2010). 
 
 
In the case of the orange juice they looked at the carbon footprint 
for 10.0% of the total time.  In the case of the detergent they spent 3.3% 
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of the total time focusing on the carbon footprint.  In terms of the time 
course of gaze at the light bulb, attention was directed within the first five 
seconds at the carbon footprint icon, but attention only moved to the 
accompanying textual information in the second five second period.  It 
seemed to take much longer for participants to attend to the basic carbon 
footprint icon in the case of the orange juice (only really focussing in the 
second five second interval), and in the case of this product they hardly 
attended to the accompanying information at all.  In the case of the 
detergent, there was minimal visual attention to any aspect of the carbon 
footprint.  Importantly, in less than 7% of cases overall did the participants 
fixate immediately on the carbon footprint icon or the accompanying 
carbon footprint information.  And, these results may have represented, as 
Beattie (2012) pointed out ‘an over-estimation of attention in situ because 
the images presented on the computer screen for participants to view 
simultaneously presented front and back views of the products; in 
supermarkets customers would have had to go to the trouble of turning the 
products around (GDA information is, of course, represented on the fronts 
of most products)’ (p. 215). 
Psychologists have argued that ‘Humans have an impressive 
capacity to determine what is salient in their environment and direct 
attention in a timely fashion to such items’ (Bowman, Su, Wyble & 
Barnard, 2009).  Carbon footprint labels should be salient to participants 
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(and if you relied solely on what people reported in surveys then you 
would surely conclude that they are very salient indeed).  However, this 
preliminary eye-tracking experiment, which did not rely on self-report 
data, does raise some questions about their salience.  It also raises some 
serious questions about the plausibility of igniting a ‘green revolution’ in 
consumer behaviour by presenting carbon labels on products.  If people 
do not attend to such labels in the first place, then the ‘green revolution’ 
is likely to be postponed for some considerable time. 
   This original study into carbon labels and visual attention 
(Beattie et al., 2010) clearly requires careful consideration.  Perhaps, the 
most striking result in this study was the variation in level of fixation 
towards carbon footprint information depending on the particular product.  
A high level of visual attention was directed at the carbon footprint of the 
low energy light bulb (18.2% of a 10 sec. interval) but the carbon footprint 
of other products (e.g. the detergent) received only minimal visual 
attention (see also Beattie, 2010).  However, this study was, of course, 
exploratory and to a certain extent, inconclusive because, although it did 
identify significant differences in level of fixation to various products, it 
did not identify which features of the products were responsible for this.  
Did participants attend more to the carbon footprint of the low energy light 
bulb because they knew that the footprint would be low, thus reflecting 
some sort of ‘optimism bias’ where gaze preference ‘towards positive and 
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away from negative images…reflect an underlying motivation to regulate 
emotions and to feel good’ (Isaacowitz, 2005; Isaacowitz, 2006; but see 
also Beattie and McGuire, 2011 for some contrary evidence).  If this were 
the case, then it would have major implications for the potential efficacy 
of carbon labelling.  Consumers might only check the carbon footprint of 
products that they know are low, not wanting to ‘see’ the bad news on 
others (like some weight-conscious consumers not checking the fat 
content of chocolates and buying them regardless).  Alternatively, did the 
results reflect the fact that low energy light bulbs are highly associated in 
people’s minds with being environmentally friendly, and therefore the 
unconscious eye movements move automatically to carbon footprint when 
this product is presented?  On the other hand, did the physical features of 
the product labels, including simple things like the relative size of the 
different categories of information represented affect the results?  
Moreover, why did our participants look much less at the carbon footprint 
on the detergent?  Was it because of how the footprint was represented on 
the detergent bottle (some physical attribute of the representation)?  Or 
was it because the carbon footprint of the detergent was high?  Or was it 
something to do with the strength of the mental association between 
(positive) environmental issues and detergent?  These are all potentially 
extremely important questions because of the emphasis being placed on 
carbon labelling as a potential solution to the issue of climate change.  But 
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without testing some of these basic alternative hypotheses, and 
determining the psychological salience of the carbon footprint, much 
effort in this domain could well be wasted. 
The experiment detailed in this chapter was an attempt to test 
experimentally some of these basic alternate hypotheses.  The salience of 
carbon footprint information was investigated by controlling the physical 
size of information labels for all three attributes (carbon footprint, price, 
energy/calories) on a range of products which did not have ready-made 
environmental associations (unlike low energy light bulbs), but 
systematically changing both the price and the carbon footprint 
information to examine the impact of these changes on unconscious visual 
fixation.  An additional question concerns whether implicit attitude 
predicts gaze direction and focus on carbon footprint, as it does in at least 
one other domain in the area of sustainability.  As previously outlined, 
research by Beattie and McGuire (2012) attempted to determine how eye 
movements towards or away from iconic images of climate 
change/environmental damage were affected by different attitudinal 
measures (either explicit or implicit).  The results revealed that those with 
a strong positive implicit attitudes to carbon footprint were significantly 
more likely to focus on the negative images of climate 
change/environmental damage than positive images of nature, and they 
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focus more on these images than those who do not have such strong 
implicit attitudes.  It was also found that this even occurs in the first 200 
milliseconds of viewing the slide.  Those with a positive implicit attitude 
to low carbon footprint products looked more at the negative images of 
climate change/environmental damage in the first 200 ms compared with 
those with less strong positive implicit attitudes to low carbon footprint 
products.  Measures of explicit attitude did not, however, predict patterns 
of eye movement towards the negative images in this way.  It would seem 
that those who have strong implicit pro-low carbon attitudes are primed 
to attend to these sorts of images, whereas those who only report strong 
attitudes are not (they actually looked less).   
This significant pattern of ‘primed’ eye movement occurs in such 
a short interval (one fifth of a second) that it is pre-conscious.  This might 
mean that those with positive implicit attitudes could potentially direct 
attention to any appropriate imagistic representations relevant to climate 
change/environmental damage (including, carbon footprint) very quickly.  
This, at least, is a potential hypothesis and one that offers some hope to 
the lobby that says we could change consumer behaviour by providing 
carbon footprint information to consumers. 
But should it really be expected that this attentional focus occurs 
with carbon labels?  This is not necessarily an easy question to answer at 
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the present time.  One could argue that a positive implicit attitude would 
predict an intrinsic interest in anything to do with the environment and 
climate change, be it an iconic image of the consequences of climate 
change, or an informational label on a product denoting what its carbon 
footprint actually is.  However, one could also argue that we are now 
very familiar with iconic images of climate change, indeed one such 
iconic image, depicting the stranded polar bear on the melting ice floe, is 
an immediate and recognizable signifier of climate change.  This has 
become something of a clichéd image of climate concern.  So much so 
that coming up to Christmas, 2011 Coca Cola teamed up with the WWF 
to ‘help the polar bear’, and, in an attempt to publicly display their 
‘green credentials’, changed the design of their famous cans.  See Figure 
2.2.  They changed the colour of their cans from red to white, added an 
image of polar bears, and then launched 1.4 billion of these special 













Figure 2.2: An example of the special edition Coca Cola can, which was 
launched onto the market in 2011. 
 
Muhtar Kent, Chairman and CEO of the Coca-Cola Company had 
this to say about the campaign ‘We want to help the polar bear – a beloved 
Coca-Cola icon since 1922 – by helping conserve its Arctic habitat’ (see 
the brandchannel October 25th 2011).  As the British newspaper, the 
Telegraph commented (3rd December 2011) ‘It was the first time in 125 
years that the regular product had been switched from its trademark red 
cans’. 
The outcome, however, was not positive.  The design and the 
colour had to be abandoned because consumers complained that the white 
cans were too easily confused with the silver Diet Coke brands.  In 
addition, consumers believed that the new colour also seemed to affect the 
taste of the product, which in fact was unchanged.  One should perhaps 
remember that a change in taste perception as a function of visual cues is 
116 
 
not unusual (see Ghose & Lowengart, 2001).  Market forces inevitably 
won out in the end and the cans were dropped. 
Of course, the ‘meaning’ of the polar bear, and our emotional 
response to it, has changed significantly between 1922 and the present 
day.  But by using the polar bear image, Coco-Cola simultaneously 
signified its product’s long tradition (in the period leading up to Christmas 
tradition is, of course, a very important concept), but it explicitly tried to 
communicate that a sugary brand of drink with no nutritional content that 
is sold in aluminium cans is actually very ‘environmentally sensitive’. 
But the important point in the present context is that if iconic 
images signifying climate change are used to market products like Coca-
Cola then this indicates how immediate (and how emotional) our response 
to them must be.  This emotional response could be crucial to driving our 
behaviour in the appropriate time frame (see Damasio, 1994).  
Presumably, a market leader like Coca-Cola would have tested this very 
carefully before it proceeded.  Would carbon footprint labels, without that 
significant period of association with climate change, and without the 
same emotional response (see Beattie, 2012), have the same effect and 
draw the eyes unconsciously towards them as a function of our underlying 
implicit values?  The answer could well be negative. 
Of course, if those with positive implicit attitudes did show higher 
levels of fixation on carbon footprint labels, or more immediate fixations 
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on the carbon footprint information, this could have important 
implications for the efficacy of carbon labelling schemes.  It would also 
have potentially important implications for the likelihood or unlikeliness 
of a ‘green revolution’ in consumer habits merely through careful 
marketing and informed consumer choice.  In other words, it is a question 
of some considerable practical as well as theoretical importance. 
The hypotheses for this study are detailed below:   
 
H1: Implicit attitudes will predict visual attention to carbon footprint 
labels, in that those participants with a strong positive implicit attitude to 
carbon footprint will attend to carbon labels with greater immediacy and 
for longer periods of time than those with a weaker implicit attitude. 
 
H2: Those participants with a strong positive implicit attitude will be more 
likely to fixate first on the carbon footprint label than those with weaker 
implicit attitudes. 
 
H3: Given the current lack of detailed knowledge about specific carbon 
footprint values amongst the public, different values of the individual 
carbon footprint labels (without any colour coding to distinguish ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ values) are unlikely to influence overall gaze fixation on carbon 
labels, or first fixation on carbon labels, of the participants. 
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H4: Explicit attitude will not predict visual attention to carbon labels, 
including both overall gaze fixation or first fixation to carbon footprint 
labels.   
2.2. Method 
This was part of a larger market research project (sponsored by 
Tesco) into visual attention to product labels.  It was also originally 
conceived of as potentially part of a broader ethnographic consideration 
of visual attention to product labels in actual supermarket shopping.  
Four different non-branded packages were created for muesli, 
cake mix, ice lollies and detergent (see Figures 2.3 – 2.6).  On each slide 
– there were 6 features: product name, product image, carbon footprint 
(icon plus text ‘working with the carbon trust’, and carbon value e.g. 0.6g 
CO2), price, energy value (calories, number of washes) and bar code.  The 
product image and the product name were in colour, the product 































































Price and carbon footprint information were systematically varied 
yielding 4 combinations of high price/high carbon footprint (CF); high 
price/low CF; low price/high CF; low price/low CF.  Energy value 
(calories or number of washes for detergent), bar code, product name and 
image were all kept constant.  Sixteen different stimulus slides were used 
(4 products times 4 combinations); each contained one product name and 
image plus bar code with three different information labels (carbon 
footprint, price, and energy).  The position of these different information 
labels was systematically rotated on the product (See Figure 2.7).  The 
information labels were always the same size, 3cm x 2.5 cm = (7.5 cm2), 
and the monitor was 33cm x 24 cm = (792 cm2).  The order of presentation 
















Figure 2.7:  How CF, energy and price labels were rotated on one 
product. 
 
The image of the product was always located in the middle of the 
slide.  An angle Ө for the location of each information label was selected 
using the randomization algorithm below and a point for the centre of 







Ө = Random ( (J-1) * 120 + Z - 20, J * 120 + Z + 20 ) 
(Where J=group number; Z= random ( 0, 90 )) 
r = Random (picturesizewidth, displaysizewidth) 
loop until no overlap. 
 
Figure 2.8: The randomization algorithm for assigning position of 
images on the screen. 
 
 
The slides were shown for 10 seconds and then replaced by the 
next slide in the sequence.  The focus was on ‘spontaneous looking’ at 
these slides, following the logic of Kahneman ‘In the absence of a specific 
instruction to search for visual information, spontaneous looking is 
controlled by enduring dispositions that determine which parts of the field 
124 
 
of view should attract and hold the gaze’ (1973, p.52).  There were 22 
participants in total; all were university undergraduates paid £5 for their 
participation.   
2.2.1. Procedure 
An ASL Model 504 remote eye tracker was set up in front of the 
computer monitor on which the stimulus material was shown.  The eye 
tracker employs a camera surrounded by infrared emitting diodes to 
illuminate the eye of the participant looking at a screen.  The participants’ 
point of gaze on the screen is determined by the camera combining the 
position of the pupil and the corneal reflection.  The remote camera in the 
eye tracker fed into a screen in order to enable observation of the 
positioning of camera observing the eye.  From a separate computer, the 
illumination of the infra-red camera and the ‘pan/tilt’ of the camera in the 
eye tracker was adjusted to enable recognition of the pupil and corneal 
reflection.  Participants were seated in front of the eye tracker.  The eye 
tracker was adjusted to record each participant’s right eye, the participant 
then had to undergo a 9-point calibration procedure.  The calibration was 
carried out by asking each participant to gaze at each of the nine numbers 
on the screen in front of them (and told when to look at each number in 
turn).  The numbers were on the extreme left, middle and extreme right of 
the screen, at the top, middle and bottom of the screen.  If the dots 
signifying gaze were not on the numbers as required during the calibration 
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process then adjustments to the settings were made, and the participant 
was restarted in the calibration procedure.  Finally, participants were told 
simply that they were going to be shown a series of images, which were 
not specified in advance.   
2.2.2. Scoring 
The recordings were analysed using a freeware mpeg2 video 
editing program (mpeg2cut2) with frame advance function to analyse 
mpeg2 video clips.  Each 40 ms frame was coded by a human observer in 
terms of where each participant was looking.  There were 22 participants 
(16 slides x 10 seconds x 25 frames per second) generating 88,000 
individual data points individually coded and analysed.  Each frame was 
scored as having gaze focus on carbon footprint/price/energy/product 














2.2.3. Attitudinal measurements 
Participants completed two computerised self-report attitudinal 
measures (a Likert scale and a Feeling Thermometer) after the eye-
tracking was complete (see Figures 2.10 and 2.11).  The Likert scale 
assesses explicit preference towards high/low carbon footprint products.  
Participants were asked: ‘Which statement best describes you?’ on a 5-
point scale (1 = ‘I strongly prefer products with a high carbon footprint to 
a low carbon footprint’; 5 = ‘I strongly prefer products with a low carbon 
footprint to a high carbon footprint’).  The Feeling Thermometer assesses 
explicit feelings of warmth and coldness towards products with high/low 
carbon footprints.  Participants were asked: ‘Please rate how warm or cold 
you feel toward the following products’ (1 is ‘very cold’; 5 is ‘very 
warm’).  Thermometer difference (TD) scores (ranging from - 4 to + 4) 
were calculated by subtracting the score given to the high carbon product 
from the score given to the low.  Positive scores indicate a preference for 




















Figure 2.10: A computerised version of the Likert scale for measuring 














Figure 2.11:  A computerised version of the Feeling Thermometer scale 




 2.2.4. Implicit Association Test (IAT)  
There were two target categories (Low Carbon Footprint/High 
Carbon Footprint) and two attribute categories (Good/Bad).  Exemplars 
from these categories appeared in the middle of the screen and participants 
were asked to sort the exemplars into their respective categories which 
appeared at the top left-hand and right-hand corners of the screen.  In this 
version of the IAT images were used to represent the high carbon and low 
carbon exemplars as research has suggested that images can be evaluated 
quicker than words (De Houwer & Hermans, 1994; Giner-Sorolla, García 
& Bargh, 1999; Hermans, De Houwer & Ellen, 1994).  To sort exemplars 
into the left-hand category, participants were asked to press ‘Z’ on the 
left-hand side of the keyboard and to sort exemplars into the right-hand 
category participants were asked to press ‘M’ (on the right-hand side of 
the keyboard).  In total, there were seven blocks where Blocks 1, 2 and 5 
were practice blocks and Blocks 3, 4, 6 and 7 were the critical blocks 
where participants were required to sort exemplars into one of two 
categories that appeared simultaneously.  The reasoning behind the IAT 
is that participants should find it easier to sort exemplars if the paired 
target categories are associated (therefore responding faster and making 
fewer errors) and harder to sort exemplars if the paired target categories 
are not associated (therefore responding slower and making more errors).  
Thus, participants who associate low carbon footprint products with 
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‘Good’ and high carbon footprint products with ‘Bad’ should respond 
slower on trials where the pairs are ‘Good/High Carbon Footprint’ and 
‘Bad/Low Carbon Footprint’ and faster on trials where the pairs are 
‘Good/Low Carbon Footprint’ and ‘Bad/High Carbon Footprint’.  The 
converse should be true for participants who associate low carbon 
footprint products with ‘Bad’ and high carbon footprint products with 
‘Good’. 
The computerised versions of the seven trials are shown below in 
Figures 2.12 – 2.18.  This is an example of what the participants actually 


























    
                   Figure 2.13: 2nd block: Good vs. Bad. 
 
Figure 2.14 and 2.15: 3rd and 4th block: Good or High Carbon Footprint 

















Figure 2.17 and 2.18: 6th and 7th block: Good or Low Carbon Footprint 
vs. Bad or High Carbon Footprint. 
 
 
IAT D scores were computed by following the following scoring 
algorithm (see Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 2003): 
1. Exclude trials where latencies are above 10,000 ms. 
2. Exclude trials where over 10% of trials had latencies 
lower than 300 ms. 
3. Calculate mean response latencies for Block 3, Block 4, 
Block 6 and Block 7. 
4. Calculate the standard deviation for Blocks 3 and 6 
(combined) and Blocks 4 and 7 (combined). 
5. Calculate the difference score for Blocks 3 and 6 and the 
difference scores for Blocks 4 and 7. 
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6. Divide the two difference means by the associated pooled 
standard deviations. 
6. Average the two resulting scores to compute the D score 
for each participant. 
 
There was no specific time penalty for errors in this version of the 
IAT.  If participants made a mistake, then they had to press the correct 
key before moving on and this additional step represented the time 
penalty. 
The D score reflects the difference in latencies during the critical 
trials and the error rate.  D score effect sizes are similar to Cohen’s d 
(Cohen, 1988) and usually take the form of small, medium and large 
values of 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 respectively.  Positive IAT effect scores reflect 
a preference for low carbon footprint products, negative effect scores 
reflect a preference for high carbon footprint products (D scores between 
- 0.2 and + 0.2 are considered neutral) see Figure 2.19 below for an 









Figure 2.19: Interpretation of D scores from the carbon footprint IAT. 
 
2.3. Results2 
The mean amount of time spent looking at the carbon footprint 
label was 12.2%, with a range from 8.8% (low CF/high price muesli) to 
16.2% (low CF/low price cake mix).  Participants spent significantly more 
time looking at carbon footprint than they did at price across the 16 stimuli 
(Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test, T= 19½, n = 21, p < 0.001, 
2-tailed test), but not significantly more time looking at carbon footprint 
than energy value (T= 58, n = 19, n.s.).  See Figure. 2.20.   
 
                                            
2 The small number of participants in this study (22), intensively studied, meant that the distribution 









These results suggest that carbon footprint is intrinsically salient 
when the size of the label is carefully matched with other labels (like price 
and energy value) and when the information is represented on the front of 
the product.  Of course, in a real shopping situation price is likely to be 
significantly more important than it was in this particular experimental 
task where no actual purchase had to be made. 
Whether the carbon footprint information was high or low had no 
significant effect on level of fixation (all 8 Wilcoxon tests here were non-




Figure 2.21:  Mean percentage of time spent looking at carbon footprint 
with different products of different prices with error bars. 
 
 
Analyses of the attitude measures revealed that the average Likert 
score was 3.7 (moderately pro-low carbon) with a standard error of 0.16, 
and a mean of 1.7 for Thermometer Difference score (moderately pro-low 
carbon) with a standard error of 0.31.  The IAT revealed that the average 
D score was 1.9 (strongly pro-low carbon) with a standard error of 0.4, 
suggesting that the average implicit attitude was more positive than the 
average explicit attitude in this particular sample.  However, and 
importantly, 5 participants still showed implicit scores that were much 
less pro-low carbon than their self-reported attitudes would suggest (4 had 
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negative D scores indicating a preference toward high carbon products, 
one was neutral, despite all 5 scoring 4 or 5 on the Likert scale).  Similar 
results have been reported elsewhere (Beattie, 2010).  
The next analysis considered the relationship between explicit 
attitudes and the proportion of time spent looking at carbon footprint 
information on each slide.  The analyses was carried out by comparing 
those with a strong positive explicit attitude (operationally defined as 4 or 
5 on the Likert scale) with those with a neutral or negative explicit attitude 
(operationally defined as 1,2 or 3 on the Likert scale).  There were 14 in 
the first set (strong positive explicit attitude) and 8 in the second set 
(neutral or negative explicit attitude).  Each stimulus array was considered 
separately.  In each case n  = 14 and n2=8 and in no case was there any 
significant statistical effect.  See Table 2.1.  In other words, those who 
express a strong positive attitude to carbon footprint do not spend 










Table 2.1: The effects of explicit attitude to carbon footprint on possible 
selective attention to carbon footprint information. 
 
 




































10.8 6.9 52½   
Ice Lollies 
CF-High 
Price – High 
10.4 9.7 52       
Ice Lollies 
CF-High 
Price – Low 
11.6 11.9 55½   
Ice Lollies 
CF-Low 
Price – High 
11.5 18.7 38½   
Ice Lollies 
CF-Low 
Price – Low 
10.2 9.5 53       
Detergent 
CF – High 
Price – High 
13.8 11.6 49½   
Detergent 
CF – High 
Price – Low  
14.1 13.1 50       
Detergent 8.9 11.8 47       
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CF – Low  
Price – High 
Detergent 
CF – Low 
Price - Low 
18.9 6.6 47       
Cake mix 
CF – High 
Price - High 
8.0 11.9 39       
Cake mix 
CF – High 
Price - Low 
10.9 9.5 43       
Cake mix 
CF – Low 
Price - High 
11.9 12.2 52       
Cake mix 
CF – Low 
Price - Low 




The next analysis considered whether implicit attitude had any 
effect on the proportion of time spent looking at carbon footprint 
information.  A strong positive implicit attitude was operationally defined 
as anything above the median D score (D = 1.69) and a more negative 
implicit attitude as anything below the median.  In this case, of course, 
there were 11 in the first set (with a mean D score of 3.24) and 11 in the 
second set (with a mean D score of 0.46; 5 of the 11 had a negative D 
score).  The fixation level on carbon footprint was 1.01% lower for those 
with high D scores compared to lower D score, with means of 11.27% and 
12.28% respectively, and there was no significant relationship between D 
score and level of fixation on carbon footprint information (T=49, n=16, 
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n.s.) when the statistical comparison was made across the 16 stimulus 
arrays (see Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2: The effects of implicit attitude to carbon footprint on possible 
selective attention to carbon footprint information. 
 
Proportion of time spent looking at 
carbon footprint information 
Statistical 
comparisons Mann-
Whitney U test 
U values 
















































CF – High 
Price – 
High 
8.4 17.7 37½   
Detergent 
CF – High 
Price – 
Low  
16.6 11.0 51       
Detergent 
CF – Low  
Price – 
High 
9.6 10.3 55       
Detergent 
CF – Low 
Price - 
Low 
11.0 17.8 49       
Cake mix 
CF – High 
Price – 
High 
9.0 8.3 53       
Cake mix 
CF – High 
Price - 
Low 
9.2 11.7 49       
Cake mix 
CF – Low 
Price -High 
8.3 15.8 46       
Cake mix 
CF – Low 
Price - 
Low 
13.2 19.3 50       
 
 
  It was also found that there was no significant correlation 
between implicit attitude and the proportion of time spent looking at the 
carbon footprint information when each stimulus slide was considered 
separately (with 16 correlations computed, the various Spearman Rank 
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Order Correlation Coefficients ranged from 0.02 to -0.31). See Table 2.3.  
In other words, there seemed to be no systematic relationship between the 
measure of implicit attitude and the overall level of fixation on the carbon 
label, in direct contrast to what had been found with iconic images of 
climate change reported in Beattie and McGuire (2012). 
 
Table 2.3: Mean percentage of time spent looking at CF information for 
each of the 4 products (and the 4 combinations of each product). 
 




High D score  
(above the 
median) 
Low D score  
(below the 
median) 
Cake mix Price-High/CF-High   9.0   9.8 
Price-High/CF-Low   9.2 14.9 
Price-Low/CF-High   9.2 11.7 
Price-Low/CF-Low 11.2 21.2 
Muesli Price-High/CF-High 11.3 15.0 
Price-High/CF-Low 14.5   3.1 
Price-Low/CF-High 19.8   9.9 
Price-Low/CF-Low 10.2   8.4 
Detergent Price-High/CF-High   8.4 17.7 
Price-High/CF-Low   9.9 10.1 
Price-Low/CF-High 16.6 11.0 
Price-Low/CF-Low 11.0 17.9 
Ice lollies Price-High/CF-High 11.2 12.2 
Price-High/CF-Low 10.9   9.1 
Price-Low/CF-High   9.0   9.8 
Price-Low/CF-Low   9.2 14.9 
 
 
Thus, there seems to be no relationship between either measure of 
explicit or implicit attitude and the overall proportion of time spent 
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looking at the carbon footprint information.  However, this does not mean 
that there might not be some more subtle differences in patterns of 
attention between the two groups.  For example, in the Beattie and 
McGuire (2012) study there was an overall difference in level of gaze as 
a function of implicit attitude, but in addition there were also distinct gaze 
biases operating within the first 200 milliseconds.  The group with a high 
positive implicit attitude towards carbon footprint spent a significantly 
higher proportion of the time within the first 200 milliseconds looking at 
negative images of climate change than positive images.  So the question 
for the present experiment is - what is the relationship between attitudinal 
measures and early attentional focus on carbon footprint information?  
Before attempting to answer this, it is important to consider one important 
difference between the two studies.  Iconic images of climate 
change/environmental damage are both instantly recognizable and 
emotionally laden and the question of whether they draw gaze 
immediately was clearly an interesting and pertinent one for the former 
study.  Carbon footprint is different in that the images (and accompanying 
text) are less immediately recognizable and less emotionally laden (see 
again Beattie, 2012) and certainly need more time to process.  So in this 
study the main focus of the analysis was on where the first fixation 
occurred, operationally defined as 200 milliseconds of gaze at the same 
target area (in other words, 5 successive gaze points at the same target).  
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The target areas of interest were the three main attributes of the product, 
namely carbon footprint, price and energy value.  The prediction was that 
implicit attitude should influence first fixation; and more specifically that 
those with a positive implicit attitude should be more likely to fixate first 
on carbon footprint information.  An additional question was - how many 
individual 40 ms gaze points occurred before this first fixation was 
achieved?  Table 2.4 shows how this was scored for one participant 
looking at the different stimulus arrays.  It documents the number of gaze 
points before a fixation was achieved and what the focus of that first 
fixation was.  You can see that this participant had a high D score of 5.62, 
in other words, this was someone with a very high positive implicit 
attitude.  Their first fixation was on ‘carbon footprint’ in the case of 11 
out of 16 stimulus arrays, and it took a mean of 23.5 individual gaze points 
(40 milliseconds each) to arrive at this fixation.  The next most frequent 
fixation target was ‘energy’ with 4 cases (and 15.5 gaze points to arrive at 
this), and ‘price’ in just one case.  This type of analysis was carried out 













D score 5.62 
Slide Number of 40 ms 





10 Carbon Footprint 
Cake mix 
CF-high Price-high 
30 Carbon Footprint 
Ice lollies 
CF-high Price-low 
41 Carbon Footprint 
Muesli 
CF-high Price-low 
27 Carbon Footprint 
Ice lollies 
CF-low Price-high 












30 Carbon Footprint 
Ice lollies 
CF-low Price-low 
14 Carbon Footprint 
Washing powder 
CF-low Price-high 
10 Carbon Footprint 
Washing powder 
CF-high Price-low 
10 Carbon Footprint 
Muesli 
CF-low Price-low 













Table 2.5 shows the fixation pattern of one individual who had a 
negative implicit attitude towards carbon footprint.  Note that here the first 
fixation was on ‘carbon footprint’ in just 4 out of the 16 cases (with a 
mean of 15.3 gaze points to arrive at this fixation).  The ‘energy’ value of 
the product was the most frequent point of first fixation for this participant 
(7 cases), with ‘price’ in second place with 5 cases.  See Table 2.5.  
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Table 2.5: The first fixation of one individual with a negative implicit 
attitude towards carbon footprint. 
 
Participant mp2446 
D score -0.47 
Slide Number of intervals 
































32 Carbon Footprint 
Muesli 
CF-low Price-low 
12 Carbon Footprint 
Muesli 
CF-low Price-high 












12 Energy  
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Following on, a statistical analysis was carried out comparing the 
6 participants with the most positive implicit attitude and the 6 with the 
least positive implicit attitude, as the most extreme members of the set of 
participants in terms of their underlying implicit attitude.  The mean D 
score for the 6 highest was 4.02 and the mean D score for the 6 lowest 
was -0.24.  Those with the most positive attitude had a mean of 7.0 first 
fixations on carbon footprint (out of a possible maximum of 16).  Those 
with the least positive attitude had a mean of 4.5 first fixations on carbon 
footprint.  
 









A Mann-Whitney U test revealed that those with the highest 
positive implicit attitudes were more likely to fixate first on carbon 
footprint information than those with more negative implicit attitudes 
(U=7, n1=6,  n2=6, p < 0.05, one-tailed test). 
 Most positive 
implicit attitude (n=6) 
Least positive 








Mean 7.0 4.5 
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This did not occur with explicit attitude.  Those with the most 
positive explicit scores (defined on the basis of 4/5 on the Likert scale and 
a positive Thermometer Difference score) had a mean of 5.3 first fixations 
on carbon footprint.  Those with more negative explicit attitudes had a 
mean of 6.5 first fixations on carbon footprint.  This difference was both 
in the wrong direction and non-significant.  
These results could turn out to be very important because they 
suggest that implicit attitude has an impact on unconscious gaze behaviour 
such that individuals with a positive implicit attitude to certain 
environmental features are more likely to fixate first on carbon footprint 
information when they view certain products.  One possible implication 
of this is that it suggests that carbon footprint information might just work 
with those individuals who have got the right underlying attitude to the 
environment in the first place.  It also suggests that carbon labelling is not 
entirely doomed as an approach to inducing behavioural change in the 
case of promoting more sustainable consumption. 
2.4. Discussion   
Many influential figures in the worlds of politics and business 
have argued that one important weapon in the fight against climate change 
is the provision of carbon footprint information on products so that 
consumers can make informed decisions in the light of the products’ 
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environmental consequences.  The argument underpinning this has been 
that ‘the green movement must become a mass movement in green 
consumption’ but in order to achieve this some argued that ‘we must 
empower everyone - not just the enlightened or the affluent’.  Both 
politicians and business leaders have suggested that the solution here is to 
break down the barriers of price and information, to make green choices 
affordable and to give the consumer the right information to make 
informed decisions.  At considerable expense (because of the difficulties 
in actually computing accurate carbon footprint information) carbon 
labels have appeared on certain products in various countries across the 
globe.  But could this kind of approach ever work in psychological terms?  
One can, after all, see the obvious attractions of the approach.  It 
empowers consumers to act in a positive way for the environment and, in 
addition, it allows them to do what they say they really want to do, i.e. 
behave in accordance with their (reported) positive attitude towards the 
environment.  It also removes the need for more drastic action like 
government legislation or prohibitive pricing of high carbon alternatives.  
However, unfortunately, it does make several large assumptions both 
about underlying attitudes (and their predictive value for consumer 
choice) and the salience of carbon labels, which this experimental study 
set out to test. 
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The study found firstly in terms of consumer attitude that measure 
of implicit attitude, which seem to predict much of everyday automatic 
consumer choice, do not relate closely to the usual self-report measures of 
attitude in line with previous findings (see Beattie, 2010).  Secondly, in 
terms of visual attention it found that participants do direct their attention 
at carbon labels for a significant proportion of the time, but this overall 
viewing figure is not affected by whether this information is high or low 
(and does not, therefore, reflect any ‘optimism bias’ where people might 
avoid looking at high carbon products).  The level of attention to carbon 
footprint is comparable to the level directed at other sorts of information 
on products, including price, energy value and even the product image 
itself.  This is an important result because without minimal visual attention 
to carbon footprint information, this information could not possibly 
influence consumer choice.  But one must bear in mind here how the 
information was presented in the current study.  The carbon footprint was 
represented on the front of the package (it is normally represented on the 
back or the sides with a clear implicit message about its relative 
importance) and, in addition, the size of the carbon footprint label was 
carefully matched with the other labels, which tends not to be the case 
with real commercial products. 
However, the study also found that there was no significant 
relationship between how positive the explicit attitude to carbon footprint 
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was and the overall amount of attention devoted to the carbon label.  No 
effect was found either with the measure of implicit attitude.  But very 
importantly there was a significant statistical association between the 
measure of implicit attitude and the target of the first fixation.  Those 
individuals with the most positive implicit attitude were more likely to 
fixate first on the carbon footprint information (rather than ‘energy’ or 
‘price’) compared to those with a more negative implicit attitude.  Those 
with the most positive implicit attitude had a mean of 7.0 first fixations on 
carbon footprint whereas those with the least positive implicit attitude had 
a mean of 4.5 first fixations on carbon footprint.  This association did not, 
however, occur with explicit attitude.  Those with the most positive 
explicit scores (defined on the basis of 4/5 Likert scores and a positive 
Thermometer Difference score) had a mean of 5.3 first fixations on carbon 
footprint whereas those with more negative explicit attitudes had a mean 
of 6.5 first fixations on carbon footprint.  As has already been pointed out 
this difference was both in the wrong direction and non-significant.  So 
again, as mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis, there is evidence that 
measures of implicit attitude, but not measures of explicit attitude, predict 
patterns of unconscious eye movements (see also Beattie & McGuire, 
2012). 
This result could potentially have important practical implications 
in our efforts to do something about climate change.  We already know 
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that consumers could be crucial in this fight.  According to the 2005 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment: ‘over the past 50 years, humans have 
changed ecosystems more rapidly and extensively than in any comparable 
period of time in human history’.  In the words of Stoddard and 
Cruickshank (2012) ‘The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) has found that global CO2 emissions grew by 70 per cent between 
1970 and 2004.  This is despite the overwhelming scientific consensus 
that increasing levels of CO2 in the atmosphere caused by human activity 
pose a serious threat to human well-being.  This time frame also 
corresponds to the period during which the global community has come 
to understand human impacts on the environment better than ever before, 
and has developed an ever-expanding system of global governance to 
address these problems’ (2012, p.9).  The authors add a coda that ‘It is 
important to recognise that coincidence does not imply causality.  The 
continued degradation of the global environment has not been caused 
solely by government weaknesses, but rather by a multitude of drivers, 
including prevailing economic models and patterns of consumption and 
production’ (2012, p.9).  Clearly, patterns of consumption are crucial to 
this change in CO2 emissions (along with prevailing economic models and 
patterns of production, as well as, quite probably, the absence of effective 
global governance) because, in many ways these everyday behaviours are 
at the centre of everything.  Change the patterns of consumption, and 
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therefore the demand for certain products (and, of course, the needs, habits 
and aspirations of the consumer) and many other things will fall into place.  
Many politicians and international companies have recognised this very 
point, hence the focus on providing the consumer with clearer information 
about the environmental consequences of the products they buy (in the 
form of carbon footprint labels).  An earlier study which examined 
patterns of gaze fixation on products (Beattie et al., 2010) showed little 
visual attention to carbon footprint labels except on specific 
environmentally friendly products.  The present study, however, might 
hint at a slightly more optimistic conclusion.  It seems to offer the 
intriguing possibility that carbon footprint information might well work 
with the right set of individuals i.e. those with the right implicit attitude to 
the environment in the first place, in that they seem to fixate first on 
carbon footprint at least in an experimental situation. 
Of course, this study was both relatively small scale and an 
experimental analogue (although it did generate 88,000 individual gaze 
points that were individually scored and coded), and therefore does clearly 
need to be replicated on a much larger sample in a more ecologically valid 
setting for consumer choice.  Nevertheless, given the global significance 
of this topic and the potential importance of the conclusion, many people 




Of course, one other very important consideration also emerges 
from this study.  That is, if we have a mechanism of influence (carbon 
labels) that might work with the right individuals (at least in terms of 
grabbing early pre-conscious visual attention), how can we produce more 
of the right individuals within a reasonable time frame?  The answer will 
have to be a campaign, or a set of campaigns, to change not just what 
people say about the environment (see Beattie, 2011) but their underlying 
implicit attitudes.  We know, of course, that this will not be easy but there 
are clearly precedents for orchestrated change in implicit attitudes in a 
number of other domains (see Beattie, 2013 for a discussion of studies 
that have changed implicit attitudes to race) and there are other examples 
to guide us in the case of consumer psychology (Gibson, 2008) 
The over-arching question posed in this chapter was whether 
implicit attitudes predict unconscious visual attention to carbon footprint 
information on products.  This study offers the briefest glimmer of hope 
in that our implicit attitude to an environmental feature does seem to 
predict first fixation on carbon labels on products.  However, what this 
study does more than anything else is remind us of all the untested 
assumptions underlying this whole consumer-based approach to tackling 
climate change.  Clearly much new empirical work needs to be done in 
this area before we place all of our trust in consumers and their spending 
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habits, and their desire, either conscious or unconscious, to change these 









































                                            
3 This study was begun at the interdisciplinary Sustainable Consumption Institute (SCI) at the 
University of Manchester as part of the Flagship Programme ‘Sustainable Consumer Behaviour and 
Lifestyles’.  The SCI was funded by Tesco and this research was part of a project into visual attention 
to product labels. It was considered as market research and did not go through separate psychology 
departmental ethics committee scrutiny.   
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Chapter 3: An experimental investigation 
of the relationship between self-reported 





As already discussed, the evidence is now extremely clear that our 
climate is changing.  According to the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), global warming is ‘unequivocal’ and 
‘unprecedented’ (IPCC, 2014).  More people globally are witnessing the 
devastating effects of climate change first-hand, with increased adverse 
weather conditions such as more frequent flooding, stronger hurricanes, 
longer heat waves, more tsunamis and periods of drought (IPCC, 2015; 
UK Climate Change Risk Assessment, 2016).  The World Health 
Organisation (WHO, 2017) warns that with temperatures rising and the 
increase in rainfall we need to be prepared for more illnesses resulting 
from climate change, including mosquito borne infections like malaria, 
dengue and the Zika virus.  The WHO report that ‘Climate change already 
claims tens of thousands of lives a year from diseases, heat and extreme 
weather’, and they say that it is ‘the greatest threat to global health in the 
21st century’.  Indeed, the Global Risk Perception Survey (from the World 
Economic Forum) identified climate change as the top global risk facing 
157 
 
humanity, a greater risk than weapons of mass destruction and severe 
water shortages (Global Risk Report, 2016).  
Psychology has a major role to play here because people are the 
most significant contributor to climate change through energy use, 
population growth, land use and patterns of consumption (IPCC, 2014; 
2015).  Currently, CO2 emissions from human activity are at their highest 
ever level and continue to rise.  Global CO2 emissions in 2011 were 
reported as being ‘150 times higher than they were in 1850’ (World 
Resource Institute, 2014; see also IPCC, 2014; 2015).  Although we 
cannot undo the damage already done with regards to climate change 
(Clark et al., 2016; Sadler-Smith, 2015; Sunstein, 2015) we do have the 
power to adapt our behaviour to ameliorate any future effects (Hayles & 
Dean, 2015). 
There have been a number of government policies to encourage 
the reduction of CO2 emissions in both domestic households and in the 
workplace with a target of an 80% reduction by 2050 (see GOV.co.uk, 
2015; Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2016; Defra, 2016).  
There have also been campaigns (reviewed in the introduction) from a 
variety of organisations aimed at promoting awareness, and encouraging 
a more sustainable lifestyle, amongst the general public.  These campaigns 
have used a variety of media, including television commercials (Act On 
CO2), magazine advertisements (sponsored by the WWF) and social 
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media (The Climate Coalition).  But with groceries accounting for, on 
average, one third of household CO2 emissions (Sharp & Wheeler, 2013; 
Moser, 2015; Fisher et al., 2013) it would seem important to persuade 
consumers to opt for low carbon alternatives in everyday purchases.  
Carbon labelling, which is the practice of communicating the greenhouse 
gas emissions associated with the life cycle of a product or service, was 
one major initiative designed to help in this regard.  The idea behind the 
initiative was to inform consumers of the environmental impact of the 
products that they purchase through a simple labelling scheme, thus 
enabling them to reduce the CO2 emissions of their household by making 
simple and relatively small changes to their lifestyle.    
In 2006, the Carbon Trust introduced the ‘Carbon Reduction’ label 
scheme to show that the carbon emissions of a particular product had been 
measured and that the manufacturers using these labels were committed 
to reducing carbon emissions.  These labels were used on many food items 
in the U.K. including Kingsmill bread, Walkers crisps and Quaker Oats 
and also on domestic appliances such as Dyson cleaners.  The Carbon 
Trust explicitly stated that ‘It is consumption activity and consumer 
behaviour that drives carbon emissions on a wider scale.  In order to meet 
the long-term emission reduction targets it will be necessary to change 
cultural patterns of consumption and the way in which products and 
services are produced for the final consumer’ (see Vision 21, 2008).  
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These labels are assessed every two years and if the manufacturers of 
these particular products do not successfully reduce the carbon footprint 
of the item, then they no longer have the right to use the label.  The carbon 
reduction label has also been used internationally.  Aldi was the first 
retailer in Australia to introduce a carbon footprint reduction label on their 
‘Everyday Olive Oil’ range.  The Carbon footprint reduction labels also 
became popular in Japan, Korea and France and are now used in over 26 
countries worldwide (Carbon Trust, 2011). 
Subsequently, in 2007, the Carbon Trust teamed up with the 
multinational retailer Tesco and developed the ‘Carbon Measured’ label.  
The Carbon Measured label provided consumers with an accurate 
measure of CO2 emissions of the lifecycle of selected products, thus 
enabling consumers to make more informed choices in terms of exact 
environmental impact.  The carbon footprint label included a symbol of a 
black footprint in which the carbon value of the particular item was 
embedded.  For example, in the case of the Tesco lightbulb there was an 
image of a black footprint with ‘30kg CO2’ embedded in white lettering 
on the footprint, below the footprint were the words ‘per 1000hrs per 
bulb’, and above the footprint the text read ‘Working with the Carbon 
Trust’ in bold lettering.  Alongside the footprint was an information box 
detailing what had actually been calculated.  So in this case, the 
information box read ‘The carbon footprint of this product is 30kg per 
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bulb per 1000 hours of use and we have committed to reduce the footprint 
of future equivalent lightbulbs’.  The label also informed the customer that 
‘The electricity used to power the lightbulb makes up 98% of the footprint.  
You can reduce your carbon footprint by switching off the lightbulb when 
you don't require lighting’. 
Tesco began measuring the carbon footprint of a number of its 
other own store-branded products, including orange juice, detergent, toilet 
roll and energy saving lightbulbs with the intention to include carbon 
labels on all of its 70,000 own brand products within a few years.  The 
then CEO of Tesco, Sir Terry Leahy, stated that we needed a mass 
movement in green consumption and pledged that Tesco would be ‘a 
leader in helping to create a low-carbon economy’.  Leahy was optimistic 
about the possible impact of carbon labelling, saying that this could be the 
start of ‘a green revolution’.  On the basis of existing market research, 
which had measured consumer attitudes to consumption and climate 
change, he was confident that the public were ready for this green 
revolution and willing to adapt their behaviour accordingly ‘with the right 
information’.   
The background market research on consumer attitudes seemed 
unambiguous, as we have seen in the Downing and Ballantyne report 
(2007).  Forum for the Future reported that 85% of people reported that 
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they wanted more information about the associated environmental 
impacts of their purchases (Berry, Crossley & Jewell, 2008).  Leahy 
concluded from this that ‘Customers want to do more in the fight against 
climate change if only we can make it easier and more affordable’.  This 
view was shared with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (Defra) in the U.K. who asserted that ‘Many people are willing to 
do more to limit their environmental impact, they have a much lower level 
of understanding about what they can do and what would make a 
difference’ (2008, p.28).     
However, not all researchers were so optimistic.  Upham, Dendla 
and Bleda (2011) used focus groups to gain more insight into consumers’ 
understanding of carbon labels.  They found that that there was little 
understanding of the values on the carbon labels.  Some consumers 
wanted a recommended daily allowance for carbon (Upham et al., 2011, 
p.5; see also Beattie, 2012).  Gadema and Oglethorpe (2011) asked 428 
participants if they thought that it would be an advantage to have carbon 
footprint information labels on products.  Whilst 72% of respondents 
reported that the labels would be useful, 81% of respondents found that 
such labels were difficult to understand and that the comparison of carbon 
footprint values across the various products was confusing.  Significantly, 
participants in this particular study ranked carbon footprint information 
162 
 
13th on the list of important attributes of a product (out of a total of 14).  
Hartikainen et al. (2014) also found that although 90% of their 
respondents reported that a carbon label would influence their purchasing 
decisions, they would prioritize price and taste before they even 
considered the actual carbon footprint information.   
But it was not just that consumers did not understand carbon labels 
or prioritise the information, it was also found that consumers paid little 
visual attention to them.  As already discussed, Beattie et al. (2010) found 
that in an experimental setting where participants viewed images of 
products, the carbon label was the focus of the first visual fixation of 
participants in only 7% of cases suggesting that the carbon label was not 
of immediate concern to most participants (see also Beattie, 2012).  It was 
also found that participants showed little visual attention overall to the 
carbon label in the first five seconds which is a critical finding considering 
that this is close to the average time taken to make a selection in a 
supermarket (See Louw & Kimber, 2007; Young, 2004). 
However, there is another potentially even more serious issue 
here, as discussed in the introduction.  The assumption guiding 
government agencies (including Defra in the U.K.) and multi-nationals 
like Tesco are that self-report measures of attitudes are good predictors of 
actual consumer behaviour.  But is this really the case?  At first sight, 
there does appear to be a significant relationship between attitudes and 
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behaviour in the environmentally-relevant consumption domain.  For 
example, Schlegelmilch, Bohlen and Diamantopoulos (1996) report that 
‘attitudes are the most consistent predictor of pro-environmental 
purchasing behaviour’ (p. 51).  Honkanen, Verplanken and Olsen (2006) 
report ‘a significant relation between attitude and intention to consume 
organic food’ (p. 426).  Dahm, Samonte and Shows (2009) report that 
‘attitudes were significant predictors of consumption behaviors and 
practices…Positive attitudes toward organic foods and other 
environmentally friendly practices significantly predicted similar 
behaviors’ (p. 195).  Barber, Taylor and Strick (2009) reported ‘a strong 
and significant relationship between attitude and willingness to purchase 
environmentally friendly wine’ (p. 69). But in none of these studies was 
actual behaviour examined, rather the focus was on self-reports of 
behaviour, or reported intentions, or willingness to consume 
environmentally friendly products.  Baumeister, Vohs and Funder (2007) 
have commented that although psychology may call itself the science of 
behaviour ‘some psychological sub-disciplines have never directly 
studied behaviour’ (2007, p.396).  They also noted that ‘a remarkable 
amount of the ‘behaviour’ studies turn out to be really just responses on a 
self-report questionnaire.  Sometimes these questionnaires ask people to 
report what they have done, will do, or would do.  More often, they ask 
people to report what they think, how they feel, or why they do what they 
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do’ (2007, p.397).  When it comes to issues regarding the environment 
and climate change, any such responses may well be overshadowed by 
social desirability and reporting biases. 
When actual consumer behaviour is studied, the relationship with 
self-reports of behaviour is often much less clear.  For example, 
Tsakiridou, Boutsouki, Zotos and Mattas (2008) explored the relationship 
between attitudes and behaviours towards organic products.  The 
researchers developed a 23-item questionnaire where respondents were 
required to report their personal consumption of organic products using a 
Likert scale.  They found that 50% of participants reported that they 
preferred to buy organic products as opposed to conventional products.  
However, this was contradicted by actual consumption data, in that only 
a small proportion of those who expressed a positive attitude towards 
organic products actually purchased organic products.  Corral-Verdugo 
(1997) randomly selected 100 families in Mexico who completed a series 
of self-report questionnaires to report their attitudes to ‘re-use and 
recycling’ and to report their recycling behaviour.  Participants were 
required to report the amount of glass, aluminium, newspapers, etc. they 
reused and recycled.  These reports of behaviour were then compared with 
direct observations of reuse or recycled items of the household.  The 
researchers found that ‘beliefs (assessed verbally) only predicted the self-
reported conservation, while competencies (assessed nonverbally) were 
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only related to observed behavior’ (1997, p. 135).  Similarly Fielding et 
al. (2016) measured self-reported household recycling, self-reported 
water conservation behaviour as well as actual recycling and actual water 
use.  Their results showed a ‘weak relationship between self-reported 
household recycling and objective measure of recycling’.  They also 
found a ‘weak relationship between self-reported water conservation 
behaviour and objective household water use’ (2016, p.90). 
Kormos and Gifford (2014) performed a meta-analysis of the 
validity of self-report measures of pro-environmental behaviour and 
concluded that ‘self-reports are only weakly associated with actual 
behaviour’ (2014, p. 360).  They identify some of the factors responsible 
for this weak relationship including the fact that ‘self-report measures may 
be prone to exaggeration’ and that because self-report measures are 
‘subjective by nature; descriptors such as “Often,” may mean different 
things to different participants’ (2014, p. 360).  In addition to this, self-
reports of behaviour may ‘reflect individuals’ perceptions of their 
behaviour (Olsen, 1981), behavioural intentions (Lee, 1993), or other – 
sometimes false – beliefs and attitudes (Rathje, 1989), rather than 
objective behaviour’ (2014, p. 360).  They also say that ‘limited memory 
or knowledge may also reduce the accuracy of self-reports (e.g. see 
Warriner, Gordon, McDougal & Claxon, 1984)’ (2014, p. 360).     
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One alternative approach to this issue of the potentially weak 
relationship between self-report measures of attitudes and actual 
behaviour is to measure ‘implicit’ attitudes, where reporting biases may 
not be so prevalent.  These implicit attitudes are underlying evaluations, 
which appear to be fast and automatic (Kahneman, 2011), often operating 
below the level of conscious awareness and therefore less amenable to 
change (Beattie, 2010; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson, Lindsey & 
Schooler, 2000).  Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz (1998) have defined 
implicit attitudes as ‘actions or judgments that are under the control of 
automatically activated evaluation, without the performer's awareness of 
that causation’ (p. 1464).  Research has shown that in some domains 
implicit attitudes (measured using associative tasks like the IAT) and 
explicit attitudes, measured using self-reports show little or no correlation.  
This is especially the case in the environmental domain (Beattie, 2010; 
Beattie & Sale, 2009; 2011; Brunel, Tietje & Greenwald, 2004; Friese, 
Wänke & Plessner, 2006; Hofmann, Gschwender, Nosek & Schmitt, 
2005) and other ‘sensitive’ domains like race (Beattie, 2013; Beattie, 
Cohen & McGuire, 2013).  The IAT has been acknowledged as a reliable 
and valid measure of implicit attitudes towards given target concepts with 
a test-retest reliability of 0.60 (Greenwald et al., 2002) and a consistency 
measure with a Cronbach’s alpha > 0.08 (see Friese et al., 2006; but see 
Blanton et al., 2009).  The basic premise behind the IAT is that when 
167 
 
categorising items into two sets of paired concepts, if the paired concepts 
are strongly associated, then participants should be able to categorise the 
items faster into these sets (and with fewer errors) than if they are not 
strongly associated.   
A number of studies have examined whether implicit attitudes 
predict behaviour in the environmental domain (often in direct 
comparison to explicit attitudes).  But again, there has been a bias to use 
self-reports of behaviour rather than actual behaviour with potentially 
misleading conclusions (see, for example, Friese, Wänke & Plessner, 
2006; Levine & Strube, 2012).  Perhaps typical is Vantomme, Guens, 
DeHouwer and DePelsmacker (2006) who reported that ‘the IAT effects 
for buyers and non-buyers of fair trade products were significantly 
different’ and also that ‘the logistic regression analysis demonstrated that 
IAT effects partially predicted ethical consumer behaviour even when the 
influence of the explicit measure was controlled for’ (p. 702).  But the 
experimenters did not analyse actual consumer choice, they based their 
conclusions on people reporting their behaviour.   
However, some studies have measured implicit attitudes and 
actual behaviour, although the behaviour in questions is often somewhat 
incidental like the choice of a goody bag at the end of the study (Beattie 
& Sale, 2011) or the choice of a plastic carrier bag (Geng et al., 2015).   
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Geng et al. (2015), for example, measured students’ connectedness to 
nature using a 14-item ‘Connectedness to Nature’ Scale (CNS) – an 
explicit measure designed to measure participants’ emotional and 
cognitive connectedness to nature.  They also used an IAT to measure 
implicit attitudes to natural and built environments.  As well as this, 
participants completed a ‘College Students’ Environmental Behaviours 
Questionnaire’ which required students to report their behaviours to seven 
different domains including energy conservation, waste avoidance, 
recycling and purchasing behaviour.  Participants also completed a 
simulation task whereby they chose four packs of wafers at the end of the 
task.  Each participant was then asked if they needed a free plastic bag.  
Geng et al. (2015) found that reported CNS measures correlated with 
reported environmental behaviours and implicit measures correlated with 
spontaneous environmental behaviours.  However, ‘spontaneous 
environmental behaviours’ were solely based on those who chose or did 
not choose a carrier bag at the end of the study.  Similarly, Beattie and 
Sale (2011) reported that only implicit attitude, under time pressure, 
predicted behavioural choice, namely the selection of a low carbon goody 
bag.   
Given the importance of consumer behaviour to climate change, 
we clearly need to understand more fully the relationship between both 
self-reported and implicit attitudes of consumers to environmental 
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features of products such as carbon footprint, and self-reports of 
behaviour versus actual behavioural choices.  Given the emphasis in both 
governmental and commercial circles on carbon labelling, it is important 
to evaluate its potential effectiveness in guiding behavioural choice.   
The aim of the present study is thus to investigate experimentally 
the relationships between explicit and implicit attitudes to carbon 
footprint, reported environmental and carbon behaviour, and actual 
product choice in an experimental setting.  By studying consumer choice 
in an experimental situation, we are able to carefully control for a range 
of variables that could affect the selection of certain everyday products, 
including brand, price and carbon footprint in a simulated ‘shopping’ task.  
We can also consider the impact of variables such as time pressure on 
product selection.  Following Kahneman (2011), one prediction is that 
implicit attitudes should be more closely associated with behaviour under 
time pressured as responses become more automatic.  The specific 
hypotheses are detailed below:  
 
H1: Self-reported attitudes to the environment and to carbon footprint will 





H2: Self-reported attitudes to carbon footprint are unlikely to be 
associated with actual carbon behaviour. 
    
H3: Implicit attitudes to carbon footprint are unlikely to be associated with 
self-reported carbon behaviour. 
 




Fifty participants were recruited to take part in this experiment (19 
male, 31 female).  The mean age of participants was 27.7 ranging from 18 
to 67.  Participants included staff and students from Edge Hill University 
(n=34), and members of the public (n=16).  Each participant received 
£5.00 for taking part in the experiment.  Ethical approval was obtained 
from the Edge Hill University Research Ethics Committee (UREC).  
Participants were informed about the test procedure and told that they 
could withdraw at any point during the experiment and that their data 
could be removed from the study and destroyed at any point up to three 
weeks after they had taken part in the experiment (no participant asked for 
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their data to be removed and destroyed).  They were fully debriefed at the 
end of the study.   
3.2.2. Self-reported environmental behaviour questionnaire 
Participants were asked to complete a self-report sustainability 
behaviour questionnaire.  There were 30 items on this particular 
questionnaire - 10 items were designed to measure participants’ reported 
pro-environmental behaviour with items such as ‘I avoid using toxic 
detergents’, ‘I avoid using aerosols’ and ‘I buy organic products’.  A 
further 20 questions were designed to measure participants’ carbon 
efficient behaviour with items such as ‘I buy high efficiency lightbulbs’, 
‘I buy locally produced foods’, and ‘I turn the heat off in unused rooms’.  
Participants reported their behaviour on a scale of ‘always’ (5), ‘often’ 
(4), ‘sometimes’ (3), ‘rarely’ (2) or ‘never’ (1).  
3.2.3. Attitudinal measures 
Likert scale 
As in the previous chapter, a Likert scale was used to assess 
explicit preference towards high/low carbon footprint products.  
Participants were asked: ‘Which statement best describes you?’  They 
reported their answer on a 5-point scale (1 = ‘I strongly prefer products 
with a high carbon footprint to a low carbon footprint’; 2 = ‘I moderately 
prefer products with a high carbon footprint to a low carbon footprint’; 3 
= ‘I like products with a high carbon footprint and a low carbon footprint 
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equally’; 4 = ‘I moderately prefer products with a low carbon footprint to 
a high carbon footprint’; 5 = ‘I strongly prefer products with a low carbon 




The carbon Implicit Association Test (described in the previous 
chapter) was used to measure participants’ implicit attitudes to carbon 
footprint (see section 2.2.4. for a detailed description of the carbon IAT 
and the algorithm used to calculate the D score). 
3.3 Simulated shopping task 
3.3.1. Stimuli 
 
Participants were asked to select products from a series of items 
displayed on flash cards.  There were 10 items in total and each item was 
central to any regular weekly shop.  The products were: breakfast cereal 
(bran flakes), bread, cheese, coffee, fabric conditioner, ice cream, orange 
juice, soup, toilet roll, and washing up liquid.  The product images were 
modified photographs of actual products.  The amount of information 
provided on each item varied from product to product but generally the 
most expensive products had more information and the value products had 
less information.  Each product had 4 variations – luxury brand (the most 
expensive), well-known brand (e.g. Heinz, Hovis, Kellogg’s), 
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organic/Eco brand and value brand (the cheapest variety and usually the 
supermarket’s own brand).  So for example, in the case of ice cream the 
luxury brand was ‘Carte D’Or’, the well-known brand was ‘Walls’, the 
organic/Eco brand was ‘Breyer’s Organic’, and the value brand was 
‘Sainsbury’s Basic’.  Although the original packaging was not altered in 
any way, the price of the item and the carbon footprint of the item were 
superimposed onto the front of the item.  The price of the product was 
always the actual price, which was sourced from various supermarket 
websites.  Prices were represented in white numbers on a black circular 
sticker and always placed in the same position on the four individual items 
within the set, but this varied from set to set.  So for example, when it 
came to soup, the price sticker was always placed on the top left-hand 
hand corner, with cereal the price was always placed on the top right-hand 
corner.  In terms of price across the brands, the luxury items were always 
the most expensive, followed by the organic/Eco, followed by popular-
brand, followed by value.   
In this study the carbon footprint was colour coded in green for 
low carbon and black for high carbon.  The carbon footprint value was 
represented numerically and was clearly visible on the representative 
footprint.  In order to assign a carbon footprint value to the products, the 
actual carbon footprint value of the particular product was sought (e.g. 
Branflakes = 80g).  For scoring purposes this was regarded as ‘H’ and 
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placed on a black footprint to represent a high carbon footprint value.  This 
figure was then halved to generate a lower carbon footprint (in this case 
40g and this was arbitrarily assigned, in the case of cereal, to the popular 
brand).  For scoring purposes this was regarded as ‘L’ and the carbon 
value was placed on a green footprint to represent low carbon footprint. 
10% was then subtracted from this value and arbitrarily assigned it to the 
value cereal brand.  This was then regarded as ‘LL’ (representing the 
lowest carbon footprint value and placed it on a green footprint, again, 
representing low carbon footprint).  Finally, 10% was added to the starting 
carbon footprint value and was arbitrarily assigned to the luxury cereal 
brand.  This value was regarded as ‘HH’ and placed it on a black footprint 
to represent the highest carbon footprint value of this particular product 
set.  The carbon footprint was assigned to products using the following 
criteria: each product had two high and two low carbon footprint labels, 
and each brand had five high and five low carbon labels. Once the price 
and carbon footprint was attached to each product image, they were then 
placed on a white background and laminated thus creating a series of flash 
cards.   
3.4. Procedure 
Participants entered the lab and were asked to complete a variety 
of tasks (the order of these tasks was randomised).  They completed a self-
175 
 
report questionnaire about their carbon and environmental behaviours.  
They were also asked to complete a computerised Likert scale reporting 
their preference towards high and low carbon footprint items.  In addition 
to the self-report measures, participants completed the carbon IAT.  In 
order to assess participants’ carbon choices, they also participated in a 
simulated shopping task.  Forty laminated flash cards were laid out in ten 
rows, with each row having 4 alternatives.  Each participant was asked to 
choose ten items (one from each row) under one of two conditions – time 
pressure and no time pressure.  After each condition was complete, there 
was a two-minute break whilst the cards were reset.  There were thus a 
total of 20 choices per participant.  The order of the time pressure/no time 
pressure conditions was randomised across each participant to counteract 
any possible order effects.  When participants were in the time pressure 
condition they were told to imagine that they were in a ‘real hurry’ and 
were told to choose an item as quickly as they could, whereas under no 
time pressure they were told that they had as much time as they needed to 
make the selection of an item.  The average time spent choosing a product 
under time pressure was 2.7 seconds (with a range from 1.2 to 5.5 
seconds) as opposed to 7.3 seconds (range from 2.0 to 27.8 seconds) under 
no time pressure.  The time spent choosing under time pressure was 
significantly shorter (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test, T=0, 




3.5.1. The relationship between self-reported attitudes and self-
reported behaviours 
 
There were three categories of self-reported behaviour: reported 
carbon behaviour (with 20 items), reported environmental behaviour 
(with 10 items), and all reported sustainable behaviours (both categories 
together) with 30 items.  A scale was produced for each of these categories 
by multiplying frequency of response by ‘value’ (where ‘always’=5, 
‘often’=4, ‘sometimes’=3, ‘rarely’=2 and ‘never’ =1).  For each 
participant, the score in each of these 3 categories could range between 20 
and 100 for reported carbon behaviour, 10 and 50 for reported 
environmental behaviour and 30 and 150 for all reported sustainable 
behaviour.  The actual ranges for each of these 3 categories were: 40 to 
94 (carbon), 10 to 45 (environmental) and 50 to 136 (all sustainable 
behaviours).  The overall mean for the Likert score was 3.6, which 
represents a slight explicit preference for low carbon.  The data was 
dichotomised as follows: 4 = (‘moderately prefer low carbon’) or 5 
(‘strongly prefer low carbon’) were categorised as having a positive 
explicit attitude towards low carbon (PEA), n=30.  1, 2, 3 on the Likert 
                                            
4 In this study there were 50 participants who self-reported their environmental behaviour (10 items) 
and carbon behaviour (20 items) as well as engaging in choice behaviour in a simulated shopping task 
with each participant making 20 choices (10 under time pressure and another 10 under no time 
pressure). There were 1,500 responses on the self-reported questionnaires and 1000 behavioural 
choices, yielding data with an essentially normal distribution, which meant that parametric statistics 




were categorised as non-positive towards low carbon, in effect either 
neutral or preferring high carbon (NPEA), n=20.  Reported behaviour was 
compared in each of the 3 categories with participants falling with the 
PEA or NPEA groups using a series of t tests.  The analyses revealed that 
in each case the results were significant at the two-tailed level.  For 
reported carbon behaviour: t=2.16 (n1=30, n2=20), p < 0.05.  For reported 
environmental behaviour: t=2.53 (n1=30, n2=20), p < 0.02.  For all 
reported sustainable behaviours: t=2.49 (n1=30, n2=20), p < 0.02).  The 
means are displayed in Table 3.1.  In other words, there does appear to be 
a significant relationship between self-reported attitudes and self-reported 
behaviours, and this is found not just with respect to the category of 
carbon behaviours, but seems to apply to other environmental behaviours 
and therefore sustainable behaviours more generally. 
Table 3.1: Relationship between self-reported attitude to carbon 
footprint and self-reported carbon/environmental/sustainable behaviour 
























3.5.2. The relationship between self-reported attitudes and actual 
choice behaviour 
 In terms of behavioural choice, the number and nature of the 
carbon choices they actually made was tabulated for each participant.  
Then the frequency of choice was multiplied by value, as before, but here 
the ‘value’ is not reported frequency, but the carbon value of the particular 
product with one choice of an LL product scoring 4, one choice of an L 
product scoring 3, one choice of an H product scoring 2, one choice of an 
HH product scoring 1.  This generated a score between 10 and 40 for each 
participant (as there were 10 choices) for each of the 2 conditions (time 
pressure and no time pressure).  The next comparison focused on the 
actual choice behaviour of the PEA and NPEA groups using a two factor 
ANOVA (with factor 1: explicit attitude: high or low and factor 2: time 
pressure).  The ANOVA revealed that there was no significant main effect 
for explicit attitude to low carbon on behaviour (F=3.31, d.f.=1, n.s.), no 
significant effect for time pressure (F=0.67, d.f.=1, n.s.) and no significant 
interaction effect between explicit attitude and time pressure (F=0.96, 






Table 3.2:   Relationship between self-reported attitude to carbon 
footprint and actual carbon behaviour, with or without time pressure 
(mean scores; high scores indicate more low carbon choices). 
 
 No time 
pressure 









         25.35          25.60         25.48 
Overall mean          26.48          25.94         26.21 
 
Of course, there could be an argument that because carbon 
footprint was colour coded with green (covering both L and LL), and 
black (H and HH), that this may have minimised the effects of the 
variation within each of the two categories (H versus HH, for example).  
Therefore, it was imperative to analyse the data in terms of frequency of 
low (L or LL) versus high (H or HH) carbon choices in both conditions 
(TP versus no TP).  The data is displayed in Table 3.3.  It is worth noting 
that there were more low carbon choices overall than high carbon choices.  
There was also a tendency for people with a positive explicit attitude 
towards low carbon to select more low carbon items when not under time 





Table 3.3: Relationship between self-reported attitude to carbon 
footprint and number of low carbon and high carbon choices (no time 
pressure; high scores indicate more low carbon choices). 
 
 Number of low 
carbon choices 
 


















The next analysis (Table 3.4) focused on behavioural choice under 
time pressure.  Here it was found that those with a positive explicit attitude 
to low carbon were again more likely to choose low carbon products under 
time pressure, but this result was not significant (X2 = 0.05, d.f.=1, n.s.). 
 
Table 3.4: Relationship between self-reported attitude to carbon 
footprint and number of low carbon and high carbon choices (time 
pressure). 
 
 Number of low 
carbon choices 



















In summary, self-reported attitudes to low carbon might be 
significantly associated with self-reported 
carbon/environmental/sustainable behaviour but it was not significantly 
associated with low carbon choices in the experimental paradigm. 
3.5.3. The relationship between implicit attitudes and self-reported 
behaviours 
The analysis here mirrors that carried out for explicit attitudes.  As 
before, attitudes (in this case implicit attitudes) were dichotomised with a 
positive implicit attitude towards low carbon operationalised as a D score 
of 0.8 and above (PIA), n=26; and a non-positive implicit attitude as 
anything less than 0.8 (NPIA), n=24. The behavioural self-report 
measures were dichotomised as before.  The mean D score in this sample 
was 0.99, which represents a strong pro-low carbon preference (for the 
particular set of high and low carbon items represented in the IAT).  The 
next comparison focused on the reported frequency of behaviour in each 
of the 3 categories with participants falling within the PIA or NPIA groups 
using a series of t tests.  The analyses revealed that in each case the results 
were not significant at the two-tailed level.  For reported carbon 
behaviour: t=1.21 (n1=26, n2=24), n.s.  For reported environmental 
behaviour: t=0.31 (n1=26, n2=24), n.s.  For all reported sustainable 
behaviours: t=0.95 (n1=26, n2=24), n.s.  The means are displayed in Table 
3.5.  In other words, there does not appear to be a significant relationship 
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between implicit attitudes and self-reported 
carbon/environmental/sustainable behaviours. 
 
Table 3.5: Relationship between self-reported 
carbon/environmental/sustainable behaviours and implicit attitude to 



















64.62 27.79 92.42 
 
3.5.4. The relationship between implicit attitudes and actual choice 
behaviour 
 
The next comparison focused on the actual choice behaviour of 
the PIA and NPIA groups using a two factor ANOVA (factor 1 being 
implicit attitude: high or low; factor 2 being time pressure).  The ANOVA 
revealed that there was no significant main effect for implicit attitude to 
carbon footprint on carbon choice (F=2.46, d.f.=1, n.s.), no significant 
effect for time pressure (F=0.66, d.f.=1, n.s.) and no significant interaction 
effect between implicit attitude and time pressure (F=0.03, d.f.=1, n.s.).  




Table 3.6: Relationship between implicit attitude to carbon footprint and 
actual carbon behaviour, with or without time pressure (mean scores). 
 
 No time 
pressure 












26.00 25.33 25.67 
Overall mean 26.48 25.94 26.21 
 
The next analysis focused on the data in terms of frequency of low 
(L or LL) versus high (H or HH) carbon choices in both conditions (TP 
versus no TP).  The data is displayed in Tables 3.7 and 3.8.  There was a 
tendency for people with a positive implicit attitude towards low carbon 
to select more low carbon items, however, this fails to reach significance 
when either under no time pressure (X2 = 0.96, d.f.=1, n.s.), or under time 







Table 3.7: Relationship between implicit attitude to carbon footprint and 
number of low and high carbon choices (no time pressure). 
 
 Number of low 
carbon choices 
 















Table 3.8: Relationship between implicit attitude to carbon footprint and 
number of low and high carbon choices (time pressure). 
 
 Number of low 
carbon choices 
 














Finally, Tables 3.9 ‘a’ and ‘b’ display the relationship between 
explicit and implicit scores and mean carbon choices.  There have been 
arguments in the literature that when explicit and implicit attitudes are 
both positive towards an object, then together they have more predictive 
power (Maison, Greenwald & Bruin, 2004).  Although the mean low 
carbon score is higher when explicit and implicit attitudes are both 
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positive and lowest when both implicit and explicit attitudes are non-
positive, none of the specific comparisons were significant.  Self-reported 
attitudes to carbon might be significantly associated with self-reported 
sustainable behaviours, including carbon behaviours, but neither they, nor 
the measures of implicit attitude, were reliably associated with actual 


















Table 3.9a and b: Overall means for actual carbon behaviour varying 
with explicit and implicit attitude under no time pressure (a), and under 
time pressure (b).  
  














































Non-positive    Positive 

















Non-positive    Positive 
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3.6. Discussion  
This study has demonstrated that self-reported attitudes to carbon 
are significantly associated with self-reported carbon behaviours (e.g. ‘I 
buy high efficiency lightbulbs’, ‘I buy locally produced foods’, ‘I turn the 
heat off in unused rooms’ etc.), self-reported environmental behaviours 
(e.g. ‘I avoid using toxic detergents’, ‘I avoid using aerosols’, ‘I buy 
organic products’ etc.) as well as the generic category of sustainable 
behaviours (the two categories combined).  This finding is in line with 
much of the published literature on this topic (Barber, Taylor & Strick, 
2009; Corral-Verdugo, 1997; Honkanen et al., 2006; Schlegelmilch et al., 
1996).  There are many government agencies and NGO’s who would see 
this as a very optimistic result in the battle against climate change.  But, 
following the exhortations of Baumeister et al. (2007) and others this 
study attempted to move beyond self-reports of carbon behaviour to 
consider the carbon value of consumer choice in a simulated shopping 
task.  Here it was found that positive pro-low carbon self-reported 
attitudes were not reliably associated with the actual choice of low carbon 
alternatives in the shopping task under either condition (time pressure or 
no time pressure).  This contrast between self-reported environmental 
behaviour and actual behaviour is unfortunately also consonant with 
previous research.  For example, Corral-Verdugo (1997) reported that 
‘beliefs (assessed verbally) only predicted the self-reported conservation, 
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while competencies (assessed nonverbally) were only related to observed 
behavior’ (1997, p. 135).  Fielding et al. (2016) reported a ‘weak, 
relationship between self-reported household recycling and objective 
measure of recycling’ (2016, p.90).  The findings are also in line with the 
conclusions of the meta-analysis of Kormos and Gifford (2014) which 
were that ‘self-reports are only weakly associated with actual behaviour’ 
(2014, p. 360). 
The problem that we are faced with is that climate change requires 
urgent action not mere self-reports of action.  Given that the vast majority 
of studies in the attitude-behaviour environmental domain (and 
elsewhere) use self-report measures of behaviour, this may mean that we 
are generating research findings that may be making policy makers, both 
in government and elsewhere, overly optimistic (and perhaps even 
complacent) about our readiness for actual behaviour change (and our 
ability to predict it).   
The study reported here also found the implicit attitudes to low 
carbon, measured using the Implicit Association Test, were not 
significantly associated with either self-reports of behaviour or actual low 
carbon choices either under time pressure or no time pressure.  This issue 
is returned to in Chapter 4, with a finer grain analysis of the data, but the 
broad picture still stands.  There is some evidence that positive implicit 
attitudes to low carbon are associated with some low carbon behaviours, 
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particularly when the choices are made under a degree of time pressure 
(Beattie & Sale, 2011; Geng et al., 2015)   But the problem with some of 
these previous studies is that the behaviours are often relatively 
inconsequential (choice of a goody bag as a reward for taking part in the 
study; choice of a plastic carrier bag) in comparison to actual product 
choice, which is the central act when it comes to shopping.  In this study, 
colour-coded carbon labels were competing with a whole series of other 
product features such as brand (well known, luxury, eco, value etc.) and 
price, as would happen in any supermarket.  Perhaps, not surprisingly, 
because of years of effective advertising, it was found that these other 
features were very significant in guiding the choice of the experimental 
participants.  The analyses (slightly anticipating the detailed results to be 
presented in Chapter 4) revealed, for example, that well-known brands 
were chosen 38.0% of the time, followed by value brands (32.4%) then 
organic/Eco brands at 17.0% of the time and finally luxury brands at 
12.6% of the time.  Choices of individual products varied enormously 
from product to product.  Well-known brands of soup (Heinz) and toilet 
rolls (Andrex) were both chosen 58% of the time, followed by fabric 
conditioner (Lenor 56%).  The least popular brand was coffee at 18% 
(Lavazza).  Implicit attitudes to low carbon might not have been 
sufficiently powerful to override the others powerful implicit forces 
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attracting us to these other features of products (Friese et al., 2006; see 
also McGuire & Beattie, 2016). 
It was found, however, that the choice of the low carbon 
alternatives (signalled through a green carbon footprint) were more 
frequent than the choice of the high carbon alternatives (signalled through 
a black carbon footprint), but this was not reliably associated with either 
measure of attitude.  Nevertheless, this might be useful information for 
those concerned with representing carbon footprint on products.  In the 
U.K. there has been a good deal of misunderstanding about how to 
interpret carbon labels using the current format (Upham et al., 2011).  
Other countries, like Australia, have gone for a colour-coded traffic light 
approach.  This was resisted in the U.K., perhaps unwisely, and Tesco 
eventually stopped labelling its own products at all, blaming the slow 
uptake on carbon labelling from competitors.  But clearly the slow uptake 
from the consumers themselves was also a major issue (see Beattie, 2012).  
Perhaps other approaches, including colour coding, should have been tried 
first before abandoning this particular project.  Colour coded carbon labels 
might actually have a role to lay in guiding consumer behaviour.   
This study is clearly in need of further elaboration and extension.  
An experimental approach was used to investigate consumer choice to 
give us more control over some of the features that might influence this, 
including brand, carbon label, colour coding of carbon footprint, price etc.  
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There is nevertheless the opportunity to extend this research on implicit 
and explicit attitudes to carbon footprint to consider real consumer 
behaviour rather than simulated behaviour.  Indeed, this has recently been 
attempted by Panzone et al. (2016) who used 900 panel members of the 
Dunhumby Shopper Thoughts Panel from the Tesco consumer data base, 
and the Tesco Club-Card data (which record all purchases at Tesco), to 
examine people’s actual shopping preferences.  They considered the 
relationship between such shopping habits and measures of both implicit 
and explicit attitudes.  This is potentially an important study in terms of 
future research.  Their results were also not that optimistic about the 
ability to predict actual behaviour from these particular attitudinal 
measures.  They found that the sustainability IAT score did not 
significantly predict the sustainability of the food baskets, although it did 
predict one single measure, namely the share of expenditure allocated to 
bottled water – in that those with a positive implicit attitude to 
sustainability bought less.  Their measures of explicit attitude also 
produced mixed results.  Measure of ‘Green Consumer Attitude’ and 
‘Sustainable Food Preference’ ‘did not predict aggregate consumer 
behaviour’ (Panzone et al., 2016, p. 15). 
However, the study did have a number of methodological and 
conceptual shortcomings.  Firstly, instead, of assessing the specific carbon 
footprint of each ‘shopping basket’, they used an Environmentally 
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Sensitive Shopper index or ESS (Panzone, Wossnik & Southerton, 2013).  
There are three sustainable categories included in the ESS index: fruit and 
vegetables purchases over total food expenditure, organic fruit and 
vegetables over total fruit and vegetables, on-line food and drink 
purchases over total food and drink purchases.  It also includes three 
unsustainable categories: meat purchases over total food and drink 
purchases, red meat as a proportion of total meat and purchases of bottled 
water over total food and drink purchases.  This index clearly has some 
merit.  Meat has clearly a higher carbon footprint than fruit and 
vegetables, on-line shopping and bottled water have very different carbon 
footprints to their alternatives (in different directions, of course).  But it 
still is, at best, a rough guide as to the sustainability of the shopping basket 
rather than a more exact measure.  Secondly, they used an IAT with 
somewhat problematic images.  Some required reading of information on 
products (e.g. the ‘by air’ writing on the green beans), which is difficult 
given the fast time constraints of the IAT.  Some images appeared 
contradictory (a recycle crate with unsustainable products, like plastic 
bottles inside).  This was included as a ‘sustainable’ image.  Some images 
were highly ambiguous.  The image of the bottled water had no labels, so 
a consumer could have filled these with tap water (as many people do).  
Thirdly, there is always an issue with respondents completing an online 
IAT.  How can we be sure that the conditions were appropriate for 
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completing the IAT (with no distractions)?  How do we know that the 
individual completing the IAT was the same person choosing the actual 
products on the shopping trips to Tesco?  After all, a Tesco Club-Card is 
generally shared in a household rather than being unique to an individual.  
Fourthly, there is always the possibility that those consumers with a 
positive implicit attitude towards sustainable products actually shopped 
elsewhere for these products, for example, in farmers’ markets or local 
shops and specifically avoided a large retailer like Tesco which might not 
have the best reputation for environmentally friendly practices.  Only the 
shopping at Tesco was analysed in this study.  Indeed, Panzone et al. 
explicitly recognise this issue - ‘consumers who reported not shopping 
primarily in the store brand who supplied the data had even more pro-
environmental IAT scores compared to loyal customers.  As a result, the 
insignificant IAT-behaviour relation might be caused by these consumers 
using their implicit pro-environmental attitudes primarily in retail 
channels with a positive reputation for environmental quality’ (2016, p. 
15). 
Panzone’s finding that implicit attitude did significantly predict 
the consumption of bottled water suggests that there may be some 
connection between implicit attitudes and product choices.  Bottled water 
was one of the images included in their IAT, so it suggests that the 
selection of items in the IAT is a critical one.  It may be very naïve to 
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assume that any sample of images in the IAT will predict any sample of 
behaviours (because the images in the IAT essentially construct the 
concept of ‘high’ and ‘low’ carbon for the participants).  So a degree of 
stimulus and behaviour specificity (and mapping) may need to be 
carefully thought out in future.  The methodological and conceptual 
weaknesses in this study may have contributed to the failure to find any 
more general effects.  But clearly we can extend research in this domain 
to correct these deficits.  
In conclusion, climate change is the most pressing global problem 
we face, and psychology has a significant role to play in trying to 
understand the drivers behind consumer behaviour, given that the 
consumer is very significant factor in climate change.  But if we are to do 
anything significant about climate change then we have to follow the 
recommendations of Baumeister and study behaviour and behavioural 
choice rather than just questionnaire responses about intentions to act, 
willingness to act, or reports of past behaviour.  Questionnaire responses 
might be easier to obtain but they can encourage false (and overly) 
optimistic conclusions about how we can predict actual consumer choice, 
and therefore how things might change in the future.  There are clearly 
new research possibilities for a focus on carbon attitudes and actual 
consumer carbon behaviour in this digital age (using the supermarket and 
similar data sets).  We just need the impetus to change focus and begin 
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some new lines of enquiry if we are to shed new light on this most pressing 




































Chapter 4: So what does determine actual 
consumer choice? The effects of brand 
and carbon footprint information with or 
without time pressure 
 
4.1. Introduction  
Chapter three produced somewhat pessimistic conclusions about 
our ability to predict actual behaviour from measures of attitude, be they 
measures of explicit or implicit attitude.  The fact that explicit attitudes 
only predict self-reported behaviour rather than actual consumer choice is 
not a positive conclusion (from the point of view of our planet, and the 
host of initiatives based solely on self-report measures of attitude), but it 
is a very important research finding.  Unfortunately, measures of implicit 
attitude in this particular study also had little predictive power.  But the 
question is, was the grain of the analysis sufficiently fine to provide 
insights into what determines patterns of consumer choice.  In this chapter, 
this question is considered again in more detail with a much finer grain 
analysis of choice of brand and a consideration of how carbon footprint 
might influence this.  What occasioned this more detailed consideration 
was, quite simply, the urgency of the issue.  Stern (2006), after all, had 
been explicit ‘Human activities are a major driver of this rapid change in 
our climate…particularly patterns of consumption and energy use, driven 
by consumer demand for higher standards of living’.  In other words, we 
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as consumers are playing a major role in the creation of this problem.  One 
argument is that if we are part of the problem, then we must be part of the 
solution.  This point has not been lost on agencies like the United Nations, 
selected governments around the world and many leading multinationals, 
indeed the very same multinationals that have made it their mission to 
promote and then satisfy this increasing consumer demand. 
In a keynote lecture at Edge Hill University in February 2015, 
Beattie pointed to the case of Unilever.  He pointed out that this is one of 
the top ten global companies in terms of both turnover and reach.  This 
company reports an annual turnover of around £40 billion with its 
products sold in 190 countries across the globe (Unilever Sustainable 
Living Plan, 2013).  It proudly boasts that 2 billion times a day, a 
consumer somewhere on the globe uses one of their products.  The Key 
Performance Indicators (KPI) of this enormous company are, not 
surprisingly, primarily financial - they aim for 5% growth with fewer, 
bigger innovations.  They aim to win a higher proportion of market share, 
and want to build their brands and win consumer preference.  They are 
choosing to focus on premium products with higher margins.  However, 
they recognize the essential dilemma that they (and we) are all facing.  In 
their ‘Sustainable Living Plan’, they say that ‘We are living in a world 
where temperatures are rising; water is scarce, energy expensive, food 
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supplies uncertain and the gap between rich and poor increasing’ 
(Unilever Sustainable Living Plan, 2013, p. 1.)  Their conclusion is that 
‘Business must be part of the solution.  Sustainable, equitable growth is 
the only acceptable business model’ and that ‘in order to live within the 
natural limits of the planet we will have to decouple growth from 
environmental impact’.  Therefore, they have another KPI, which is not 
about finance, but about the environment.  As a company, they aim to 
‘halve the greenhouse gas impact of our products across the lifecycle by 
2020’ (2013, p.16).  In pursuit of this goal, Beattie argued, they reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions from their manufacturing chain and reduced 
deforestation.  They have opted for more environmentally friendly 
sourcing of raw materials.  They have doubled their use of renewable 
energy and produced concentrated liquids and powders.  They have 
reduced greenhouse gas emissions from transport and reduced greenhouse 
gas emissions from refrigeration.  They have also reduced employee 
travel.  So what effect did these various initiatives have on their 
environmental impact?  Their report concludes: ‘Our greenhouse gas 
footprint impact per consumer has …. increased by around 5% since 
2010’ (2013, p.16).  They then attempt to explain what has gone wrong.  
‘We have made good progress in those areas under our control but…the 




He said ‘It would seem that the problem essentially is us, as 
consumers, and how we behave.  It is what we do with these good 
environmental products (in terms of our patterns of usage and our 
generation of waste, our fondness for refrigeration, the length of the 
showers we choose to take, our use of energy etc.) and why we choose the 
environmentally unfriendly alternatives in the first place’ (Beattie, 2015).  
So why might this be? In addition, what can we do about it?  
There are a multiplicity of possible reasons for this - the effects of 
climate change are less personal than other looming disasters and people 
feel that climate change will primarily affect future generations (Hansen 
et al., 2013).  Climate change cannot be reversed immediately and we 
know that delayed contingent reinforcement and punishment is highly 
problematic for behaviour change (see Skinner, 1938).  Climate change 
also requires a ‘global response’, but because it is a global issue (Walker 
& King, 2008), involving many different countries, there seems to be a 
diffusion of responsibility, and people are merely leaving it to others.  It 
also seems that quite simple experiences can occasion quite significant 
shifts of responsibility at the level of the individual (Beattie et al., 2010).  
For example, when experimental participants in the U.K. watched sections 
of Al Gore’s film ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ highlighting China’s 
industrialization and its dirty power stations, they were significantly more 
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likely to agree to statements like ‘It is the responsibility of other countries, 
not the U.K., to reduce climate change’ and ‘Climate change is a problem 
to be solved by future generations’.  This all happened because they had 
been briefly reminded of China’s huge coal reserves and its use of old 
technology in coal-burning technology (see also Beattie, 2010, p.221; 
Beattie, 2011).  Uncertainty about the time course of climate change 
undoubtedly also plays an important role with powerful lobbies behind 
this uncertainty (according to the BBC, the US fossil fuel giants, the Koch 
Brothers, are spending $900 million on advertising), rather similar to the 
uncertainty about the relationship between smoking and lung cancer 
generated by the tobacco industry in the nineteen fifties, sixties and 
seventies (Conway & Oreskes, 2010). 
However, climate change is complicated; it requires an 
understanding of basic physics (or perhaps more than basic physics) to 
understand the mechanisms underpinning it (without very high degrees of 
simplification), the public even find some of the proposed solutions far 
too complicated in terms of the physics involved.  Take carbon labelling 
for example.  This process of enhancing product information to promote 
more sustainable consumption has been stressed in a variety of top-level 
policy reports (see Upham, Dendler & Bleda, 2011).  These include UN 
Agenda 21 United Nations (1992), the EU Sustainable Consumption and 
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Production Action Plan (Commission of the European Communities, 
2008), the UK Sustainable Development Report (Defra, 2005), and the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1998).  However, 
Upham et al. (2011) tested the public’s reaction to carbon labelling in a 
series of focus groups and found that they had genuine difficulty in 
understanding how a gas (or gases) could even be expressed in terms of 
its mass (260g of carbon etc.), which, of course, is the essence of carbon 
labelling.  They also had severe difficulty in linking an emissions figure 
to its environmental impact.   
Then there is the emotional valence of ‘global warming’ which 
sounds almost benign and, at the opposite extreme, the term ‘climate 
change’ sounds too catastrophic to contemplate.  Therefore, in order to 
maintain some degree of psychological stability and to remain relatively 
optimistic about the future, we avoid contemplating climate change 
whenever possible (Ehrenreich, 2009).  We may even subconsciously 
avoid seeing images connected with climate change as we do with other 
sorts of negative images (Isaacowitz, 2005; 2006; see also Beattie & 
McGuire, 2012). 
Thus, for a myriad of reasons, it is clearly going to be difficult to 
get the public to change their behaviour in the light of this particular 
threat.  However, some have maintained a degree of optimism despite all 
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of this, and they have argued that it may be difficult to promote major 
behavioral change, but not impossible.  These proponents of behaviour 
change suggest that, in order to do this successfully, we have to 
understand people better and to design better initiatives, which build on 
underlying psychological insights.  The first step is to access the 
underlying attitudes of the public to climate change and sustainable living.  
An attitude is classically defined as ‘a mental and neural state of readiness 
organised through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence 
upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations with which it 
is related’ (Allport, 1935, p.810).  Accessing these underlying attitudes 
might seem to be very difficult, but an extraordinary number of influential 
people and organizations think it is relatively easy – they think that you 
just have to ask the public to report their attitudes in carefully constructed 
surveys. 
Take, for example, the arguments of Leahy (2007), the then CEO 
of Tesco (the multinational supermarket chain), when he announced a call 
to arms to tackle the problem of climate change.  As pointed out in the 
introduction, his message was very simple.  He said that ‘The green 
movement must become a mass movement in green consumption’.  In 
order to achieve this goal Leahy argued that ‘we must empower everyone 
- not just the enlightened or the affluent’.  He believed that the market was 
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ready for this green consumer ‘revolution’, and his proposed solution was 
to break down the barriers of price and information.  In other words, he 
was arguing, from a marketing and business point of view, that we must 
make green choices affordable and give the consumer the right 
information to make informed decisions to produce a ‘revolutionary’ 
change in patterns of consumption.  He argued that ‘Customers want to 
do more in the fight against climate change if only we can make it easier 
and more affordable’, and pointed to numerous market research surveys, 
which seemed to support his conclusion.  The results of the survey by 
Downing and Ballantyne (2007) and others were very consistent with the 
more recent British Social Attitudes survey (2012) which revealed that 
76% of people ‘believe climate change is happening and that humans are, 
at least partly, responsible’ (the British Social Attitudes Survey, 2012; 
Park, Clery, Curtice, Philips & Utting, 2012).  Even more recently, the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (2015) in the U.K. found that 
66% of people ‘reported feeling very or fairly concerned about climate 
change’ based on a survey using 1,981 face-to-face home interviews. 
 Leahy was basing his planned initiative, which was the carbon 
labelling of Tesco products, on self-reports where people said that they 
‘were prepared to change their behaviour’.  Similarly, Defra started from 
the assumption that ‘Policy action needs to be rooted in understanding and 
204 
 
awareness of consumer behaviour’ (2008, p. 22).  They argued that we 
must focus on people’s ability to act and people’s willingness to act -  
‘Many people are willing to do more to limit their environmental impact, 
they have a much lower level of understanding about what they can do 
and what would make a difference’ (2008, p.28).  Having assessed the 
‘mental and neural state of readiness’ (in Allport’s words) and identified 
‘a positive attitude to the environment’, they then carried out various 
segmentation analyses.  These analyses were used to segment the 
population into identifiable groups with different socio-economic profiles, 
consumer habits and patterns of media consumption, and various 
campaigns were then planned and aimed at each of the segments.  
However, few of these social marketing campaigns had the intended 
outcomes (see Corner & Randall, 2011). 
So why might this be?  One could propose a very simple 
hypothesis - it might be more difficult to understand consumers because 
there is mounting evidence that people have two distinct cognitive 
systems each with its own properties and mode of operation, with one of 
these systems not open to introspection (Kahneman, 2011).  Kahneman 
calls these systems – ‘System 1’ (the fast, automatic and largely 
unconscious system) and ‘System 2’ (the slower, more deliberate and 
reflective, conscious system).  This could be the reason why many 
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initiatives, aimed at behavioral adaptation to climate change, have failed.  
They have made the wrong basic assumption about human beings. 
This hypothesis could help explain a number of things.  Consider 
first one of the core problems in the attitude-behaviour literature.  Why do 
people report positive attitudes about the environment, but then do very 
little to ameliorate the effects of their own lifestyle on the environment – 
this has been called the ‘value-action’ gap?  This ‘value-action’ gap 
emerges repeatedly in the research literature in the area of consumption 
and elsewhere in a range of countries.  For example, Aertsens et al. (2009) 
noted: ‘While most consumers hold positive attitudes towards organic 
food (Magnusson et al., 2001; Saba & Messina, 2003; Kihlberg & Risvik, 
2007), the proportion of consumers purchasing organic food on a regular 
basis remains low, with market shares of organic products in European 
countries, varying from below one percent in some Southern, Central and 
Eastern European countries to over 5% (Sahota, 2009; Padel et al., 2009)’ 
(Aertsens et al., 2009, p. 1140).  Similarly, the Swedish researchers Roos 
and Tjarnemo (2011) wrote ‘While a large proportion of the population 
has positive attitudes towards caring for the environment, these positive 
attitudes are not always translated into actual behaviour.  Sales of organic 
food products are low’ (2011, p.983).  Vermeir and Verbeke (2006) say 
that ‘initiatives like sustainable organic food, product free from child 
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labor, legally logged wood, and fair-trade products often have market 
shares of less than 1%’ (MacGillivray, 2000).  This is at least partly due 
to the attitude-behaviour gap: attitudes alone are often a poor predictor of 
behavioural intention or market place behaviour (Kraus, 1995; Ajzen, 
2001). 
There are clearly different ways of attempting to resolve this 
‘value-action’ gap.  You could assume that you have a good measure of 
underlying attitude but what you need to do is to add other psychological 
components into the model, like subjective norms (beliefs about how 
others will behave) and perceived behavioural control (whether you think 
that your behaviour will make a difference) in an attempt to boost its 
predictive power (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen, 1985; 1991).  
Alternatively, you can consider other economic, marketing or commercial 
features of products (like price, quality, convenience, and brand 
familiarity, see Vermeir & Verbeke, 2006, p. 171) that may affect 
consumer choice and factor those into the model in an interactive way. 
However, there is, of course, another possibility, which is that 
perhaps we have been measuring attitudes incorrectly in the first place, or 
the wrong sort of attitudes.  Indeed, one might question whether our 
‘mental and neural state of readiness’ is open to introspection, and 
whether we could ever hope to report it accurately in surveys (see Beattie, 
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2010).  Allport himself seemed to show some awareness of this in his 
classic 1935 volume.  He wrote ‘The meagreness with which attitudes are 
represented in consciousness resulted in a tendency to regard them as 
manifestations of brain activity or of the unconscious mind.  The 
persistence of attitudes which are totally unconscious was demonstrated 
by Müller and Pilzecker (1900)’ (Allport, 1935, p. 801).  He clearly did 
not rule out the concept of the unconscious attitude but chose to focus 
exclusively on the measurement of attitudes with self-report 
questionnaires.   
However, interest in ‘the meagreness with which attitudes are 
represented in consciousness’, in other words ‘implicit cognition’ and 
‘implicit attitudes’, has been growing in the past few years, and this could 
lead us to think very differently about the ‘value-action’ gap.  This 
research might one day tell us that the ‘value-action’ gap does not actually 
exist because we have been measuring and factoring in the wrong measure 
of ‘value’ in the first place.  In an international bestseller, the Nobel 
laureate and behavioural economist Daniel Kahneman (2011) has made a 
very convincing case for the central role of these implicit and automatic 
processes in everyday life.  Take a very simple example, imagine looking 
at an angry face – as quickly as you recognise the gender of the person or 
the colour of the person’s hair, you have decoded the facial expression.  
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This is ‘System 1’ thinking – it is automatic, unconscious and fast.  A 
multiplication task, on the other hand, is much slower and more deliberate; 
it requires effort and is conscious.  This is ‘System 2’ thinking in 
Kahneman’s terminology.  In everyday life, System 1 is always active, 
dealing with many of the routine aspects of everyday life.  Kahneman 
characterises System 1 as a ‘workaholic’ and System 2 as sometimes a bit 
lazy (Kahneman, 2011, p.46).  System 1 often jumps rapidly to 
conclusions, but System 2 does not always check the validity of the 
conclusions, even when it would be relatively easy to do so.  The two 
systems work on different principles, System 1 works on the principle of 
associative activation – ‘ideas that have been evoked trigger many other 
ideas, in a spreading cascade of activity in your brain.  The essential 
feature of this complex set of mental events is its coherence.  Each element 
is connected, and each supports and strengthens the others’ (Kahneman, 
2011, p.51).  System 2 uses more propositional and logical reasoning. 
Kahneman uses the example of ‘bananas - vomit’ to show how 
System 1 works in terms of spreading activation.  Our minds 
automatically assume a causal connection between the two words, 
producing within us an emotional response, and changing the state of our 
memory so that we are now more likely to recognise and respond to 
objects and concepts associated with sickness and nausea.  We are, for 
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example, more likely to complete the frame ‘s-ck’ as ‘sick’ rather than as 
‘sock’ or ‘suck’, having been unconsciously primed with the paired 
concepts of ‘bananas’ and ‘vomit’, all because of this associative 
‘machine’ underpinning System 1 thinking (see Beattie, 2015).  
Kahneman argues that as human beings we do not necessarily understand 
the causes and operations of our own cognitions and behaviour because 
of this fundamental division in our cognitive processes.  ‘When we think 
of ourselves, we identify with System 2, the conscious, reasoning self that 
has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about and what to 
do.  Although System 2 believes itself to be where the action is, the 
automatic System 1…is effortlessly originating impressions and feelings 
that are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate choices of 
System 2’ (2011, p.21).    
Greenwald (1990) has considered the accumulated effects of all of 
this associative activation for attitudes, our ‘mental and neural state of 
readiness’, and argued that we may well have implicit attitudes formed on 
such basic processes that are not available to introspection and are indeed 
unconscious.  We may believe that we have a positive attitude to bananas 
because we think that they are healthy and nutritious, but our associative 
experiences may provide us with a very different implicit attitude to them 
(and Seligman, 1970, famously demonstrated that you only need a small 
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number of negative experiences to make this happen).  The problem with 
theorising about implicit attitudes was that we had no way to access 
implicit attitudes, or measure them reliably, until Greenwald developed a 
reaction time based task to measure associative connections called the 
Implicit Association Test or IAT (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 
1998). See section 2.2.4. for a detailed description of the IAT. 
In some domains, consciously reported explicit attitudes and 
implicit attitudes measured through speed of association are correlated 
(although the size of the correlation does vary).  However, in other 
domains, there seems to be little or no correlation between the two 
measures and this has led Greenwald and Nosek (2008) to suggest that 
explicit and implicit attitudes can be ‘dissociated’.  When it comes to 
climate change, there appears to be no significant correlation between 
implicit and explicit measures, this time in terms of attitude to carbon 
footprint (Beattie & Sale, 2009).  Some argue that this is not that 
surprising and that explicit and implicit attitudes reflect the two very 
different information-processing systems described by Kahneman and 
others with different processes of acquisition.  Implicit attitudes are based 
on a slow-learning associative system whereas explicit attitudes are based 
on a fast learning system, which uses higher-level logic and symbolic 
representations (Sloman, 1996).  Rydell et al. (2006) have also shown that 
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you can change implicit and explicit attitudes with different sorts of 
information.  Consciously accessible information about a target changes 
the explicit attitude towards that target, whereas subliminally presented 
primes, ‘reflecting the progressive accretion of attitude object-evaluation 
pairings’, changes the implicit attitude towards them.  You can even 
change implicit and explicit attitudes in opposite directions by using 
associative information below the level of conscious awareness to change 
implicit attitudes, and consciously processed material (in opposition to 
this) to change explicit attitudes.    
So what are the possible implications of not having one but two 
types of attitude, for behaviour in general, and more specifically for 
consumer behaviour in the context of the threat of climate change?  Both 
types of attitude can be relevant for behaviour, but under different sets of 
circumstances and this is what the empirical research seems to suggest.  
Self-report attitudes may predict behaviour under certain situations, 
especially when people have the motivation and the opportunity to 
deliberate before making a behavioural choice, (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton 
& Williams, 1995), but they are less good at predicting spontaneous 
behaviour under time pressure (Friese, Wänke & Plessner, 2006; Beattie, 
2010; Beattie & Sale, 2011), or when consumers are under any sort of 
cognitive or emotional load (Gibson, 2008; Hofman, Rauch & Gawronski, 
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2007).  Unfortunately, time pressure, cognitive load and the absence of 
any opportunity to deliberate, characterises much of everyday 
supermarket shopping (Beattie & Sale, 2011).  Supermarket shopping is 
rarely found to be a slow, deliberate, reflective process.  The shopper 
passes about 300 brands per minute (Rundh, 2007) and each individual 
choice is often quick and automatic (Zeithaml, 2008).  Therefore, in a 
context such as this, implicit attitudes, would seem to be a better predictor 
of actual consumer choice rather than explicit attitudes and thus require 
an indirect measure as opposed to a direct and self-reportable measure 
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).  
The concept of implicit attitude could be a critical element in the 
fight against climate change.  Implicit, rather than explicit attitudes may 
well be underpinning everyday habitual consumer behaviours.  Such 
behaviours may be more difficult to change (Downing & Ballantyne, 
2007) because attempts to change attitudes and behaviour just focus on 
certain types of message, ignoring the associative networks of the implicit 
system.  Recent research investigated how implicit attitudes relate to how 
we process information relevant to climate change, assuming that the 
processing of relevant information is the start point of the whole process 
of behavioural change and there are many persuasive messages available 
about climate change.  But what happens if people do not see these sorts 
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of messages (Beattie et al., 2011)?  The relationship between explicit and 
implicit attitudes and visual fixation of carbon labels on products was 
explored in Chapter 2.  The research suggested that there was no 
significant relationship between how positive the explicit attitude to 
carbon footprint was and the overall amount of attention devoted to the 
carbon label.  There was also no effect with the measure of implicit 
attitude.  However, there was a significant statistical association between 
the measure of implicit attitude and the target of the first fixation.  Those 
individuals with the most positive implicit attitude were more likely to 
fixate first on the carbon footprint information (rather than ‘energy’ or 
‘price’) compared with those with a more negative implicit attitude.  
Those with the most positive implicit attitude had a mean of 7.0 first 
fixations on carbon footprint (out of a possible 16) whereas those with the 
least positive implicit attitude had a mean of 4.5 first fixations on carbon 
footprint.  This association did not, however, occur with explicit attitude.  
Those with the most positive explicit scores had a mean of 5.3 first 
fixations on carbon footprint whereas those with more negative explicit 
attitude had a mean of 6.5 first fixations on carbon footprint.  This 
difference was both in the wrong direction and non-significant.  So again 
we find evidence that measures of implicit attitude, but not measures of 
explicit attitude, predict patterns of unconscious eye movements. 
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Of course, these studies are about visual attention rather than 
choice but it is the actual behavioural choices that people make rather than 
merely what people notice that is the critical issue when it comes to 
climate change.  However, one domain where actual choice has been 
explored is that of racial bias in recruitment.  In this research, it was shown 
that, although the vast majority of people report having no preferences 
either way in terms of race or ethnicity, when implicit bias is measured 
through the IAT, focussing on the associative connections between the 
target categories (Black/White) and the attribute categories (Good/Bad), 
the majority of the sample had an implicit pro-White bias and the White 
participants had a strong pro-White bias.  Furthermore, implicit bias 
measured in the IAT predicted shortlisting decisions in a fictitious job 
selection task in a way that explicitly reported attitude did not (see Beattie, 
2013; Beattie, Cohen & McGuire, 2013; Beattie & Johnson, 2012). 
This research opens up the possibility that we may have implicit 
attitudes at odds with what we report (and indeed at odds with how we 
think about ourselves), which can nevertheless influence our everyday 
decisions.  So the question remains, to what extent do these implicit 
attitudes predict consumer choice (given the importance of consumption 
to climate change)?  As already mentioned, Beattie and Sale (2011) had 
found that when participants were asked to select either a high carbon or 
low carbon goody bag at the end of an experiment measuring attitudes, 
215 
 
those with a strong pro-low carbon implicit attitude were more likely to 
select the low carbon goody bag, but only under time pressure.  Very 
similar results had been reported by Friese, Wänke and Plessner (2006) 
who also found that implicit attitude predicted the choice of a gift (a 
‘generic’ gift versus a ‘branded’ gift) for taking part in the experiment, 
but again only under time pressure.  These results are interesting, but of 
course, tell us very little about how people will behave in a real consumer 
choice situation for a number of reasons.  Firstly, in terms of what might 
be called broad ecological considerations, consumer products are 
characterised by a number of different dimensions (brand, value, taste, 
health features, environmental implications etc.), all operating 
simultaneously, which could impact on consumer choice at both the 
associative and more rational levels.  Advertising is used to build brands 
(be it well-known brands, luxury brands, organic or eco brands, or value 
brands) in an associative manner (Aaker & Biel, 2013), and when it comes 
to consumer choice under time pressure, even when System 1 might be 
more active, these other associations might swamp any implicit 
associations to do with our attitudes to carbon footprint.  Secondly, in 
terms of experimental considerations, in both Friese et al. (2006), and 
Beattie and Sale (2011), the choice of the reward was left until the very 
end of the experiment.  At this point, it might have been apparent to 
participants that the experiment was measuring attitudes to certain 
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attributes of products, and might have produced some demand 
characteristics about what was or was not appropriate behaviour. 
Of course, notwithstanding these points, both studies did suggest 
that time pressure is a critical variable in this domain and that implicit 
attitudes might be more predictive of behaviour when time is not freely 
available and when there is little opportunity to deliberate.  This may have 
particular relevance for consumer choice especially in supermarkets 
where much everyday shopping occurs in advanced Western societies.  
These kinds of considerations formed the basis for the present study, 
where consumer choice of real brands as a function of both time and as a 
function of both implicit and explicit attitudes is studied.   
The aim in this chapter is to investigate what sorts of factors 
determine choice, and whether this fundamental division of human beings 
(at least in terms of System 1 and System 2 thinking) has any relevance 
for our culture of consumption and our ability to adapt to face the threat 
of climate change.  Here, the aim is to experimentally investigate whether 
carbon footprint information has any effect on consumer choice.  There is 
recent evidence from Finland that it can influence consumer choice at least 
on meat products (Koistinen, Pouta, Heikkilä, Forsman-Hugg, Kotro, 
Mäkelä & Niva, 2013).  In Australia there is evidence that carbon 
labelling, particularly using colour-coded carbon footprints (with a green 
footprint denoting ‘below average carbon emissions’ and black denoting 
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‘above average’) can influence actual shopping behaviour, but the effects 
are not particularly large (high carbon decreasing by 6%; low carbon 
increasing by 4%), unless paired with price (see Vanclay et al., 2011).  But 
how would carbon label interact with the other information labels on 
products (see Gadema & Oglethorpe, 2011) and would it relate in any way 
to measures of explicit or implicit attitude?  Further, is there any evidence 
of ‘dissociation’ in these attitudes towards the environment, which may 
help explain the relative inaction of the consumer towards climate change, 
and which attitudinal variables might predict a behavioural response to 
the various labels? This is a much finer grained analysis than Chapter 
three and aims to explore how brand and carbon footprint affect choice in 
much greater detail. The hypotheses are as follows:     
 
 
H1: Consumer brands will have a significant effect on consumer choice 
with well-known branded products selected most frequently, particularly 
under time pressure. 
 
H2: Colour-coded carbon footprint will significantly affect consumer 
choice. 
 
H3: Explicit and implicit attitudes to carbon footprint will not be 
significantly correlated with each other. 
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H4: Explicit attitudes to carbon footprint will not be associated with the 
choice of (colour-coded) high or low carbon footprint products. 
 
H5: Implicit attitudes to carbon footprint will be associated with the 
choice of (colour-coded) high or low carbon footprint products. 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
The participants used in this experiment were the same 
participants used in Chapter 3.  Ethical approval was obtained from the 
Edge Hill University Research Ethics Committee (UREC).  As in the 
previous Chapter, participants were informed about the test procedure and 
told that they could withdraw at any point during the experiment and that 
their data could be removed from the study and destroyed at any point up 
to three weeks after they had taken part in the experiment (no participant 
asked for their data to be removed and destroyed).  They were fully 
debriefed at the end of the study.   
 
4.2.2. Stimuli 
As in Chapter three, ten products were selected for this study.  
These were everyday products, central to any weekly shop.  The same 
products were chosen: breakfast cereal (bran flakes), bread, cheese, 
coffee, fabric conditioner, ice cream, orange juice, soup, toilet roll and 
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washing up liquid.  These products all have a variety of information labels 
on the front of the products.  The number of these informational labels 
varied from product to product, and depended to a certain extent on the 
price and brand of the product, with the more expensive products having 
either more information labels or more of their surface area covered by 
image, logo or icon.  
 
As in Chapter three, the price of each product was superimposed 
onto the image of the product; price was always represented in white 
numbers on a black circular background.  The positioning of the price 
sticker was always in the same position across the four individual products 
in that set.  So for example, in the case of cheese, the price sticker was 
superimposed on the bottom left-hand corner of the product.  When it 
came to bread, in each case the sticker was superimposed on the top right-
hand corner.  The prices superimposed on the images of the products were 
always the actual prices.  The luxury brands were always the highest in 
price, then organic/eco, then the well-known brands followed by the value 
brands. All of the original details on the product remained the same and 
were not altered in any way. 
As well as the addition of price information, the carbon footprint 
value for each item was also superimposed onto the front of each product.  
The intention was to manipulate carbon footprint information in order to 
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test experimentally its effects on consumer choice.  The question is - can 
carbon footprint information influence consumer decision making? This 
is a very important theoretical and practical issue for many businesses 
concerned about climate change.  A core consideration was to vary carbon 
footprint in a systematic way by beginning with the actual carbon footprint 
of the product (derived from a variety of sources from both government 
and commercial databases) and then recalculating three additional values 
using this as the baseline in order to generate two high and two low carbon 
footprint values.  For example, in the case of ‘soup’ the typical carbon 
value is 186 grams CO2 for a standard can of ‘generic’ soup.  This was 
represented with a ‘186g’ on a black footprint and assigned arbitrarily to 
the value version of the product.  This figure was then halved to generate 
a lower carbon footprint value (93g CO2).  This was represented with 
‘93g’ on a green carbon footprint and assigned arbitrarily to the well-
known brand version of the soup.  Then 10% was subtracted from this 
value to generate the lowest carbon footprint value.  This was represented 
with ‘84g’ also on a green background.  Finally, 10% was added to the 
starting value which generated the highest carbon footprint value (here 
represented by ‘205g’ on a black background).  This was arbitrarily 
assigned to the organic/eco brand of the soup.  In the case of the other 
products, the high and low values were assigned arbitrarily to the different 
versions of the products (luxury, well-known brand, value and 
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organic/eco) with the only constraint being that each of the ten products 
had to have an equal number of high and low carbon footprint labels 
attached (5 of each in the final tally).  The images of the various products 
complete with the added carbon footprints and price stickers were then 
placed on a white background and laminated, creating a series of flash 
cards.  There were 40 flash cards in total. 
4.2.3. Attitudinal measures 
In order to determine participants’ explicit attitudes towards high 
carbon footprint and low carbon footprint, participants completed a 
computerised Likert scale and a Feeling Thermometer.  Here participants 
rated how ‘warm’ or ’cold’ they felt towards ‘high carbon’ and then how 
‘warm’ or ‘cold’ they felt towards ‘low carbon’ where 1 = very cold, 3 = 
neutral and 5 = very warm.  In order to calculate a Thermometer 
Difference (TD) score, the high carbon footprint score is subtracted from 
the low carbon score.  Thus, a TD scores can range from -4 to +4, with a 
negative TD score indicating that the participant report a preference for 
high carbon footprint compared to low carbon footprint and a positive TD 
score indicating that they report a preference for low carbon footprint 
compared to high carbon footprint.  The more extreme the number then 
the stronger the preference on this measure.  For example, 1 would 
represent a mild preference for low carbon footprint, whereas 4 represents 
a very strong preference for low carbon footprint. 
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4.2.4. Implicit Association Test (IAT)  
As in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, participants were also asked to 
complete the ‘carbon footprint’ Implicit Association Test or IAT designed 
to test their implicit attitudes to the target categories (High Carbon/Low 
Carbon) by measuring the associative connection between these and the 
attribute categories (Good/Bad) (Beattie, 2010, Beattie & Sale, 2010; 
Beattie & McGuire, 2012; Beattie & McGuire, 2015).   
4.3. Shopping task 
A total of 40 flash cards were laid out on a table displaying images 
of 10 different products (as described earlier) with four different brand 
variations of each (luxury brand, well-known brand, value brand and 
organic/eco brand).  The four different brands for each product were laid 
out in a row.  The particular order within the row was changed for each 
new participant.  Each participant was asked to select a choice of items 
under a number of shopping conditions that included shopping alone 
under time pressure (‘Imagine yourself shopping alone in a supermarket - 
you are in a real hurry’) and shopping alone but with no time pressure 
(‘Imagine yourself shopping alone in a supermarket - you are shopping 
with plenty of time on your hands’).  Each condition was randomised 
between participants to control for possible order effects.  Participants had 
to select 10 products in total.  Once they had chosen their first product, 
they were then asked to select the next and so on.  All choices were timed 
223 
 
on a stop-watch.  The order in which they had to choose the products was 
randomised across both conditions.  Each participant was asked to 
complete the shopping task for all products under one condition before 
moving on to the next condition.  
4.4. Results5 
4.4.1. Consumer choice and the nature of the brand with no time 
pressure 
The first focus for the analysis was the relationship between brand 
and consumer choice under no time pressure.  See Tables 4.1 and 4.2  It 
was immediately apparent that the brand chosen most frequently under no 
time pressure was the well-known brand (38.0% of all selections) 
followed by the value brand (32.4%) followed by the organic/eco brand 







                                            
5 In this chapter, a much finer grained analysis is pursued to explore possible connections between 
both explicit and implicit attitudes and behavioural choices.  Various categorisations are employed 
which restricted the distribution under each condition and for this reason non-parametric statistics 
were employed.  This chapter is considered highly exploratory in both scope and design (this also 





Table 4.1: The relationship between consumer choice of brand under no 
time pressure. 
 
Brand Percentage of times 
chosen by all 
participants 
Luxury 12.6% 




There was, however, considerable variation from product to 
product.  So for example, when it came to products like soup (Heinz), 
toilet roll (Andrex) and fabric conditioner (Lenor) the well-known brands 
were chosen in over 50% of all occasions, and these well-known brands 
dominated consumer choice.  However, in other cases the well-known 
brands were not chosen so frequently.  For example, in the case of coffee, 
the well-known brand (Lavazza) was chosen only in 18% of cases; in the 
case or orange juice the well-known brand (Princes) was chosen in only 
24% of cases.  Value brands seemed to be selected more frequently when 
it came to washing-up liquid (62%) and bran flakes (52%).  Organic/eco 
brands were selected most frequently when it came to coffee (32%) and 
ice cream (24%), but note that the well-known (in the case of the ice 
cream) and value brands (in the case of the coffee) are still selected more 
frequently in the case of these products.  Luxury brands were selected 
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most frequently when it came to orange juice (32%) and ice cream (28%).  
In both these cases these were the top selection (see Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2: Brand choice across all participants under no time pressure 
(percentage choice). 
 
 Luxury Well-known 
brand 
Value Organic/eco 
Bran Flakes 0% 
 
26%         52% 22% 
Bread 10% 
 
44%         28% 18% 
Cheese 2% 
 
44%         36% 18% 
Coffee 14% 
 
18%         36% 32% 
Fabric 
Conditioner 
20% 56%         12% 12% 
Ice cream 28% 
 





24%         30% 14% 
Soup 16% 
 
58%         14% 12% 
Toilet roll 4% 
 
58%         32% 6% 
Washing up 
liquid 
0% 26%         62% 12% 




4.4.2. Consumer choice and the nature of the brand with time pressure 
Interestingly, under time pressure, the well-known brands became 
even more popular.  Well-known brands were now selected in 42.8% of 
all cases compared to 38.0% under no time pressure.  Value brands were 
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selected 31.4% of the time, followed by luxury brands with 15.4% and 
lastly organic/eco with 10.4%.  See Table 4.3.  
 
Table 4.3: The relationship between consumer choice of brand under 
time pressure. 
 
Brand Percentage of times 
brand was chosen by all 
participants  
Luxury 15.4% 




Table 4.3 reveals a number of things.  Firstly, it hints at the power 
of advertising for those brands that have become well-known (Hovis, 
Kellogg’s, Heinz etc.), in that these brands are immediately recognisable 
and accessible under time pressure and when consumers are under time 
pressure, then the more likely they are to choose something they instantly 
recognise (Jensen & Drozdenko, 2008).  The well-known brand of soup 
was selected most frequently of all products (74%) and the same for toilet 
roll (58%).  See Table 4.4.  Secondly, it demonstrates that the organic/eco 
brand drops to fourth place under time pressure (10.4%), which is lower 
than the luxury brand (15.4%).  However, without time pressure, the 
organic/eco brand is selected more frequently (17.0%) than the luxury 
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brand (12.6%).  This would seem to suggest that when we change the 
temporal context of consumer choice, it does influence consumer 
behaviour and that the organic/eco brand becomes more popular when 
there is some time for consideration. 
Table 4.4: Brand choice across all participants under time pressure 
(percentage choice). 
 
 Luxury Well-known 
brand 
Value Organic/eco 
Bran Flakes 0% 
 
48%         42% 10% 
Bread 
 
8% 44%         34% 14% 
Cheese 
 
2% 56%         30% 12% 
Coffee 
 
24% 20%         40% 16% 
Fabric 
Conditioner 
26% 42%         18% 14% 
Ice cream 44% 
 





38%         24% 4% 
Soup 12% 
 
74%         14% 0% 
Toilet roll 2% 
 
58%         38% 2% 
Washing up 
liquid 
2% 32%         54% 12% 
Mean 15.4% 42.8%      31.4%          10.4% 
 
4.4.3. Consumer choice: inferential statistics 
Statistical analyses focussed on the relationship between time 
pressure and brand choice.  The first analysis considered the relationship 
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between choice of organic/eco brand versus the well-known brand under 
both time pressure and no time pressure following the observations above 
(see Table 4.5).  Under time pressure the well-known brands were chosen 
more frequently, whereas the organic/eco brands were chosen less 
frequently under time pressure and this difference in distribution was 
significant (X2 = 9.25, d.f. = 1, p < 0.01, 2-tailed test). 
 
Table 4.5: The relationship between choice of organic versus well-
known brand under time pressure/no time pressure. 
  
         No TP TP Total 
Organic/eco 
 
85 52 137 
Well-known 
brand 
190 214 404 
Total 275 266 541 
 
 
The next comparison considered choice of organic/eco brands 
versus luxury brands under time pressure and no time pressure, as shown 
in Table 4.6.  The analysis suggests that the organic/eco brands were less 
likely to be chosen under time pressure compared to the luxury brands, 
which were more likely to be chosen under time pressure (X2 = 8.03, d.f. 
= 1, p < 0.01, two tailed test).  In other words, under time pressure, 
consumers are significantly more likely to choose luxury brands and 





Table 4.6: The relationship between choice of organic/eco brands versus 
luxury brands under time pressure/no time pressure. 
 
         No TP TP           Total 
Organic/eco 85 52 137 
Luxury 63 77 140 
Total 148 129 277 
 
 
A number of the statistical comparisons, however, revealed no 
significant differences in terms of the comparisons made.  So, for 
example, both organic/eco brands and value brands are less likely to be 
chosen under time pressure in a similar pattern to each other with no 
significant difference in underlying distribution (X2 = 3.48, d.f.=1, n.s.).  
See Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7: The relationship between the choice of organic/eco brands 
versus value brands under time pressure/no time pressure. 
 
           No TP TP Total 
Organic 85 52 137 
Value 162 157 319 
Total 247 209 456 
 
 
Similarly, when well-known brands and luxury brands were 
compared, under time pressure and no time pressure, the participants were 
more likely to choose both the well-known brands and the luxury brands 
under time pressure in a very similar pattern and again there was no 




Table 4.8: The relationship between the choice of well-known brands 
versus luxury brands under time pressure/no time pressure. 
 
           No TP TP Total 
Well-known 
brand 
190 214 404 
Organic 
 
63 77 140 
Total 253 219 544 
 
The next comparison focused on the selection of value brands and 
well-known brands under time pressure and no time pressure.  Here it was 
found that the value brands were more likely to be chosen under no time 
pressure, the well-known brands were more likely to be chosen under time 
pressure.  The differences in terms of absolute numbers under the two 
conditions were not that large and the difference failed to reach 
significance (X2 = 1.05, d.f. = 1, n.s.).  See Table 4.9. 
 
Table 4.9: The relationship between the choice of value brands versus 
well-known brands under time pressure/no time pressure. 
 
           No TP TP Total 
Value 
 
162 157 319 
Well-Known 
brand 
190 214 404 
Total 352 371 723 
 
 
Similarly, when the choice of value brands and luxury brands were 
compared under time pressure and no time pressure, it was found that the 
luxury brands were more likely to be chosen under time pressure, but 
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again, the difference in quantitative terms were not that great and the 
overall difference failed to reach significance (X2 = 1.34, d.f. = 1, n.s.).  
See Table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.10: The relationship between the choice of value brands versus 
luxury brands under time pressure/no time pressure. 
 
 No TP TP Total 
Value 162 157 319 
Luxury 63 77 140 
Total 225 234 459 
 
 
4.4.4. Does carbon footprint influence consumer choice?   
An overview of this has been presented in Chapter 3, but here the 
data will be considered in a more nuanced way.  The carbon footprint of 
each consumer choice is laid out in Table 4.11. ‘HH’ represents the 
product with the highest carbon footprint (starting value plus 10%), ‘H’ 
represents the product with a high carbon footprint (the starting value), 
‘L’ represents the low carbon footprint product (half the starting value), 








Table 4.11: Number of high and low carbon items chosen by each 
participant in the sample under no time pressure/time pressure. 
 





























2 1 3 4 0 4 2 4 
Participant 
2 
2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 
Participant 
3 
3 1 2 4 2 1 4 3 
Participant 
4 
1 3 4 2 1 4 3 2 
Participant 
5 
1 4 4 1 2 2 4 2 
Participant 
6 
3 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 
Participant 
7 
4 1 3 2 2 1 4 3 
Participant 
8 
1 1 5 3 2 1 5 2 
Participant 
9 
2 3 2 3 1 3 4 2 
Participant 
10 
1 3 5 1 2 1 4 3 
Participant 
11 
4 2 3 1 1 1 4 4 
Participant 
12 
1 2 4 3 2 2 3 3 
Participant 
13 
3 3 2 2 3 3 3 1 
Participant 
14 
3 4 2 1 5 1 2 2 
Participant 
15 
2 2 1 5 1 3 5 1 
Participant 
16 
3 1 4 2 4 3 3 0 
Participant 
17 
0 4 4 2 3 5 2 0 
Participant 
18 
3 2 2 3 4 1 2 3 
Participant 
19 
2 1 4 3 2 2 2 4 
Participant 
20 





3 2 4 1 3 1 3 3 
Participant 
22 
1 2 5 2 2 3 2 3 
Participant 
23 
1 3 2 4 0 2 3 5 
Participant 
24 
3 0 4 3 5 0 3 2 
Participant 
25 
0 3 4 3 1 3 3 3 
Participant 
26 
2 1 3 4 3 1 2 4 
Participant 
27 
4 2 1 3 1 2 4 3 
Participant 
28 
0 1 5 4 4 0 4 2 
Participant 
29 
2 4 3 1 3 2 2 3 
Participant 
30 
2 4 2 2 2 5 1 2 
Participant 
31 
2 0 4 4 3 1 3 3 
Participant 
32 
1 1 5 3 2 0 5 3 
Participant 
33 
1 2 5 2 1 2 5 2 
Participant 
34 
4 0 3 3 4 1 4 1 
Participant 
35 
1 3 4 2 1 4 2 3 
Participant 
36 
0 2 3 5 0 2 5 3 
Participant 
37 
1 2 1 6 2 2 2 4 
Participant 
38 
4 4 0 2 4 3 1 2 
Participant 
39 
2 3 1 4 1 4 2 3 
Participant 
40 
3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 
Participant 
41 
2 4 2 2 1 3 2 4 
Participant 
42 
5 3 2 0 4 3 2 1 
Participant 
43 
1 1 3 5 3 4 2 1 
Participant 
44 





2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 
Participant 
46 
1 4 1 4 2 2 2 4 
Participant 
47 
3 1 2 4 2 2 2 4 
Participant 
48 
2 2 5 1 2 3 4 1 
Participant 
49 
0 1 5 4 0 3 4 3 
Participant 
50 
1 3 2 4 1 3 3 3 
 
 
From Table 4.11 and 4.12 (below) it should be clear that the 
carbon footprint of the products did influence consumer choice.  Table 
4.12 shows that when there is no time pressure, the experimental 
participants chose low carbon items a mean of 3.10 times, very low carbon 
items a mean of 2.72 times, high carbon items a mean of 2.20 times and 
very high carbon items a mean of 1.98 times.  In other words, they seem 
to prefer low as opposed to high carbon items (of course, signalled by the 
green footprint superimposed on the product).  In addition, they also prefer 
the less extreme variations within each of these categories (the low carbon 
item was chosen more than the very low carbon item and the high carbon 
product was chosen more than the very high carbon product).  Variations 
within the category were, of course, only signalled by the numerical value 






Table 4.12: Mean number of high and low carbon items chosen by each 
of the 50 participants under no time pressure/time pressure. 
 



















Mean 1.98 2.20 3.10 2.72 2.16 2.28 2.98 2.58 
 
 
Nonparametric analyses revealed that the preference for low carbon items 
over high carbon items was significant – with either the full set (‘HH+H’ 
versus ‘LL+L’) compared (Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test, 
Z = -3.322, n = 39, p < 0.001, 2-tailed), or focussing just on the less 
extreme categories items ‘H’ versus ‘L’) (Wilcoxon Test, Z = -2.833, n = 
44, p < 0.004, 2-tailed).  It was also significant focussing just on the more 
extreme category items (‘HH’ versus ‘LL’) (Wilcoxon Test, Z = -2.422, n 
= 42, p < 0.05, 2-tailed).  However, the apparent preference for the low 
carbon items (‘L’) versus the very low carbon items (‘LL’) was not 
significant (Wilcoxon Test, Z = -1.212, n= 44, n.s.), neither was the choice 
of high carbon items (‘H’) versus the very high carbon items (‘HH’) 
(Wilcoxon Test, Z = -0.812, n = 43, n.s.).  
 When the participants were under time pressure, they chose 
low carbon items a mean of 2.98 times and very low carbon items a mean 
of 2.58 times, high carbon items a mean of 2.28 times and very high 
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carbon items a mean of 2.16 times.  So again, the participants show a 
preference for low as opposed to high carbon items.  As in the previous 
case, they seem to choose the low carbon items more than the very low 
carbon items and the high more than the very high carbon items, but when 
under time pressure the difference was not as extreme as it was when there 
was no time pressure.  Again, nonparametric analyses revealed that the 
preference for low carbon items over high carbon items was significant – 
comparing the full set (‘HH+H’ versus ‘LL+L’) (Wilcoxon Matched-
Pairs Signed-Ranks Test, Z = -2.630, n = 38, p < 0.05, 2-tailed).  The 
differences were also significant focussing either on the less extreme 
categories items (‘H’ versus ‘L’) (Wilcoxon Test, Z = -2.362, n = 40, p < 
0.05, 2-tailed). However, when it came to the more extreme category 
items (‘HH’ versus ‘LL’) the preference for low carbon was not 
significant (Wilcoxon Test, Z = -1.317, n = 52, n.s.).  When comparing 
the preference for the low carbon items (‘L’) versus the very low carbon 
items (‘LL’) this was not significant (Wilcoxon Test, Z = -1.563, n=40, 
n.s.), neither was the choice of high carbon items (‘H’) versus the very 





4.4.5. Do measures of explicit and implicit attitudes to carbon footprint 
relate to one another? 
 
Table 4.13 shows the mean Likert scores, Thermometer 
Difference (TD) scores and D scores for the sample.  The mean Likert 
score was 3.60, which is approximately midway between neutral and a 
moderate preference for low carbon, translating to a slight preference for 
low carbon.  The mean TD score was 1.20, which also represents a slight 
preference for low carbon.  The D score was 0.99, which represents a 
strong pro-low carbon preference for this particular set of high and low 
carbon items.  The means are set out in Table 4.13.  
 
Table 4.13: Mean Likert scores, Thermometer Difference (TD) scores 







D score  
(implicit) 





Figures 4.1 - 4.3 show simplified distributions of the Likert, TD 
and D scores in which the scores are assigned to just three categories – 
pro-low carbon (positive score above neutral), neutral (‘3’ for Likert; -1 
to +1 for TD; -0.2 to +0.2 for D) and pro-high carbon (negative score 
below neutral).  It is immediately apparent that on both explicit and 
implicit measures the participants emerge as pro-low carbon, and as 
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before (see Beattie, 2010) the scores on the implicit measures suggest that 
they are even greener (with the clear proviso that this result will depend 
upon the particular stimuli used in the IAT to represent high and low 



















































































But do the explicit and implicit measures relate to each other? A 
Pearson product-moment correlation was computed to assess the 
relationship between the Likert and TD scores (explicit measures) and the 
D score (implicit measure).  In line with previous research, there was no 
significant correlation between the Likert and D scores (r = 0.016, n=50, 
n.s.).  Neither was there a correlation between the TD and D scores (r = 
0.198, n=50, n.s.).  This again suggests that explicit and implicit measures 
are ‘dissociated’ in this domain.  Interestingly, the Likert and TD scores 
also did not correlate (r = 0.056, n=50, n.s.), which suggests that self-
reported attitudes (‘I strongly prefer products with a low carbon footprint 
to a high carbon footprint’ etc.), do not necessarily correlate with 
participants’ reports of how ‘warm’ or ‘cold’ they felt towards low/high 
carbon products (see Table 4.14). 
 
Table 4.14: Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between D 





IAT  r = 0.198 r =0.016 
Thermometer 
Difference 




4.4.6. Do explicit and implicit attitudes to carbon footprint influence 
the choice of high and low carbon products?   
The next question is whether these various measures of explicit 
and implicit attitudes predict choice of low or high carbon products when 
information about carbon label is also included, which vary but with all 
of the competing marketing information included.  The statistical 
comparisons here consider the number of choices of low carbon products 
(either ‘L’ or ‘LL’) of that set of participants who score strongly pro-low 
carbon footprint on the various measures.  In the case of the Likert scale, 
this set consists of those scoring ‘5’ (‘I strongly prefer products with a low 
carbon footprint to a high carbon footprint’).  Using this criterion, 20% of 
the sample is identified as having a strong explicit attitude to low carbon.  
In the case of the Thermometer Difference measure, a criterion of +4 was 
used.  This criterion identifies 26% of the sample and represents the 
maximum difference between feeling warm about low carbon and feeling 
cold about high carbon.  In the case of the IAT, the criterion used is what 
has become the norm in the literature for identifying a strong implicit bias 
and that is ‘greater than or equal to 0.8’.  It should be stressed that this is 
an arbitrary criterion (Blanton & Jaccard, 2008; Blanton et al., 2007; 
2015) and here identifies 52% of the sample, in other words, a much 
higher proportion than either of the other two criteria used for the explicit 
measures.  The logic of this analysis is as follows: the focus will be on a 
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possible bias in selecting low carbon items for those who fall within the 
set of a strong pro-low carbon attitude.  This is compared with any bias in 
the residual sample that does not have a strong pro-low carbon attitude.  
If both groups come out with a significant bias this would simply reflect 
that it was a general bias towards selecting low carbon items by the overall 
sample.  However, if those with a strong positive attitude to low carbon 
had a significant bias towards selecting low carbon items and this trend 
was not significant for those with a less strong attitude, then the suggestion 
would be that this reflects some meaningful properties of that attitudinal 
measure for predicting behaviour.  A separate analysis was carried out 
when the choice was made not under time pressure and under time 
pressure.  Table 4.15 shows the behavioural choices of those with a strong 
pro-low carbon attitude (measured by the Likert scale) under no time 
pressure.  Table 4.16 shows the behavioural choices of those with weaker 
pro-low carbon attitudes (again measured by the Likert scale).  In both 
cases, the results are significant and represent a bias in both groups 
towards low carbon choices.  Therefore, this particular attitudinal measure 
(the Likert scale) does not discriminate in terms of actual behaviour those 







Table 4.15: The relationship between strong pro-low carbon attitude 
(Likert scale) and behavioural choice under no time pressure. 
 
No time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices  





67 33 X2  = 11.56, 




(under the null 
hypothesis that 
choice is not 
affected by carbon 
footprint 
information) 
50 50  
 
 
Table 4.16: The relationship between weaker pro-low carbon attitude 
(Likert scale) and behavioural choice under no time pressure. 
 
No time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 





224 176 X2  = 5.76, d.f. 




(under the null 
hypothesis) 
200 200  
 
In Tables 4.17 and 4.18, the same comparisons are made when the 
participants are under time pressure.  What is striking from Table 4.17 is 
that those with a strong pro-low carbon attitude, as identified by the Likert 
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scale, do not display a significant bias towards selecting low carbon items, 
but those with a weaker attitude (according to this scale) do.  In other 
words, both under no time pressure and under time pressure, this 
attitudinal measure would seem to have little discriminatory power for 
predicting actual behaviour. 
 
Table 4.17: The relationship between strong pro-low carbon attitude 
(Likert scale) and behavioural choice under time pressure. 
 
Time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 





51 49 X2  = 0.04, d.f. 
=1, n.s.  
Expected 
frequency 
(under the null 
hypothesis) 
50 50  
 
Table 4.18: The relationship between weaker pro-low carbon attitude 
(Likert scale) and behavioural choice under time pressure. 
 
Time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 





227 173 X2  = 7.29, d.f. 




(under the null 
hypothesis) 
200 200  
 
 
In the case of the Thermometer Difference, there is a very similar 
pattern.  With no time pressure comparisons, there is an inherent bias 
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towards choosing low carbon items and this is true for those with a strong 
pro-low carbon attitude (as measured by the TD) and those with a weaker 
pro-low carbon attitude.  Hence, the TD does not discriminate the 
behavioural choice of the two groups.  In the case of the time pressure, the 
results were significant, but in the opposite direction to that predicted – 
only those with the weaker pro-low carbon attitudes were significantly 
more likely to choose low carbon products. See Tables 4.19 - 4.22. 
 
 
Table 4.19: The relationship between strong pro-low carbon attitude 
(TD) and behavioural choice under no time pressure. 
 
No time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 





79 51 X2  = 6.02, d.f. 




(under the null 
hypothesis) 
















Table 4.20: The relationship between weaker pro-low carbon attitude 
(TD) and behavioural choice under no time pressure. 
 
No time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 





291 79 X2  = 121.5, d.f. 




(under the null 
hypothesis) 
185 185  
 
 
Table 4.21: The relationship between strong pro-low carbon attitude 
(TD) and behavioural choice under time pressure. 
 
Time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 









(under the null 
hypothesis) 
65 65  
 
Table 4.22: The relationship between non strong pro-low carbon attitude 
(TD) and behavioural choice under time pressure. 
 
Time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 





207 163 X2  = 5.23, d.f. 




(under the null 
hypothesis) 




In the case of the analyses using the IAT, the results are different.  
Under no time pressure, both groups (strong and weaker pro-low carbon 
implicit attitude) show a significant bias towards choosing low carbon 
items.  However, under time pressure the strong pro-low carbon group 
does show a significant tendency to selecting low carbon items; the 
weaker pro-low carbon group does not show a significant tendency in this 
regard.  In other words, when participants/consumers are under time 
pressure (as they are in many everyday consumer situation) those with a 
strong implicit attitude to low carbon are more likely to shop in a 
sustainable way.  From a statistical point of view this is interesting 
because the group identified on the basis of the normative measure of 
strong implicit attitude (0.8 and above) was larger and therefore less 
selective, and less extreme, than the strong group identified by either of 
the other two measures.  This makes the present result all the more 








Table 4.23: The relationship between strong pro-low carbon attitude 
(IAT) and behavioural choice under no time pressure. 
 
No time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 





154 106 X2  = 8.86, d.f. = 




(under the null 
hypothesis) 
130 130  
 
 
Table 4.24: The relationship between weaker pro-low carbon attitude 
(IAT) and behavioural choice under no time pressure. 
 
No time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 





137 103 X2  = 4.82, d.f. = 




(under the null 
hypothesis) 










Table 4.25: The relationship between strong pro-low carbon attitude 
(IAT) and behavioural choice under time pressure. 
 
Time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 





150 110 X2  = 6.16, d.f. = 




(under the null 
hypothesis) 
130 130  
 
Table 4.26: The relationship between weaker pro-low carbon attitude 
(IAT) and behavioural choice under time pressure. 
 
Time pressure Number of low 
carbon choices 
(L or LL) 
Number of high 
carbon choices 









(under the null 
hypothesis) 
120 120  
 
4.4.7. Do either explicit or implicit attitudes to low carbon products 
predict the choice of organic or eco brands? 
 
In the last section, it was found that carbon footprint not only 
influenced consumer choice, but also that attitude to low carbon (either 
self-reported or implicit) seemed to impact on that choice.  One important 
theoretical question is how general the behavioural impact of such 
underlying attitudes might be? Although only attitude to low and high 
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carbon products was measured, would this measure also predict the choice 
of organic or eco products?  It is important to remember that the carbon 
footprint was randomly assigned to the range of products.  Although there 
may be a relationship between carbon footprint and organic/eco products 
in general, this would not have been the case in this particular 
experimental context, where these two variables were randomly 
manipulated. 
Tables 4.27-4.30 show how both implicit and explicit attitudes 
relate to the choice of organic/eco products under conditions of no time 
pressure or time pressure.  These results are extremely interesting.  The 
first analysis (Table 4.27) shows that of the 26 participants with a strong 
pro-low carbon implicit attitude, 22 of them chose one or more 
organic/eco products, only four of these participants did not choose 
organic/eco products, when there was no time pressure.  This contrasts 
with a much more even split (13/11) for those with a weaker pro-low 
carbon implicit attitude.  In other words, when the participants as 
‘consumers’ had time to make their selection, this act of choice of 
organic/eco products was significantly affected by their underlying 
implicit attitude.  This did not occur when participants were under time 






Table 4.27: The relationship between implicit attitude to low carbon and 
choice of organic/eco products under no time pressure. 
 












(D less than 0.8) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
One or more 
organic/eco 
choices 
22 13 X2  = 5.51, d.f. 




4 11  
 
 
Table 4.28: The relationship between implicit attitude to low carbon and 
choice of organic/eco products under time pressure. 
 












(D less than 0.8) 
Outcome of 
statistical test 
One or more 
organic/eco 
choices 
12 9 X2  = 0.40, d.f. 
= 1, n.s. 
No organic/eco 
choices 
14 15  
 
Measures of explicit attitude to low carbon also significantly 
predicted the choice of organic/eco products, but again only when the 
choice was not made under time pressure.  It must be remembered that the 
operational definition of a strong pro-low carbon explicit attitude was 
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more extreme in terms of where it lands on the underlying distribution of 
scores than the implicit criterion, and uniquely identifies just 10 
individuals but every single one of them chose an organic/eco product 
when not under time pressure.  This was not the case for those with a 
weaker pro-low carbon explicit attitude (see Table 4.29).  However, when 
the choices were made under time pressure those with a strong pro-low 
carbon explicit attitude still preferred organic/eco products, whereas the 
majority of those with a weaker attitude here chose no organic/eco 
products.  However, this difference failed to reach significance (see Table 
4.30).  In other words, those who hold the strongest attitude to low carbon 
products (either implicit or explicit) have some tendency to choose 
organic/eco products, but only when they are not under time pressure, 
suggesting that they may need more time to process the label and/or reflect 










Table 4.29: The relationship between explicit attitude to low carbon and 
choice of organic/eco products under no time pressure. 
 
















One or more 
organic/eco 
choices 
10 25 Fisher’s Exact 
Probability 
Test, p < 0.05, 
2-tailed test.  
No organic/eco 
choices 
0 15  
 
Table 4.30: The relationship between explicit attitude to low carbon and 
choice of organic/eco products under time pressure. 
 
















One or more 
organic/eco 
choices 





3 26  
 
4.5. Discussion 
This particular experiment attempted to uncover some of the core 
psychological factors underpinning consumer choice on the 
understanding that the behaviour of consumers is particularly relevant to 
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issues to do with climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions.  Indeed, consumer behaviour would appear to be one of the 
major obstacles on the road to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  The 
multinational Unilever, for example, has introduced a number of (very 
expensive) major initiatives in the last few years to reduce the 
environmental impact of their goods, but found that their greenhouse gas 
footprint impact per consumer had ‘….increased by around 5% since 
2010’ (Unilever Sustainable Living Plan, 2013, p.16).  Consumer 
behaviour seems to have been responsible for this unanticipated increase, 
rather than decrease, in carbon footprint associated with Unilever 
products. 
This experiment attempted to answer a number of basic 
psychological questions.  Firstly, what brand aspects of products (well-
known brand, value brand, luxury brand, organic/eco brand etc.) predict 
consumer choice?  In addition, what are the implications of time pressure 
on such choices, given that under increasing time pressure there is less 
opportunity for deliberation and reflection?  Secondly, do measures of 
explicit or implicit attitude towards carbon footprint impact on patterns of 
choice when environmental information is available?  What, for example, 
happens if carbon footprint, experimentally manipulated in various ways, 
is added to products?  Will this influence consumer choice when this 
particular type of environmental information has to compete with all of 
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the other information that is available on products?  How does time 
pressure impact on any of these relationships?   
In this behavioural choice study, it was immediately apparent that 
we, as consumers, are very sensitive to both brand information and value 
in our selection of products.  The brands chosen most frequently under no 
time pressure were the well-known brands - Heinz, Kellogg’s, Hovis etc. 
(chosen in 38.0% of all selections, with four alternatives to choose from) 
followed by the value brand (32.4%).  Significantly, further down the list 
was the organic/eco brand with 17.0% and lastly the luxury brands at 
12.6%.  However, when behavioural choice is made under time pressure, 
this trend became even more pronounced and the well-known brands were 
selected even more frequently (pointing to the power of advertising for 
promoting brand recognition).  Well-known brands were now chosen in 
42.8% of all cases and value brands 31.4% of the time (down slightly).  
Organic/eco brands were now in fourth and last place with only 10.4% of 
selections. 
This time dimension had a statistically significant effect on 
consumer choice in terms of the selection of well-known brands compared 
to organic/eco brands.  Under time pressure, consumers were also 
significantly more likely to choose luxury brands and significantly less 
likely to choose organic/eco brands.  Given the social and temporal 
aspects of much supermarket shopping, often characterised by significant 
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time pressure, this is not an optimistic conclusion regarding 
environmentally sensitive choices. 
It must be remembered that carbon footprint information was 
represented in a very obvious visual way on these particular products with 
colour coded footprints (green for below average, black for above 
average) and they were represented on the front of products rather than 
the backs (see Beattie et al., 2010).  This result shows that representing 
carbon footprint in this way can influence consumer choice.  Participants 
(with a positive implicit attitude to carbon footprint within this sample) 
were guided by these colour-coded carbon footprints but not by the 
numerical values of carbon footprint, representing the gradations of high 
and low carbon, within them.  There was no statistical difference between 
the two levels of high carbon footprint that were added to the products, or 
the two levels of low carbon footprint.  Given that most countries have 
not introduced colour-coded carbon footprint but have instead opted for 
numerical values on a plain background, this might well explain why these 
campaigns have so far been relatively unsuccessful in promoting 
behavioural change and the selection of the low carbon alternatives (see 
Beattie, 2010; 2012).  
The next question was whether these various measures of explicit 
and implicit attitudes predicted the choice of low or high carbon products 
when information about the carbon footprint is included on real products, 
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which vary in terms of brand and with all of the competing marketing 
information included.  In the case of the explicit measure (the Likert 
scale), both under no time pressure and under time pressure, this 
attitudinal measure had little discriminatory power for predicting actual 
behaviour.  When under time pressure, both groups (strong and weak pro-
low carbon attitude) showed a low carbon bias in terms of behavioural 
choice.  When under no time pressure, the weak explicit attitude group 
did display a low carbon preference; the strong group did not, which, of 
course, was exactly the opposite of what was predicted.  In the case of the 
implicit measure, however, the results were different in one important 
regard.  Under no time pressure, both groups (strong and weak pro-low 
carbon implicit attitude) displayed a significant bias towards choosing low 
carbon items (as was the case with the explicit group).  However, under 
time pressure, the strong pro-low carbon implicit group did show a 
significant tendency in selecting low carbon items; the weak pro-low 
carbon implicit group did not show a significant tendency in this regard.  
In other words, when participants/consumers are under time pressure, 
those with a strong implicit attitude to low carbon are more likely to shop 
in a sustainable way.  This result only becomes apparent when you 
consider the individual choices in some detail.  Measures of explicit 
attitude to low carbon also significantly predicted the choice of 
organic/eco products, but here only when the choice was not made under 
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time pressure, suggesting that they may need more time to process the 
label and/or reflect on the nature of their choice. 
In summary, these results give us some insight into some of the 
variables that affect consumer choice and point towards the attitudinal 
measures that may help us predict consumer behaviour that is more 
sustainable.  Organic/eco brands are clearly not the first choice option, 
particularly under time pressure.  Some individuals, however, with a 
strong positive implicit attitude towards low carbon are more sensitive to 
these brands and to carbon footprint information.  In the case of implicit 
attitudes measured using the IAT, one might say that it is extraordinary 
that a simple reaction time measure, which simply computes the response 
time in a categorisation task, can predict anything at all in a separate 
domain.  However, the simple measure predicts the choice of low carbon 
items under time pressure and even predicts the choice of organic/eco 
products (at least when there is more time for the consumer to reflect).  
The advantage of this simple measure is that participants do not seem 
quite so able to distort it for reasons of social desirability, in order to 
appear greener than they really are compared to self-report measures (see 
Steffens, 2004).  Therefore, it may provide us with a simple diagnostic 
tool to test the public’s actual readiness to go green, in the fight against 
climate change, and this could turn out to be very important indeed.  One 
could imagine redoing the segmentation analyses of Defra and other 
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leading organisations where one attempted to profile the population in 
terms of both explicit and implicit attitudes rather than relying merely on 
what people say.  
Of course, the research also raises some very general issues about 
whether or not consumers are dissociated in a number of respects, and 
whether two separate (but potentially interacting) systems of 
unconscious/implicit and conscious/explicit attitudes really do exist (see 
Gawronski, Hofmann & Wilbur, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006).  This is by no 
means universally accepted in the psychological literature; indeed, it is 
currently the subject of much quite heated debate (see Blanton & Jaccard, 
2006; Blanton et al., 2007; 2009 for a critique of this position and 
Greenwald, Nosek & Sriram, 2006; McConnell & Leibold, 2009; Ziegert 
& Hanges, 2009 for some rebuttals).  However, it would seem that in some 
domains, this notion of implicit attitudes, deriving from various 
associative connections and operating unconsciously alongside our more 
reflective attitudes (and indeed conflicting with them on occasion), might 
have some credibility (Beattie, 2013; Kahneman, 2011).  Such a view, 
after all, might not surprise those psychologists who worked in the 1930s 
alongside some of the major tobacco companies to promote smoking 
(subliminally) through the association of smoking with societal success, 
social acceptance, masculinity or feminity and confidence.  It might not 
even have surprised Gordon Allport in his early work on racism and ‘the 
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inner conflict’ (Allport, 1954/1979).  It is certainly an idea worth 
exploring further in the domain of consumption and climate change.  If 
we really do have a fundamental division when it comes to our underlying 
attitudes towards the environment, then this could be critical in the battle 
against climate change.  After all, most of us say that we know that we 
need to adapt our behaviour as consumers in the light of the threat of 
climate change, but then actually do nothing.  Until we start to promote 
low carbon products and low carbon lifestyles in a way that impinges on 
our automatic, unconscious system, little may actually change in this 
regard.  We cannot leave choice of low carbon products solely to reason 
and reflection, it could be far too late.  As Kahneman (2011) himself has 
noted, System 2 (the system of reason and reflection) can be very lazy 
indeed; it leaves a great deal to System 1, and System 1 is currently 
prioritising well-known brands and value brands over those with the right 
environmental properties.  System 1, in the domain of consumption, is 
directing us to choose those things that we have been taught to value – big 
brands (and status) and economical brands (and money) rather than 
environmental brands.  This may well need to change.  We need to think 
about how to promote low carbon lifestyles as something to do with a new 
sort of societal status, fun, necessary, caring, cooperative, clever, 
perceptive, confident, a must have, the next big thing, a new revolution, 
in a way that System 1 might notice.   
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Chapter 5: Can the presence of others 




As we have already seen, the IPCC identify a number of aspects 
of human activity that contribute to greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), and 
thereby impact on climate change.  These include such things as 
population size, economic activity, energy use, land use patterns, 
technology and climate change policy.  However, they also include 
another major factor that they identify as ‘lifestyle’, where ‘lifestyle’ 
reflects aspects of the behavioural choices that we make in our everyday 
lives that have an effect on GHG.  Of course, the reason that ‘lifestyle’ 
could be particularly important in this context is that it is something that 
could potentially change (and potentially change faster and more 
dramatically than many of the other factors like ‘population size’ or ‘land 
use patterns’).  Indeed, ‘lifestyle’ is identified as one of the common 
enabling factors that underpin adaptation and mitigation responses, 
according to the IPCC.  Clearly, we need a much better understanding of 
the variables that influence lifestyle choices, and particularly those 
choices with a direct bearing on GHG, if we are to prevent further changes 
in our climate.  This is the focus of the present study which empirically 
investigates one very simple but extremely important question, namely 
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how does the presence of others, whilst we are shopping, influence our 
choice of more sustainable products?  The IPCC highlight a number of 
policy instruments for changing behaviour, including the labelling of fuel 
or other products and the clear identification of vehicle efficiency.  
However, when products are labelled (either in terms of their 
environmental consequences for example, ‘eco’/‘organic’ etc. or in terms 
of their carbon footprint) how does the presence of others affect whether 
they are selected or not?   
There are two broad hypotheses that one might develop to predict 
the likely effects.  One hypothesis is that the presence of others should 
lead consumers to focus more on the environmental labels (either 
organic/eco or carbon label) because of the growing awareness about 
climate change amongst the public and their belief that climate change is 
‘real’ (Leiserowitz, 2006).  The public also say in numerous surveys that 
they are prepared to adapt their behaviour to help reduce climate change 
(Downing & Ballantyne, 2007; Park, Clery, Curtice, Philips & Utting, 
2012) and that they want more information about the associated 
environmental impacts of their purchases (Berry, Crossley & Jewel, 2008; 
but see also Beattie & Sale, 2009; Beattie, 2010). Selecting 
environmentally friendly options or low carbon products, whilst in the 
presence of others, allows people to present their very public concerns 
about the environment and climate change, and indeed potentially elevate 
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their social status in the group through this public display of 
environmental awareness (Griskevicius, Tybur & Van den Bergh, 2010). 
The second broad hypothesis is that there are more pressing concerns 
when shopping than the environmental features of the products.  Such 
things as brand, reputation, price and the value for money of the products 
are likely to be more significant variables in guiding consumer choice.  
The environmental features of such products could well be significantly 
less important than any of these other features.  Furthermore, features like 
‘brand reputation’ and ‘value for money’ are also highly likely to be 
influenced by the presence of others as consumers wish to display that 
they can afford luxury items or branded goods or that they are keen to get 
value for money from their purchases.  Both of these broad hypotheses 
now need to be elaborated and shown, not just to be plausible, but highly 
credible in the light of both theory and the existing empirical evidence. 
5.1.1. Social status and consumer choice 
The starting assumption for both hypotheses is the observation 
reported in a number of academic disciplines that consumer choice and 
social status are connected (see Hopkins & Kornienko, 2004; Han, Nunes 
& Dreze, 2013; Kim & Jang, 2014).  Indeed, the public display of status 
through purchased goods has been defined as ‘conspicuous consumption’.  
The term ‘conspicuous consumption’ was first introduced by the 
economist Thorstein Veblen in 1899 in his classic book ‘The Theory of 
264 
 
the Leisure Class’, where it was used to define ‘the advertisement of one’s 
income and wealth through lavish spending on visible items’ (Heffetz, 
2011, p.1101).  Here consumption is understood as a communicational 
act, which occurs in a social context and which interlocutors can interpret.  
Implicit in this theory is that shopping with others may well influence the 
choices that are made.  
There are many different theoretical perspectives on conspicuous 
consumption, including one that derives from evolutionary biology, 
namely ‘costly signalling theory’.  The basic premise behind this theory 
is that certain animals (including humans) use conspicuous display as a 
form of communication that signals inclusiveness fitness.  However, these 
displays must come at a cost, in that they need to take a considerable 
amount of ‘effort, risk, economic resources and time’ to work in this 
respect (see Griskevicius, Tybur, Sundie, Ciandini, Miller, & Kendrick, 
2007).  Take, for example, the peacock, displaying its tail to attract 
attention during courtship in order to signal the quality of its genetic 
makeup by the sheer elegance and spread of its feathers.  This is obviously 
a costly signal in that this elaborate signal makes the peacock more 
vulnerable to predators.  
For an action to qualify as ‘costly signalling’ it needs to meet the 
following four criteria.  Firstly, it ‘must be costly to the signaller in terms 
of economic resources, time, energy, risk or some other significant 
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domain …  Second, it must be easily observable by others.  Third, the 
display must ultimately increase the odds that the signaller will gain some 
fitness advantage through the display, such as increased ability to attract 
desirable mates.  Finally, the signal must be an indicator to potential mates 
of some important trait or characteristic, such as access to resources, pro-
social orientation, courage, health, or intelligence’ (Griskevicius et al., 
2007, p.86).  Expensive or luxury purchases (Veblen, 1899) obviously 
meet these criteria (and commercial advertising is, of course, based upon 
this fundamental idea).  The ostentatious purchase of luxury goods (the 
adverts tell us) will lead to us attracting more friends and sexual partners 
through our ability to signal that we have access to the appropriate 
financial resources (Black & Morton, 2015).  The question is whether the 
purchase of more environmentally friendly or more sustainable products 
could potentially follow similar principles.  Some environmentally 
friendly products are more expensive than their less environmentally 
friendly counterparts (Ling, 2013; Rödiger & Hamm, 2015), so the 
purchase of these products is a rather straightforward (but important) way 
in which inclusive fitness can be signalled (more access to financial 
resources).  However, what happens if the environmentally friendly or low 
carbon products are not more expensive?  Can they still signal inclusive 
fitness as defined by costly signalling theory?  After all, they can still be 
configured to meet the four criteria (from Griskevicius et al., 2007, p.86).  
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Firstly, they are costly to the signaller in that the consumer choosing the 
products needs to have spent the time in learning about and understanding 
environmental issues or carbon footprint (and to have spent the time in 
situ interpreting the label on the product itself).  Secondly, the selection 
of the environmentally friendly or low carbon products is potentially 
observable by others (because of the presence of labels on the products).  
Thirdly, caring about our environment/planet could perhaps make you 
more desirable to others, and fourthly, the behaviour in question could be 
an indicator to potential mates of an important trait or characteristic, 
namely pro-social orientation.      
Griskevicius, Tybur and Van den Bergh (2010) suggested that 
there are indeed links between pro-environmental consumer choice and 
elevated status and ‘that activating status motives can lead people to shy 
away from luxury and instead choose self-sacrifice’ (2010, p.392).  They 
argued that people are indeed willing to act pro-environmentally because 
it enhances their social status.  Griskevicius et al. (2010) used the example 
of the Toyota Prius (a ‘green’ hybrid car which costs more than a 
conventional equivalent) and compared it with the Honda Civic (a cheaper 
but highly efficient equivalent standard car).  In a survey conducted in 
2007 amongst customers who had purchased the Toyota Prius, advertised 
as ‘The planet’s favourite hybrid’, over half of the people in the survey 
said that the main reason for buying the Prius was that it ‘makes a 
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statement about me’.  Only a quarter of the customers bought the car 
because it actually had lower emissions (New York Times, 2007).  One 
owner openly admitted ‘I want people to know that I care for the 
environment’.  In other words, the main reason for buying a Prius seemed 
to be related to social identity, and elevating social status, through 
consumer choice.  
Griskevicius et al. (2010) then empirically investigated the 
connection between pro-environmental behaviour and elevated status.  
Participants in their study were given a ‘motivational prime’ in the form 
of a short story that was aimed to prime high status motivation.  The short 
story required them to imagine that they were ‘graduating from college, 
looking for a job, and deciding to go work for a large company because it 
offers the greatest chance of moving up’ (2010, p.395).  The story went 
on to describe the upmarket place of work with its ‘upscale lobby and nice 
furniture’.  As the readers came to the end of the story, they ‘learn that 
they will have an opportunity to receive a desirable promotion.  The story 
ends as the reader ponders moving up in status relative to his or her same-
sex peers’ (2010, p.395).  In a control condition, participants were also 
asked to read a story of a similar length that was not designed to prime 
social status.  Instead, the participants ‘read about losing a ticket to an 
upcoming concert and searching through the house.  After the person finds 
the ticket, he or she heads off to the concert with a same-sex peer’ (2010, 
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p.395).  There was also a second control condition where participants did 
not read a story, but were simply asked to make their product choices.  
After the various manipulations, participants were asked to imagine that 
they were out shopping for three different products, ‘a car’, ‘a household 
cleaner’ and ‘a dishwasher’.  For each product, there was a luxury option 
and an environmentally friendly option.  Both options were similar in 
price, they were made by the same manufacturer and had three key 
features describing the product.  So for example, in the case of the 
dishwasher, the luxury option was describes as follows: 
‘Sub-Zero ED40 Elite Dishwasher ($1,100).  Comes in choice of stainless 
steel or white exterior with black chrome trim.  Features a revolutionary heated drying 
system that eliminates water spots.  Has powerful water sprays but produces no sound’ 
(2010, p.404). 
The pro-environmental version was described as: 
‘Sub-Zero Eco-Trend Dishwasher ($1,100).  Has a standard 40-minute 
running cycle.  Uses a recirculating water system to save water.  Is made with recycled 
components’ (2010, p.404). 
Participants saw the products on a computer screen in random 
order and asked ‘If you were out shopping for a car/dishwasher/household 
cleaner, which of these two products would you buy?’ 
The study revealed that in the control condition, participants were 
more likely to choose the luxury options than the pro-environmental 
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options, whereas, in the experimental group, where participants had been 
primed with the status motivation story, they were more likely to choose 
the pro-environmental option.  The authors concluded that ‘activating 
status motives led people to increase the likelihood of choosing pro-
environmental green products over more luxurious non-green products’ 
(2010, p.396).   
This study tells us that pro-environmental consumer choice can be 
related to status and that it is possible to prime this form of behaviour.  
Griskevicious et al. (2010) then considered the effects of social context on 
this, by investigating the choice of ‘luxurious non-green products’ and 
‘green products’ in a private setting (shopping online) versus a public 
setting (shopping in a supermarket).  Participants again read the same 
story designed to prime status motivation with a control group reading a 
story unrelated to status motivation.  For the private setting, participants 
were told to ‘Imagine that you are shopping online by yourself at home’.  
In the public setting, participants were told to ‘Imagine that you are out 
shopping at a store’.  Participants were then asked to ‘indicate their 
preferences between three green versus three non-green products’.  The 
items were ‘a backpack’, ‘some batteries’ and ‘a table lamp’.  Again, each 
product had a ‘green’ and a ‘non-green’ alternative that were similar in 
price and manufactured by the same company.  The results revealed that 
when participants in the priming condition were told to imagine that they 
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were shopping in public, they showed an increased preference for green 
products compared to the control condition.  However, when shopping in 
the private condition, participants in the priming condition actually 
showed a decrease in the preference for green products.  The authors 
conclude that ‘when purchases are being made in private - when 
reputational costs were not salient - activating status motives appears to 
somewhat increase the attractiveness of luxurious (non-green) products… 
status motives increased attractiveness of pro-environmental products 
specifically when people were shopping in public.  When people were 
shopping in private, however, status motives increased desire for 
luxurious, self-indulgent non-green products’ (2010, p.397).  In other 
words, when people were aware that their choices could be observed by 
others and had the possibility of influencing other people’s perception of 
them, they were more likely to choose pro-environmental products.   
 In the next study of this series, Griskevicius et al. (2010) 
investigated what happens to behavioural choice when the green and non-
green items are priced differently.  They found that the experimental 
participants were more likely to choose green products when they were 
more expensive than the non-green products.  However, when the non-
green products were more expensive than their green counterparts, and, in 
addition, status motivation was activated, the green items were selected 
less often than their more expensive non-green counterparts.  In other 
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words, price is more effective than environmental features in signalling 
status. 
The research by Griskevicius and his colleagues suggests that 
costly signalling theory may well underpin pro-environmental 
behavioural choice, particularly in the presence of others.  However, at 
the same time, the results of their final study highlights the plausibility of 
the second broad hypothesis outlined earlier.  Environmental features may 
drive more sustainable choices in the presence of others (because of the 
relationship between apparent pro-social behaviour and status), but other 
features like cost may be equally or more important (because of the 
relationship between resource and status).  In other words, both broad 
hypotheses are plausible in the light of the existing empirical evidence. 
When environmental choices are considered at a more specific 
level (for example, organic/eco versus carbon footprint), there are a 
number of other important considerations.  Some environmental labels, 
like ‘organic’, have been around for a considerable time and are well 
recognized.  Organic farming began in the early part of the 20th century 
(Padel, 2001), pioneered by Sir Albert Howard, who encouraged ‘natural 
farming techniques’.  However, it was not until 1940 that the term 
‘organic’ was actually given to this form of natural farming when Lord 
Northbourne used the word in his book ‘Look to the Land’ (1940).  The 
early 1990s saw an increase in the popularity of organic products, which 
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coincided with the encouragement of organic farming by the European 
Union.  Since then the popularity of organic food has risen and its total 
sales in the last decade have quadrupled globally (Czarnezki, 2011).  It 
was not until 2002 that an official label was introduced in the U.S. by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (Heckman, 2006).  This label is now used 
in over eighty countries worldwide (United States Department of 
Agriculture, 2015).  As well as carrying an organic label certifying that 
the particular item has been farmed without the use of chemicals, organic 
food is usually packaged in such a way that the design will ‘carry graphic 
design work characteristic of organic produce for effective advertising’ 
(International Trade Centre, 2012, p.4).  Typically, the word ‘organic’ is 
displayed in large lettering on the front of the packaging so that it is 
obvious to the consumer that the product is indeed organic. 
Similar to organic products, the packaging of ‘eco’ products, or 
products that are ‘ecologically friendly’ are usually designed with large 
lettering and graphics that make it obvious to the consumer that the 
particular item is better for the environment describing the item as ‘Eco’ 
or ‘Ecologically friendly’. Eco products have less impact on the 
environment than their standard equivalent and although products that are 
labelled as ‘Eco’ do have to meet certain standards, they are not regulated 
by the government so the standards are likely to be less stringent than they 
are for organic labelling (Loureiro, McCluskey & Mittelhammer, 2001).   
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‘Organic’ or ‘eco’ labels may well be selected more when 
shopping with friends because the labels are (culturally) familiar and thus 
will have high signalling value.  Other environmental labels may, 
however, have much less of an impact.  For example, Gadema and 
Oglethorpe (2011) asked 428 participants to rank order the attributes 
displayed on packaging that they feel would benefit them most when 
shopping.  The three most important attributes were information about 
‘quality and taste’, ‘nutritional information’ and ‘price’.  The three least 
important attributes were ‘information about food miles’, ‘information 
about the carbon footprint of the product’ and the ‘attractiveness of the 
packaging’.  Obviously, information about food miles and carbon 
footprint are critical if individuals are going to prioritise more sustainable 
forms of shopping, but they may currently not be perceived as that 
important.  
Moreover, Upham, Dendler & Bleda, (2011) showed that there 
was little understanding of the concept of the carbon label amongst 
organised focus group sessions.  They found that, although all of their 
participants in the focus groups were aware of carbon footprint labels, the 
vast majority of their participants were confused about the carbon 
emission measurement included on the label.  Participants showed their 
lack of understanding of the contents of the carbon footprint labels with 
comments such as ‘when you see stuff like 12 kg and 55 kg, how much is 
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that, what does that actually mean?  I can’t quantify it in any way’ and 
‘I’ve no idea what 260 g of carbon looks like… I have no idea what the 
impact of 260 g is like’ (Upham et al., 2011, p.352).  Upham et al 
concluded that ‘The public found it very difficult to make sense of labelled 
emissions values without additional information’ (2011, p. 348).   
As mentioned in previous chapters, Beattie et al. (2010) 
investigated visual attention to carbon labels on actual products in an eye-
tracking study.  Participants’ eye gaze was analysed whilst they viewed 
images of a variety of real products presented on a computer screen.  Each 
product had a carbon label clearly displayed on the front or back.  It was 
found that the carbon label was not of immediate concern to most of the 
experimental participants.  It was also found that the experimental 
participants showed little visual attention to the carbon label in the first 5 
seconds of viewing (roughly the time taken to make a selection in a 
supermarket, see Louw & Kimber, 2007; Young, 2004).  For example, 
only 5.2 frames of 40 millisecond gaze was directed to the carbon label in 
the case of the detergent product, which is only 4% of the total 5 second 
period (see also Beattie, 2012; Beattie & McGuire, 2015).   
Thus, there is empirical evidence that organic or eco products may 
have labels that are familiar to people, and generally understood (Loureiro 
et al., 2001), and therefore could potentially signal social status in the way 
that luxury or branded items do (albeit on a different dimension).  
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However, the social signalling value of carbon footprint information is 
likely to be much less potent, partly because the concept is poorly 
understood (Upham et al., 2011) and partly because it elicits only limited 
visual attention, therefore it will not have the same social signalling value 
as other labels (see Chapter 2, and see also Beattie, 2010; Beattie et al., 
2011; Beattie, 2012; Beattie & McGuire, 2015). 
One possible implication of this is that organic or eco brands may 
be chosen more by consumers whilst shopping with others (like well-
known brands and luxury items) as a result of costly signalling theory 
(because they are more expensive and because they signal pro-social 
behaviour).  However, in terms of costly signalling theory, carbon 
footprint is less likely to influence consumer choice when shopping with 
others.  This is because the concept is not well understood by individual 
consumers, and because there is little correlation between carbon footprint 
and price and therefore carbon footprint cannot signal resource (like 
luxury, well-known, organic and eco brands).  For the sake of clarity, the 
specific hypotheses are detailed below:     
 
H1: Participants will be more likely to choose both well-known brands 
and luxury brands when shopping with friends than when shopping alone 




H2: Given that organic/eco products are well recognised and can signal 
pro-social status and increased resource, participants will be more likely 
to buy them when shopping with friends compared to value brands. 
 
H3: Organic/eco brands should behave in a similar fashion to well-known 
brands and luxury brands (given their associative links with social status), 
and, therefore, there should be no difference in terms of the choice of 
organic/eco brands versus popular/luxury brands when shopping with 
friends compared to shopping alone. 
 
H4: The choice of high/low carbon footprint products is unlikely to be 
affected by whether a consumer is shopping alone or with friends.  This 
is because most participants will have little faith that their friends will 
recognize and understand the carbon label, therefore, its choice will have 
little value in signalling social status.  
5.2 Method 
5.2.1. Participants 
As in Chapter 3 and 4, there were fifty participants recruited to 
take part in this experiment (19 males and 31 female).  The mean age of 
participants was 27.7 ranging from 18 to 67.  Participants included staff 
and students from Edge Hill University (n= 34), and members of the 
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public (n=16).  Each participant received £5.00 for taking part in the 
experiment.  Ethical approval was obtained from the Edge Hill University 
Research Ethics Committee (UREC).  As in the previous chapters, 
participants were informed about the test procedure and told that they 
could withdraw at any point during the experiment and that their data 
could be removed from the study and destroyed at any point up to three 
weeks after they had taken part in the experiment (no participant asked for 
their data to be removed and destroyed).  They were fully debriefed at the 
end of the study.   
5.2.2. Shopping task 
The shopping task procedure mirrored that of the shopping task 
procedure in Chapter 4 however the shopping conditions were different in 
this experiment.  Each participant was asked to select a choice of items 
under two shopping conditions - shopping alone (‘Imagine yourself 
shopping alone in a supermarket’) and shopping with friends (‘Imagine 
yourself shopping in a supermarket - you are shopping with friends’).  
Unlike the shopping task in the previous chapter, there was no time 
pressure in either condition.  As before, each condition was randomised 
between participants to control for possible order effects.  Participants had 
to select 10 products in total for condition 1, and 10 products in total for 
condition 2.  Once they had chosen their first product, they were then 
asked to select the next and so on.  The order in which they had to choose 
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the products was randomised across both conditions.  Each participant 
was asked to complete the shopping task for all products under one 
condition before moving on to the next condition.  
 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Consumer choice whilst shopping alone: descriptive statistics 
The first analysis focused on the relationship between brand and 
consumer choice whilst shopping alone (see Figure 5.1). It was 
immediately apparent that the brand chosen most frequently when 
shopping alone was the well-known brand (38.0% of all selections) 
followed by the value brand (32.4%), followed by the organic/eco brand 





















































There was, however, considerable variation from product to 
product.  So for example, when it came to products like soup (Heinz), 
toilet roll (Andrex) and fabric conditioner (Lenor) the well-known brands 
were chosen in over 50% of all occasions, and these well-known brands 
dominated consumer choice.  However, in other cases the well-known 
brands were not chosen so frequently.  So, for example, in the case of 
coffee, the well-known brand (Lavazza) was chosen only in 18% of cases; 
in the case of orange juice the well-known brand (Princes) was chosen in 
only 24% of cases.  Value brands seemed to be selected more frequently 
when it came to washing-up liquid (62%) and bran flakes (52%).  
Organic/eco brands were selected most frequently when it came to coffee 
(32%) and ice cream (24%), but note that the well-known and value 
brands are still selected more frequently in the case of these products.  
Luxury brands were selected most frequently when it came to orange juice 
(32%) and ice cream (28%).  In both of these cases these were the top 








Table 5.1: Brand choice across all products shopping alone (percentage 
choice). 
 




Bran Flakes 0% 
 
26%       52% 22% 
Bread 10% 
 
44%       28% 18% 
Cheese 2% 
 
44%       36% 18% 
Coffee 14% 
 
18%       36% 32% 
Fabric 
Conditioner 
20% 56%       12% 12% 
Ice cream 28% 
 





24%       30% 14% 
Soup 16% 
 
58%       14% 12% 
Toilet roll 4% 
 
58%       32% 6% 
Washing up 
liquid 
0% 26%       62% 12% 
Mean 12.6% 38.0%    32.4%          17.0% 
 
 
5.3.2. Consumer choice whilst shopping with friends: descriptive 
statistics 
Interestingly, when shopping with friends, the well-known brands 
became even more popular.  Well-known brands were now selected in 
41.0% of all cases compared to 38.0% when shopping alone.  Value 
brands were, however, selected much less frequently when shopping with 
friends - 20.4% compared to 32.4% when shopping alone.  Organic/eco 
and luxury brands were both selected more frequently when shopping 
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with friends (19.4% versus 17.0% for organic/eco and 19.2% versus 








These results reveal a number of things.  Firstly, it emphasises the 
power of advertising for well-known brands (Hovis, Kellogg’s, Heinz 
etc.), in that these brands are immediately recognisable and accessible 
under both conditions – shopping alone and shopping with friends.  The 
well-known brand of soup was selected most frequently of all products 
(74%) and the same for toilet roll (58%).  See Table 5.2.  Secondly, it 
demonstrates that value brands are selected much less frequently when 
shopping with friends (20.4%).  However, the luxury, the well-known and 
the organic/eco brands are all selected more frequently when shopping 














































when we change the social context of consumer choice, it does influence 
consumer behaviour - some brands become more popular but the value 
brand, becomes much less so. 
 
Table 5.2: Brand choice across all products whilst shopping with friends 
(percentage choice). 
 
 Luxury Well-known 
brand 
Value Organic/eco 
Bran Flakes  6% 
 
44%         34% 16% 
Bread 
 
12% 54%         12% 22% 
Cheese 
 
 8% 60%         16% 16% 
Coffee 
 
30% 12%         28% 30% 
Fabric 
Conditioner 
22% 48%         12% 18% 
Ice cream 48% 
 





18%         16% 30% 
Soup 14% 
 
64%           8% 14% 
Toilet roll 10% 
 
62%         22% 6% 
Washing up 
liquid 
 6% 30%         48% 16% 
Mean           19.2%          41.0%      20.4%          19.4% 
 
5.3.3. Consumer choice: inferential statistics 
The first comparison (see hypothesis 1) considers choice of well-
known brands versus value brands when shopping alone and when 
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shopping with friends, as shown in Figure 5.3.  This difference was 
significant (X2 = 11.2, d.f. = 1, p < 0.001, two tailed test) - in other words, 
when shopping with friends compared with shopping alone, consumers 
were significantly more likely to choose well-known brands and 
significantly less likely to choose value brands. 
 
 
Figure 5.3:  The relationship between choice of well-known brands 
versus value brands when shopping alone or shopping with friends. 
 
 
The next comparison focused on value brand versus the luxury 
brand when shopping alone and when shopping with friends (see Figure 
5.4).  Again, the comparison was highly significant (X2 = 19.1, d.f. = 1, p 
< 0.001, two tailed test).  What is very striking about Figure 5.4 is that 
when shopping with friends, value products and luxury products (which, 












equally often.  This was not the case when shopping alone, where the 
choice of value products predominates. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: The relationship between the choice of value brands versus 
luxury brands when shopping alone or shopping with friends. 
 
 
The next analysis considers the choice of organic/eco versus value 
brand when shopping alone and when shopping with friends (see 
hypothesis 2).  This comparison was again significant (X2 = 9.44, d.f. = 1, 
p < 0.01, 2-tailed test).  It is clear from Figure 5.5 that this was largely 
attributable to the marked drop in the selection of value brands when 
shopping with friends.  There was little difference in the selection of 
organic/eco products, although they were selected slightly more 


















Figure 5.5: The relationship between the choice of organic/eco brands 
versus value brands alone or shopping with friends. 
 
 
A number of additional statistical comparisons, however, revealed 
no significant differences in terms of the comparisons made. So, for 
example, in the case of organic/eco brands versus well-known brands (see 
hypothesis 3) there was no significant difference in underlying 



















Figure 5.6: The relationship between the choice of organic/eco brands 




Similarly, with organic/eco brands versus luxury brands there 
was no significant difference (X2 = 1.73, d.f. = 1, n.s.).  See Figure 5.7. 
 
Figure 5.7:  The relationship between choice of organic/eco brands 


























A similar pattern emerged when the analysis focused on the 
relationship between well-known and luxury brands when shopping alone 
and when shopping with friends.  In both cases, participants were more 
likely to choose these brands when shopping with friends (X2 = 3.4, d.f. = 
1, n.s.). 
5.3.4. Does the social context of shopping influence the choice of high 
carbon or low carbon footprint products?   
 
The number of high and low carbon footprint items chosen are laid 
out in Table 5.3. ‘HH’ represents the product with the highest carbon 
footprint assigned (actual carbon footprint value plus 10%), ‘H’ represents 
the product with a high carbon footprint (the actual value), ‘L’ represents 
the low carbon footprint product (half the actual value), and ‘LL’ 
represents the lowest carbon footprint (0.5 of the actual value minus 10%). 
 
Table 5.3: Number of high and low carbon items chosen by each 
participant when shopping alone or with friends. 
 
 Alone With Friends 
 HH H L 
 
 
LL HH H L 
 
LL 





From Table 5.3 and 5.4 (below) it is clear that the carbon footprint 
of the products did have some effect on consumer choice, but not in the 
way that organic/eco labels did.  Table 5.4 shows that the experimental 
participants chose low carbon items (L) a mean of 3.10 times when 
shopping alone and a mean of 2.94 times when shopping with friends.  
They chose very low carbon items (LL) a mean of 2.72 times when 
shopping alone and a mean of 2.20 times when shopping with friends.  
The choice of low carbon items showed the reverse pattern to that shown 
by organic/eco products in that low carbon items were selected more often 
when shopping alone; organic/eco products were chosen more frequently 
when shopping with friends. 
 
Table 5.4: Mean number of high and low carbon items chosen by each 
participant when shopping alone or with friends. 
 



















Mean 1.98 2.20 3.10 2.72 2.26 2.58 2.94 2.20 
 
The first statistical comparison here considers the choice of high 
carbon footprint products (H) versus low carbon footprint products (L) 
when shopping alone and when shopping with friends (see Figure 5.8).  
When shopping alone, the low carbon footprint products were chosen 
more frequently than when shopping with friends, whereas the high 
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carbon footprint products were chosen less frequently than when shopping 




Figure 5.8:  The relationship between the choice of high carbon products 
(H) versus low carbon products (L) when shopping alone or shopping 
with friends. 
 
The next comparison focused on the selection of very high carbon 
footprint products (HH) and the very low carbon footprint products (LL) 
when shopping alone and when shopping with friends.  Figure 5.9 reveals 
that when shopping with friends very high and very low carbon products 
were chosen equally often, but the participants were more likely to select 
the very low carbon products when shopping alone.  This difference, 















    
 
Figure 5.9:  The relationship between the choice of very high carbon 
products (HH) versus very low carbon products (LL) when shopping 
alone or shopping with friends. 
 
 
The next analysis focused on a comparison of any high carbon 
footprint products (H+HH) with any low carbon footprint products 
(L+LL), in other words the full set of products (thus increasing the N).  
See Figure 5.10.  Here, the results did reach significance (X2 = 4.52, d.f. 
= 1, p < 0.05, 2-tailed), suggesting that low carbon products were 
significantly more likely to be chosen when shopping alone than with 
















Figure 5.10:  The relationship between the choice of any high carbon 
products (H+HH) versus any low carbon products (L+LL) when 
shopping alone or shopping with friends. 
 
5.4. Discussion 
The IPCC have clearly identified a number of aspects of human 
activity that impact on climate change.  These include such things as 
population size and land use patterns that will be either difficult or 
impossible to change in the time available, and ‘lifestyle’ that could 
potentially be changed.  ‘Lifestyle’ involves many of the behavioural 
choices that we make in our everyday lives.  Of course, ‘lifestyles’ can be 
changed (although anything that is an ingrained habit requires careful 
consideration, see Beattie & McGuire, 2014), but only if we understand 
them.  This essentially provided the rationale for the present study.  This 
study was an attempt to understand more about consumer choice and how 













in the context of all of the other relevant features that differentiate 
products from one another (like brand, value, price etc.).  ‘Lifestyle’ has 
also been identified as one of the common enabling factors that can 
underpin both adaptation and mitigation responses to climate change, 
according to the IPCC.  But for this to be true, it is argued that we need a 
much better understanding of the variables that influence lifestyle choices, 
and particularly those choices with a direct bearing on GHG.  In the 
present chapter, one simple question is empirically investigated, namely 
how does the presence of others, whilst we are shopping, influence our 
choice of more sustainable products?  The IPCC have repeatedly 
highlighted a number of policy instruments for changing behaviour, 
including product labelling.  However, when products are labelled (either 
in terms of their environmental consequences for example, ‘eco’/‘organic’ 
etc. or in terms of their carbon footprint) how does the presence of others 
people affect whether the ‘good’ products are selected or not? 
The basic hypothesis in this chapter was that patterns of 
consumption are linked to social status (and that the choice of pro-social 
goods, just as with expensive goods, can reflect our social status), and by 
drawing upon ‘costly signalling theory’, it enables the consideration of 
how consumer choice can reflect and reify social status.  Statistical 
comparisons were in terms of consumer choices made whilst shopping 
alone or whilst shopping with friends. 
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This study found that shopping with friends has a significant effect 
on consumer choice.  We are more likely to select well-known brands and 
luxury products when shopping with friends.  This, of course, makes 
perfect sense from a costly signalling theory perspective – by purchasing 
these well-known and luxury brands we signal to our friends that we have 
the resource to purchase these kinds of items.  Similarly, we are more 
likely to purchase organic or eco brands when shopping with friends.  
Again, this is interpretable in terms of costly signalling theory, which 
would posit that we signal our pro-social orientation through our 
consumer selections.  Organic/eco products seem to have some of the 
same social properties that well-known brand and luxury brand have in 
terms of status, and the organic/eco labels seem to communicate this 
effectively.  However, carbon footprint labels did not seem to work in this 
way.  The experimental participants were significantly more likely to 
choose low carbon items (signalled using various carbon labels) when 
shopping alone than when shopping with friends, indeed exactly the 
opposite of the other better-known environmental labels.  This is an 
important and potentially very worrying finding given the emphasis 
placed on features like carbon labels to guide more sustainable consumer 
behaviour by the IPCC and others.  Perhaps these labels are not obvious 
enough to allow social signalling, or perhaps people think that others 
around them will not be able to evaluate properly carbon footprint (Upham 
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et al., 2011).  The consumer selecting low carbon products whilst 
shopping with friends will not, therefore, acquire the elevation in social 
status that they desire.   
These results of the present study could potentially have a number 
of important implications.  It is pointless for the IPCC or anyone else to 
identify enabling factors like product labelling as a driver of lifestyle 
change, in the fight against climate change, if we do not understand how 
these labels actually work.  We already know that carbon labels attract 
little visual attention (Beattie et al., 2010; Beattie, 2012; Beattie & 
McGuire, 2015) and that they are poorly understood (Upham et al., 2011; 
Zhao & Zhong, 2015), but now we know that carbon labels do not work 
socially.  There is no social cachet, no elevation in social status, no drive 
to select these items more frequently whilst shopping with friends.  To put 
it crudely, carbon labels do not operate like peacock feathers but we would 
like to tentatively suggest that they should, and this issue of the social 
signalling value of these labels needs careful attention. 
Of course, this study was, in reality, a simulation of actual 
consumer behaviour.  However, it is the kind of simulation that has been 
used many times in the past to successfully identify some of the core 
factors that drive forward patterns of consumption (see for example Wang 
& Lang, 2015).  Perhaps in the future we could design an intervention to 
promote carbon labels and then use this particular kind of experimental 
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approach to test for any effects (and follow it up with more ecologically-
sound ethnographic approaches).  Nevertheless, the goal of future 
research in this area should be clear.  If there is little social signalling 
value of carbon labels at the present time (even when these labels are 
colour-coded, as they were in the present study, in order to make it easier 
for a low carbon choice to be made, see Beattie, 2010; Vanclay et al., 
2011), then we need to focus on this social dimension in order to make 
carbon labelling a success.  We need to either change the labelling scheme 
so that it is more salient to consumers generally and/or rethink the whole 
packaging design of low carbon products, as well as work on the values 
attached to it.  After all, if social signalling is one major influence on 
consumer choice – then people need to be persuaded that low carbon is 
both recognised and appreciated by others in order for it to have the social 
cachet that is currently missing.   
Perhaps supermarkets could introduce their own ‘low carbon’ 
range in the same way that they have their own organic, luxury and 
healthy ranges.  This would enable the consumer to ‘signal’ to others, 
through the obvious packaging, that they are buying low carbon, hinting 
to others of their effort and commitment in reducing their own personal 
carbon footprint.  Alternatively, perhaps supermarkets should introduce 
low carbon aisles where they only shelve low carbon footprint products - 
this would enable consumers to display (again, very publically) their 
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interests in the long-term future of our planet through the aisles they 
inhabit and the choices that they make.  Supermarkets could even give 
priority to those who have bought low carbon items and introduce an 
express low carbon check-out.  After all, they already have check-outs for 
‘ten items or less’.  By introducing an express checkout for low carbon 
customers, it would not only make buying low carbon more convenient, 
it would allow the consumer to be publically viewed by others as being 
‘green’. Giving priority to consumers in this way could slowly make 
buying low carbon products more appealing.  
Of course, there are broader implications as well, regarding 
behaviour change.  The advertising industry, for many decades, has 
conditioned us to believe that high status products, such as fast cars and 
luxury holidays, symbolise wealth and success and that we need them (see 
Dichter, 1960; Packard, 1957).  However, this ‘high carbon’ lifestyle that 
many aspire to is the polar opposite of a sustainable lifestyle.  Perhaps 
then, it is the next generation that we need to target whilst their underlying 
attitudes are still developing.  But it will not be enough just to transmit the 
basic information about carbon footprint, rather we need to change our 
underlying values about it.  We need to make low carbon lifestyles 
fashionable.  We need the future generation to grow up with aspirations 
about leading a low carbon lifestyle in the same way that the current 
297 
 
generation were brought up with aspirations of living the ‘luxurious’ and 
‘ostentatious’ high carbon lifestyle.   
There have been many educational programmes that have targeted 
school-children, in the hope that education could change both attitudes 
and behaviour.  Although knowledge about climate change is the strongest 
predictor of intention to engage in pro-environmental behaviour (Scannel 
& Grouzet, 2010; Bord, O’Connor & Fisher, 2000; Lazo, Kinnell & 
Fisher, 2000), education alone is usually not enough (Schultz, 2015).  It 
is the emotional responses of the next generation to aspects of the 
environment, which we need to change, if we want them to act 
appropriately (see Damasio, 1994).  Perhaps, children could then take on 
the role of the educator and educate their parents about climate change 
and the importance of our ‘lifestyle’ choices.  Instead of children taking 
on their parent’s attitudes, maybe one day it could be the other way 
around.  But, of course, such a solution takes time, and that is perhaps the 







Chapter 6: Can implicit and explicit 
attitudes be modified using film and does 
this affect consumer choice? 
 
6.1. Introduction  
The thesis thus far has explored the relationship between both self-
reported attitudes, and implicit attitudes and consumer choice.  The results 
presented in this thesis seem to suggest that self-reported attitudes are 
good predictors of self-reported environmental and sustainable behaviour 
but not actual behaviour, such as visual attention to carbon labels (see 
Chapter 2) or actual selection of products marked with carbon labels 
(Chapter 3).  However, there is some relationship between implicit 
attitudes and actual consumer choice (using the experimental analogue 
developed in this thesis), in that it was found that colour-coded carbon 
footprint information did have an influence on consumer choice, even 
under time pressure, but only for those consumers with a strong positive 
implicit attitude to low carbon.  Unlike some domains like race (Beattie, 
2013; Beattie, Cohen & McGuire, 2013) the relationship between implicit 
attitudes to carbon footprint and carbon behaviour is relatively weak, but 
nevertheless any relationship in this domain needs to be identified and 
exploited as a matter of extreme importance.  A focus in the future just on 
self-reported attitudes, using the Likert scale and similar measures, may 
simply lead to complacency and error. 
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One logical consequence of this is that we must consider how we 
might change both implicit and explicit attitudes to more sustainable 
lifestyles.  This is clearly a matter of considerable urgency.  Leading 
scientists and government bodies are unanimous in arguing that we need 
to change our behaviour if we are to ameliorate the effects that climate 
change is having on our planet, and if we do not adapt our behaviour, these 
conditions will only get worse, ‘People are experiencing the significant 
impacts of climate change, which include changing weather patterns, 
rising sea levels, and more extreme weather events.  The greenhouse gas 
emissions from human activities are driving climate change and continue 
to rise.  They are now at their highest levels in history.  Without action, 
the world’s average surface temperature is projected to rise over the 21st 
century and is likely to surpass 3 degrees Celsius this century - with some 
areas of the world expected to warm even more’ (United Nations, 2017). 
In this chapter, the issue of whether we can modify attitudes and 
behaviour using film will be explored.  One possible hypothesis is that we 
must produce change in our underlying implicit attitudes to carbon 
lifestyles (and products) to affect changes in carbon behaviour of the right 
magnitude and with the right temporal quality - i.e. not temporary in 
nature (see Beattie, 2013; Gregg, 2008).  An alternate hypothesis would 
be that we must change both explicit and implicit attitudes to carbon 
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lifestyles to affect changes in carbon behaviour through consumer choice 
(this would seem to be one possible implication of Greenwald et al.’s, 
2009 meta-analysis).  A third hypothesis would be that, although measures 
of attitude (or ‘predispositions to act’), are a useful and important concept 
(indeed at the very core of psychology), the critical issue for the current 
global warming crisis is changing carbon behaviour (through patterns of 
consumer choice), regardless of any explanatory resource that we might 
want to evoke in order to explain it (like the concept of ‘attitude’).  It is 
behaviour change that is most significant (indeed the only thing that is 
significant) because it is that (and only that) which will impact on 
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.  This line of reasoning led 
to this final empirical investigation.  Can we demonstrate change in 
explicit and implicit attitudes and/or change in behaviour through 
experimental interventions?  How do any changes in attitude and/or 
behaviour interconnect?  
Behaviour change in this area is not necessarily going to be easy 
or straightforward.  There still seems to be some confusion amongst the 
general public about the seriousness of climate change, which is perhaps 
not surprising given the conflicting reports in the media (Boykoff & 
Boykoff, 2004; Boykoff, 2007).  There is also confusion amongst the 
general public about the science behind climate change and how the facts 
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and figures presented to them should be interpreted (Lowe et al., 2006; 
Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011).  The government has attempted to make 
climate change messages more comprehensible to the general public 
through a series of media campaigns (Act On CO2, 2007).  The 
Department of Energy and Climate Change spent £6m on a campaign, 
which backed scientists’ opinions that global climate change is caused by 
human behaviour.  Yet after just one week of the first airing of the 
television campaign, the advertising regulator had received over 200 
complaints from viewers saying that the adverts used in the campaign 
were ‘misleading’.  The campaign was heavily criticized for using fear to 
promote change.  In addition, some viewers claimed that the whole basis 
of the campaign about anthropogenic climate change ‘was not supported 
by the available empirical evidence’ (Corner & Randall, 2011).  Clearly, 
there is a job to be done. 
Another attempt at influencing how the public perceive climate 
change has been through film.  Over the last fifteen years there has been 
a number of films made about climate change, be they fictional films such 
as ‘The Day After Tomorrow’ (2004), ‘Lost City Raiders’ (2008), ‘The 
Age of Stupid’ (2009) or documentary-style films including ‘The 11th 
Hour’ (2007), ‘Merchants of Doubt’ (2014) and more recently ‘Before the 
Flood’ (2016).  Each of these films were made, not just to entertain or 
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educate, but to raise awareness of climate change in the hope that people 
would (ultimately) change their behaviour.  However, in order for a 
climate change campaign or film to have the desired response (i.e. by 
raising awareness, changing attitudes, changing behaviour) there are a 
number of aspects that need to be considered.  Climate change needs to 
be communicated realistically and accurately (see Lowe et al., 2006).  If 
the representation of climate change is unrealistic, it could, quite possibly, 
be interpreted as too improbable and therefore have the opposite effect.  
The threat depicted in the specific campaign or film (in this example the 
threat of climate change) needs to be felt by the viewer (van der Linden, 
Maibach & Leiserowitz, 2015; Witte, 1992, 1998).  The campaign or film 
needs to target the viewer on an emotional level if direct action is to follow 
(consider, for example, the work of Damasio (1994) who has explored 
how emotion can affect behaviour in other risk-based domains, like 
gambling).  Targeting the emotions of the viewer would seem to be a 
crucial component of behaviour change.  According to Baumeister, Vohs, 
DeWall and Zhang ‘Conscious emotion commands attention and 
stimulates analysis, learning, and adaptation, often occurring in the 
aftermath of behavior and its outcomes’ (2007, p.172). This is echoed by 
Pidgeon and Fischhoff (2011) who say that ‘Emotion creates the abiding 
commitments needed to sustain action on difficult problems, such as 
climate change.  It motivates climate scientists, as well as their audiences 
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and critics’ (2011, p.38).  They say that ‘appropriately framed emotional 
appeals can motivate action, given the right supporting conditions, in 
particular a sense of personal vulnerability, viable ways to act, feelings of 
personal control and the support of others’ (Pidgeon & Fischoff, 2011, 
p.38; see also Spence & Pidgeon, 2010).  But when it comes to film, the 
impact of the emotions does not always transfer to actual behaviour 
‘…most films are watched and emotions felt without any apparent 
behavioral consequence.  That is, plenty of actual emotions produce no 
behaviors’ (Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall & Zhang 2007, p.177).   
Others, however, disagree with this position and argue that 
knowledge is the best predictor of behaviour and that by educating people 
with facts about climate change then a change in behaviour will follow, 
‘The ultimate aim of education is to shape human behaviour’ (Hungerford 
& Volk, 1990, p.257). Indeed, as has already been mentioned, knowledge 
about climate change is the strongest predictor of intention to engage in 
pro-environmental behaviour (Scannel & Grouzet, 2010; Bord, O’Connor 
& Fisher, 2000; Lazo, Kinnell & Fisher, 2000).  Hines, Hungerford and 
Tomera (1987) suggest that before an individual can engage in 
environmentally appropriate behaviour, they must have, not just 
knowledge and awareness of the problem, but some knowledge of those 
behaviours which will bring about change.  However, Howard (1999) 
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states that when considering behaviour change, one has to consider three 
components: ‘affect’, ‘cognition’, and, of course, ‘behaviour’ - ‘The 
affective component consists of a person's feeling towards an object, the 
cognitive component consists of a person's knowledge and understanding 
of an object and the behavioural component involves a person's actual 
behaviour towards the object’ (1999, p.153).  So if we are attempting to 
successfully change behaviour, some would argue that we need a 
combination of emotion and knowledge-based content in campaigns and 
films in order to achieve the desired effect. 
Another critical element to any successful campaign or film is the 
level of the audience’s response efficacy.  Response efficacy has been 
defined as the personal belief that one’s own behaviour will actually make 
a difference to the circumstances affected by the proposed threat.  There 
also needs to be a belief amongst the audience that they can do something 
about the problem and that their personal responses will be effective in 
the resolution of the problem.  This has been termed as self-efficacy 
(Witte, 1992; Rogers, 1983).   
One film in particular which does appear to include these critical 
elements is the award-winning documentary 'An Inconvenient Truth'.  
Upon its release, ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ became an international 
success, reaching out to audiences on a global level.  It is currently ranked 
11th in the highest grossing documentary films of all time.  The film was 
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released in 2006, directed by Davis Guggenheim and written and 
presented by Al Gore, the former Vice-President of the United States of 
America.  The film received an Academy Award for ‘Best Documentary 
Film’ and it also gained Al Gore a Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 (Ryan, 2007; 
Lin, 2013).  Indeed, Al Gore was regarded as ‘the single individual who 
has done the most to create greater worldwide understanding of the 
measures that need to be adopted [to counteract climate change]’ (The 
Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2007; see also Jacobsen, 2011).  Upon the 
release of the film, there was a sense of urgency amongst government 
bodies, journalists and film critics that the general public should take it 
upon themselves to watch the film and learn about the dangers of global 
warming and the effect that climate change is having on our planet.  
Indeed, the Chicago Sun-Times' in-house film critic, Roger Erbert, wrote 
'You owe it to yourself to see this film.  If you do not, and you have 
grandchildren, you should explain to them why you decided not to' 
(Erbert, 2006; see also Lin, 2013).  Since its release, ‘An Inconvenient 
Truth’ has been used on a variety of national curricula to educate school-
children about the causes and effects of climate change (Howell, 2014).  
The U.K. government sent all U.K. secondary schools a copy of ‘An 
Inconvenient Truth’ accompanied by guidance notes for teachers 
outlining class activities and lesson plans to use alongside the film 
(Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2007; Williams, 2010).  
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Copies were also given to 50,000 teachers in the US to educate students 
about the impact of climate change.  It has also been used to educate 
students in Scotland (Leask, 2007), Northern Europe (David, 2006) and 
Spain (Expatica, 2007; Libin, 2007; see also Nolan, 2010).   
The aim of this film was to help mitigate the effects of climate 
change by encouraging people to take responsibility for their own actions.  
The makers of the film wanted to raise awareness about climate change 
amongst the general public.  They wanted people to have an understanding 
about the causes of climate change in the hope that this knowledge would 
subsequently change behaviour.  Some evidence suggests that the film did 
achieve what it set out to do.  A survey conducted amongst Americans 
shortly after the release of the film revealed that there was an increase in 
the number of people who believed that climate change was ‘mostly 
caused by human activity’ (The Pew Research Centre for the People and 
the Press, 2008; see also Jacobsen, 2011).  There was also evidence of 
behaviour change, in that the purchasing of ‘voluntary carbon offset’ had 
increased in a two-month period in the areas where ‘An Inconvenient 
Truth’ had been shown (Jacobsen, 2011).  People’s ‘concern’ about 
climate change had also increased, which was in part due to the publicity 
in the media surrounding the film (Brulle, Carmichael & Jenkins, 2012).  
Indeed, Brulle et al. concluded that ‘media coverage of climate change 
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directly affects the level of public concern.  The greater the quantity of 
media coverage of climate change, the greater the level of public concern’ 
(Brulle, Carmichael & Jenkins, 2012, p.17).  
 Other studies have attempted to measure the effectiveness of 
climate change films on reported attitudes and emotions.  In previous 
research, the effects of short extracts taken from ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ 
on participants’ levels of ‘happiness’, ‘sadness’, ‘anger’, ‘tension’, 
‘calmness’, ‘energy’ and ‘tiredness’ had been tested, as well as a 
consideration of the effects of various extracts from the film on 
participants’ explicit attitudes towards climate change (see Beattie, Sale 
& McGuire, 2011).  See introduction for details.  It was found that selected 
extracts from ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ did have a significant effect on 
participants’ mood state as well as on participants’ explicit attitudes/ 
social cognitions with respect to climate change.  Participants felt 
significantly less happy and less calm after watching each of the clips.  
Yet, participants’ levels of anger and tension were not significantly 
affected.  Each of the clips affected motivation to act and empowerment 
(and some of the clips affected levels of fatalism).  Message acceptance, 




This study thus demonstrated that films can be effective in certain 
ways.  However, from the point of view of the present concerns (changing 
our behaviour with respect to carbon lifestyles to ameliorate the effects of 
climate change), there are a number of clear limitations with this particular 
study.  Firstly, only self-report measures of mood attitudes and social 
cognitions were used to assess the effectiveness of the selected film clips, 
with all of the issues of social desirability that they present.  There was no 
attempt to measure participants’ implicit attitudes to climate change 
before, or after, watching any of these clips to measure the effectiveness 
of the film on their underlying attitudes.  As has been demonstrated, 
implicit attitudes might well be a better predictor of behaviour, especially 
when under time pressure or under some kind of cognitive load, 
reminiscent of actual consumer behaviour (Beattie, 2010, 2012; Dovidio, 
Kawakami & Gaertner, 2002; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & 
Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & Williams, 1995).  Secondly, 
there was also no attempt to measure the effect that these film clips might 
have on behaviour change amongst the participants.  There was no 
behavioural choice task incorporated in the design.  These limitations are 
important if we are to assess the effectiveness of any film on attitudes and 
behaviour.  There is one other important point about this study - 
measurements were only taken immediately after watching each of the 
seven clips - there was no follow-up questionnaire in the subsequent 
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weeks, or months, following the exposure to the extracts of the film, in 
order to measure any possible longer-term effects on the participants’ 
mood or explicit attitudes/cognitions.   
Another study that tested the effects of a climate change film on 
viewers’ perceptions of climate change was conducted by Lowe, Brown, 
Dessai, de França Doria, Haynes and Vincent (2006).  Lowe et al. 
collected data from a total of 301 filmgoers in the foyer of a cinema 
screening of ‘The Day After Tomorrow’ - a science fiction disaster film 
made in 2004 which tells the story of a new ice age which happens 
overnight as a result of global warming.  Each participant was handed a 
two-part questionnaire.  The first part of the questionnaire was completed 
before watching ‘The Day After Tomorrow’ and the second part was 
completed immediately after the participants had watched the film.  The 
second part of the questionnaire had identical questions to the first part 
with some additional questions added and a space to write extra comments 
if necessary.  The results from this study revealed that participants’ feeling 
of concern about climate change had significantly increased after they had 
watched the film.  Participants were also asked to indicate if they thought 
that ‘sudden climate change’, as depicted in the film, was likely to happen 
on a scale from 1 = ‘absolutely impossible’ to 8 = ‘absolutely certain’.  
Responses to this question revealed that participants felt that there was a 
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‘medium likelihood’ of ‘sudden climate change’ like that depicted in the 
film (with a mean response of 4.34).  Another question asked the 
participants, both before and after watching the film, what the likelihood 
of them personally experiencing climate change in their lifetime.  
Counter-intuitively, responses revealed that participants felt that they 
were significantly less likely to experience climate change in their own 
lifetime after viewing the film compared to being asked the very same 
question before they had seen the film.  This reaction, however, may have 
been a result of the extreme and unrealistic depiction of climate change 
(Hallam & Marshment, 2000).  Hence, Lowe et al. conducted focus groups 
a month after the screening of the film.  Indeed, some comments that the 
researchers collected in the focus group drew upon this very issue with 
comments such as ‘…it is just like fantasy’ (p.  447).  Another commented 
that ‘I don’t personally agree that the world can freeze in a day.  It can’t, 
how can you freeze the world in a day?’ (p. 448).  There were also 
comments criticizing the scientific credibility of the film, for example, ‘If 
you knew just how scientific the film was then it would probably have a 
stronger impact’ and ‘I don’t believe the science behind it was conveyed 
well enough.  It made it completely unbelievable’ (p. 448).  Despite the 
negative responses, there were respondents who admitted that they had 
changed their behaviour since watching the film and that they had started 
to recycle more.  However, others commented that any such changes were 
311 
 
not lasting and that they soon slipped into their old habits.  Other 
participants did actually feel motivated to change their behaviour, but did 
not know how to go about it.  One particular participant said that ‘It made 
you think you should do something and it kind of finished without telling 
you what you could actually do’ (p. 449).  The researchers concluded that 
‘while the film increased anxiety about environmental risks, viewers 
experienced difficulty in distinguishing science fact from science fiction.  
Their belief in the likelihood of extreme events as a result of climate 
change was actually reduced’.  They also concluded that ‘Following the 
film, many viewers expressed strong motivation to act on climate change.  
However, although the film may have sensitized viewers and motivated 
them to act, the public do not have information on what action they can 
take to mitigate climate change’ (2006, p.435).   
But, of course, all of the data collected in the Lowe et al. study 
were either self-reports of attitudes, or self-reports of behaviour.  There 
was no attempt to measure the effects of the film on actual behaviour in 
this particular study.  Nor did the researchers attempt to measure implicit 
attitudes of the participants and test any effects that this film may have 
had on underlying attitudes.  In terms of the possible longer-term effects 
of the film - although the researchers held a focus group a month after the 
viewing of the film, there was no quantitative data collected in the follow-
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up by way of a direct comparison with the data collected before and 
immediately after, viewing the film.  Similarly, there were no focus 
groups held either before participants had watched the film or, indeed, 
immediately after watching the film, so comparisons could not be made 
in terms of the qualitative data collected – so again, no longer-term effects 
could be tested in this regard.   
One study that did attempt to measure the longer-term effects of a 
climate change film was a study by Howell (2011, 2014).  At a screening 
of ‘The Age of Stupid’, Howell sought to test the effects of the film on 
participants’ attitudes to climate change including their ‘concern’, 
‘motivation’, ‘fear’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘agency’ before and after 
watching 'The Age of Stupid'.  The Age of Stupid is a 92 minute, low 
budget, British documentary film set in the future in 2055.  Pete 
Postlethwaite plays an archivist who lives in a Global Archive which he 
describes as a vast storage structure which contains the art work from 
every national museum.  He lives a lonely existence in a world that is 
suffering from the devastating effects of climate change with very little 
life left.  The film opens with images of different landmarks from different 
parts of the world in 2055, albeit, very different to how they look today.  
We see the London Eye and the buildings surrounding it submerged in 
water, we see the mountains in the Swiss Alps with an empty ski lift, there 
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is no snow on the Alps, just dry lifeless hills that have been scorched in 
the heat.  Las Vegas is no longer a vibrant resort where the bars and 
restaurants are open 24 hours a day, here we see Las Vegas deserted and 
buried by sand.  New Orleans has been completely wiped out and there 
are no ice caps in the arctic, they melted long ago - there is just vast ocean.  
The archivist (Pete Postlethwaite) then carefully explains to the 
viewers of the film that ‘The conditions we are experiencing now were 
actually caused by our behaviour in the period leading up to 2050.  In 
other words, we could have saved ourselves’.  The film interweaves both 
a fictional film and real life documentary footage including real news clips 
that have been broadcast over the years in different parts of the world.  As 
well as appealing to the audience on an emotional level, there is also an 
educational element which provides the audience with scientific facts 
about climate change.   
Howell (2011) issued 241 filmgoers with a multiple-choice 
questionnaire before seeing ‘The Age of Stupid’ in order to collect 
baseline data (time 1) to compare to the subsequent questionnaires.  
Participants were asked to rate their level of concern about climate 
change, their motivation to act, their knowledge, agency and fear on a 5-
point scale.  Once participants had watched the full-length film, they were 
asked to complete a second questionnaire in order to test any immediate 
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effects the film had on their attitudes (time 2).  As well as including items 
from the first questionnaire, additional questions were added.    
Howell found that the percentage of participants who indicated 
that they were ‘very concerned’ about climate change had increased at 
time 2 (83.3%) from when they were first asked about their level of 
concern before watching the film at time 1 (81.7%) but this was not a 
significant increase.  The questionnaires also included a series of 
statements where participants were required to rate their level of 
agreement from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ with a variety of 
statements.  The statements included - ‘I feel motivated to try to do 
something about climate change/global warming’, ‘I can do something to 
prevent climate change/global warming getting worse’ and ‘I know what 
I can do to reduce my carbon footprint’.  The results revealed that levels 
of motivation had significantly increased immediately after seeing the 
film compared to the baseline.  There was also a significant increase in 
percentage of participants who felt that they ‘could do something to 
prevent climate change/global warming’ immediately after watching the 
film compared to before they had seen the film.  However, participants 
were significantly less inclined to agree with the statement ‘I do as much 
as I can about climate change/global warming’ immediately after seeing 
the film compared to the baseline.  Perhaps surprisingly, a large 
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percentage of the participants felt that the devastation caused by climate 
change portrayed in the film was ‘likely’ to occur. Indeed 21.9% felt that 
there was a ‘medium likelihood’ of this devastation occurring, 29.4% felt 
that it was ‘likely’, 32.9% felt that it was ‘very likely’ and 8.3% felt that 
it was ‘virtually certain’.   
There was a follow-up questionnaire 10 weeks after participants 
had watched the film to see if the effects of ‘The Age of Stupid’ were 
lasting (time 3).  Howell found that, amongst the 67.2% of the original set 
of participants who completed the questionnaire at time 3, levels of 
concern had dropped below the baseline to 81.5% with more respondents 
indicating that they were ‘A little concerned’ at time 3 (4.3%) compared 
to time 1 (2.9%).  There was a significant reduction in motivation between 
time 2 (95.8%) compared to time 3 (91.4%).  A reduction in the level of 
agreement with the statement ‘I can do something to prevent climate 
change’ was evident at time 3 compared to time 2, and very little 
difference when compared to time 1.  People were significantly less likely 
to agree with the statement ‘It is worth lobbying politicians about climate 
change’ at time 3 compared to time 1 and time 2.  
In order to measure any changes in behaviour as a result of 
watching ‘The Age of Stupid’ Howell also included a list of behaviours at 
time 3.  These behaviours included ‘Actively involved in campaigning 
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group’, ‘Turned down heating/cut time heating on’, ‘Cut down/avoid 
driving’, ‘Avoiding buying bottled water’.  Participants responded by 
selecting the appropriate answer from the following three alternatives: 
‘Not done/doing’, ‘Done/doing more, due to film’ or ‘Done/doing but not 
due to film’.  Out of all of the statements listed in this part of the 
questionnaire, the item which most people said that they had either done 
or were doing because of watching the film was ‘Trying to raise awareness 
among people I know’ (27.8% of participants), followed by ‘Decided to 
reduce/stop holiday flying long-term’ (21.9% of participants).  The joint 
third most popular behaviour change reported as a result of watching the 
film was ‘Planning/taking holidays without flying this year’ and ‘Buying 
more local produce’ both with 17.9 participant selecting this response. 
Howell then issued another questionnaire to this set of participants 
approximately 15 months after seeing the original film - time 4 (Howell, 
2014).  The questions included those presented in the original set of 
questionnaires at time 1 and time 2 and the behavioural questions which 
were listed on the questionnaire at time 3. Of the 43.2% of the original set 
of respondents who completed the questionnaires at time 4, higher levels 
of concern had dropped to below that reported immediately after seeing 
the film at time 2, levels of motivation at time 4 had also dropped below 
levels of motivation reported at time 2.   
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In terms of reported behaviour recorded at time 3 and time 4, of 
the 13 listed behaviours on the questionnaire, only 2 behaviours had 
increased (‘Washing clothes at 30º’ and ‘Buying more local produce’) all 
other reported behaviours had decreased at time 4 compared to time 3.  At 
time 3, twenty participants reported that they were planning on taking a 
holiday which did not involve flying - a decision which they reported was 
made as a consequence of watching the film, however, when it came to 
time 4, eight participants reported that they did actually take a holiday 
which involved flying.  The remaining 11 people did not.  
Nolan (2010) tested the effectiveness of ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ 
on participants’ knowledge about climate change, beliefs about climate 
change, motivation and pro-environmental behaviour.  Participants were 
split into two groups.  One group completed the questionnaire before 
watching the film and the other group completed an identical 
questionnaire after watching the film (curiously an independent groups 
design).  The survey required participants to indicate whether certain 
activities, such as driving a car, was a major or minor cause of global 
warming or whether it was not a cause at all.  Other items on the 
questionnaire required participants to indicate how likely it was that ‘the 
earth’s annual temperature will increase at least 3 degrees Fahrenheit 
within the next 50 years’ on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very).  
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Participants were also asked to indicate their motivation to reduce GHG 
emission ranging from 1 (not very) to 7 (extremely).  In order to test the 
effectiveness of the film on participants’ intentions to act they were asked 
to report ‘how many miles they had driven in the past week, month and 
year, and how many miles they intended to drive in the next week, month, 
and year’ (2010, p.5).  
In terms of knowledge, those participants who completed the 
questionnaire after watching the film scored slightly higher than those 
who completed the questionnaire before watching the film (M = 10.59 
compared to M = 9.75).  However, this comparison was not significant.  
Those who completed the survey after watching the film were 
significantly more likely to believe that global temperatures will increase 
in 50 years’ time. Participants in the group who completed the 
questionnaire after watching the film also felt more motivated to reduce 
their own GHG emissions.  Sixty per cent of participants who completed 
the survey after watching the film reported that they intended to decrease 
their driving compared to just 26% of participants who completed the 
questionnaire before watching the film.  
In the second part of this study, 27 participants were randomly 
assigned to either of two conditions.  As in the first part of the study, 
condition 1 required participants to complete a questionnaire before 
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watching ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ and condition 2 required participants 
to complete the questionnaire after watching ‘An Inconvenient Truth’.  A 
follow-up questionnaire was also issued to participants where they were 
required to complete the same survey a month after watching the film.  
The results revealed that, as in the earlier study, participants knew more 
about the causes of global warming in the group who completed the 
questionnaire after watching the film compared to those participants who 
completed the survey before watching the film, but this was not 
significant.  Participants expressed more concern with regards to global 
warming than those who completed the questionnaire before watching the 
film.  The behavioural intention of those participants who completed the 
questionnaire after watching the film was significantly higher than those 
participants who completed the questionnaire before watching the film.   
When it came to the follow-up questionnaire conducted one month 
after watching the film, the analyses revealed that there were no 
significant lasting effects on participants’ knowledge about climate 
change, although knowledge did remain stable between time 2 and time 
3.  The film also had no lasting effects on concern or motivation in the 
follow-up 1 month later.   
Although in this study Nolan did test the longer-term effects of 
‘An Inconvenient Truth’, the effects were only tested on people’s reported 
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attitudes.  Implicit attitudes were not tested.  The independent groups 
design employed in this study also means that we cannot be confident of 
any change within an individual as a consequence of the film. 
There are very few studies that have actually attempted to measure 
the effect of climate change films on implicit attitudes.  However, one 
recent study by Janpol and Dilts (2016) tested the effects of viewing 
documentary films about natural environments and built environments on 
people's implicit perceptions of nature and built environments.  They also 
attempted to test the effects of the film on people's behaviour.  In their 
study, eighty-one participants were split into two different conditions.  In 
one condition participants were asked to watch a 50-minute film about 
Dolphins.  This was the nature condition.  In the second condition (the 
built condition) participants were asked to watch a 50-minute film about 
bridges.  Each participant was given a ticket with a unique code which 
identified their experimental condition to the researchers (but not to the 
participants).  Once all of the participants had watched either film, they 
were asked to complete a game known as FlexiTwins (Bruni & Schultz, 
2010).  FlexiTwins is a game version of the Implicit Association Test that 
measures participants’ implicit connectedness to ‘nature’ or to ‘built’ 
environments. Upon completion of FlexiTwins, participants were 
informed that the ticket they were given at the start of the experiment was 
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now worth one dollar and that they could make a charitable donation to 
either a ‘Save the Dolphin Fund’ or ‘Save the Bridges Fund’.  They found 
that there were significant differences between both conditions.  
Participants who watched the dolphin film were significantly more likely 
to hold an implicit connectedness with the natural environment than those 
participants who watched the bridge film.  When it came to the 
behavioural measure, participants were more likely to make a donation to 
the ‘Save the Dolphin Fund’ than the ‘Save the Bridges Fund’ regardless 
of which particular condition they had been assigned to (95% of 
participants donated to the dolphin fund from the dolphin film condition 
and 60% donated to the dolphin fund from the bridges condition).  
However, a significant proportion of participants in the dolphin condition 
were more likely to make their donation to the ‘Save the dolphin Fund’ 
than those participants in the bridges film condition.  
Although this study did measure implicit attitudes, these attitudes 
were only tested immediately after watching the films, there was no 
attempt to test for any longer-term effects.  The authors also failed to 
measure implicit attitudes before watching either of the films so it is 
difficult to gauge the effect that these particular films had on implicit 
attitudes as it might be the case that participants in the dolphin condition 
already held implicit connections to nature and vice versa.  In terms of the 
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charitable donation, the authors attempted to measure actual behaviour by 
informing participants that the tickets were actually worth a dollar, 
however this was not real money.  What would have happened if they 
were given a dollar at the start of the experiment and given the choice to 
donate to either charity or to keep the dollar themselves? 
The specific hypotheses for this study are detailed below: 
H1: Powerful film clips about climate change will have a significant effect 
on self-reported attitudes to carbon footprint. 
H2: Powerful film clips about climate change, particularly those with a 
strong emotional content, may have a significant effect on implicit attitude 
to carbon footprint. 
H3: Powerful film clips about climate change, particularly those with a 
strong emotional content, may have a significant immediate effect on 
lifestyle choices with different carbon footprint implications.  These may 
or may not endure when tested several weeks later. 
6.2. Method 
The aim of this experiment was to measure the immediate and the 
longer-term effects of short extracts from the film ‘An Inconvenient 
Truth’ on both implicit and explicit attitudes, and the effects of the extracts 
on behaviour in a behavioural choice task.  Six film clips were selected 
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for use in this experiment, all of which had been used in the previous study 
(Beattie, Sale & McGuire, 2011).  One clip from the Beattie et al. study 
was excluded due to it having a reverse effect making people less willing 
to act and causing a reported negative shift in responsibility amongst the 
participants.  Two of the clips were selected because they were primarily 
aimed at participants’ emotions (‘Rising Sea Levels’ and ‘Small Planet’) 
as identified by two independent judges.  These particular clips produced 
the most significant effect on levels of ‘sadness’ in Beattie et al. (2011), 
as well as decreasing happiness levels, and therefore are most appropriate 
for targeting people’s emotional state in the present study.  Two of the 
clips contained primarily factual information about climate change (as 
identified by two independent judges) and aimed to increase the 
knowledge of participants concerning climate change (‘Paradox’ and 
‘Natural Resources’).  In addition, two of the clips seemed to target 
emotions as well as providing significant information (‘Polar Bear’ and 
‘Population Growth’) again, as identified by two independent judges.  
There was also a control condition where participants watched two clips 
unrelated to climate change (‘how to assemble a flute’ and ‘how to thread 
cotton through a needle’). 
6.2.1. Film clip selection 
In order to test the suitability of the grouping for each of the clips 
i.e., if the two clips selected for the emotional condition, the information 
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condition and the combined information and emotion condition were 
grouped appropriately, twenty additional participants were asked to watch 
each of the six short clips and rate each in terms of ‘emotional content’ 
and ‘informational content’ on a scale from 1 - 5, as in 1: ‘No emotional 
content; 5: Considerable emotional content; 1: No substantive 
information; 5: Considerable substantive information.  The ‘Small Blue 
Planet’ clip was rated highest in terms of emotional content (M = 4.9) yet 
lowest in terms of informational content (M = 1.0).  The second highest 
rating for emotional content was for the ‘Rising Sea Levels’ clip (M = 
4.8), this clip also received a low score for its informational content (M = 
1.8).  In terms of informational content, the ‘Natural Resources’ clip was 
rated highest (M = 4.8), however, this scored lowest in terms of its 
emotional content (M = 1.5).  The second highest score for informational 
content was for the ‘Paradox’ clip (M = 4.1).  This clip also received a low 
score for its emotional content (M = 1.8).  There was little difference 
between the scores given for emotional content (M = 3.8) and for 
information content (M = 3.9) of the ‘Population Growth’ clip.  Similarly, 
there was little difference in the scores given for the emotional content of 
the ‘Drowning Polar Bear’ clip (M = 2.9) and for the informational content 




6.2.2. Stimuli: film clips 
Clip 1:  Rising Sea Levels (emotional) 
This clip is an illustration of what the future of our coastlines will 
look like if Greenland’s ice completely broke up and melted.  The opening 
clip shows the rapid stages of the melting ice in Greenland from 1992, 
then an image of how Iceland looked ten years later in 2002 with even 
more ice melted and then what it looked like in 2005.  Over that short 
period of time we can see the dramatic depletion of ice.  Al Gore goes on 
to say that Tony Blair’s scientific advisor says that, because of what is 
happening in Greenland right now, the maps of the world will have to be 
redrawn.  He then shows more illustrations of what would happen to 
specific coastlines if just half of Greenland’s ice and half of Antarctica’s 
ice broke off and melted.  The animated diagram shows land disappearing 
under water in Florida.  We see areas where people live disappearing 
under water in San Francisco Bay.  The Netherlands also disappears 
rapidly under water.  The area in Beijing which homes tens of millions of 
people gradually disappears, as does Shanghai - the home of 40 million 
people. Then we see Calcutta disappearing, the area covered here homes 
60 million people.  We see the World Trade Memorial site disappear under 
water in Manhattan.  This clip is played out to a backdrop of music thus 




Clip 2:  Small Planet (emotional)  
This clip opens with an image of earth taken from outer space.  
Here we see earth as a small ‘pale blue dot’.  Al Gore puts into perspective 
everything that has happened on that pale blue dot, from ‘triumphs to 
tragedies, wars and famines’.  He describes the pale blue dot as ‘our only 
home’.  He stresses that that this small blue planet is at risk if we fail to 
take action.  Throughout this clip there is gentle music in the background 
that adds to the emotionality of the clip.  This clip allows the viewer to 
take a different perspective of our planet.  Al Gore stresses that everything 
that has ever happened to the entire human race has happened on that 
small blue planet.  
 
Clip 3: Paradox (information)  
Here Al Gore explains that the effects of global warming causes, 
not only more flooding in certain areas, but it also causes drought.  He 
uses powerful imagery of two neighbouring provinces, one of which 
depicts adults waist high in deep water wearing life jackets and a baby sat 
in a washing up bowl floating on dirty flood water, whilst the other image 
shows young children walking to school on dried up cracked ground.  He 
goes on to explain to the audience why this paradox happens, and that 
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global warming increases precipitation and relocates the precipitation.  He 
also explains that global warming causes evaporation from the oceans but 
also takes moisture out of the soil and land.  He shows an image of Lake 
Chad in 1963, 1973, 1987 and in 2001 demonstrating it drying up over 
those years until it finally disappears.  
 
Clip 4: Natural Resources (information)  
Al Gore articulates how we can go about changing our behaviour 
to prevent any more GHG emissions.  He uses a graph to demonstrate that 
if we reduce our electricity use, we can save a percentage from the entire 
global warming pollution.  If we have higher fuel efficiency cars and other 
transport efficiency as well as using renewable technology etc. then this 
too will cut down on GHG emissions.  He also shows graphically how 
these behaviours combined can help to get the population to lower 
emission levels like those seen in the 1970s.  
 
Clip 5: Polar Bear (emotion and information)   
The content of this particular clip is both informational as well as 
emotional.  It begins by Al Gore showing a digital animation of the sun’s 
rays hitting the Arctic ice caps.  He goes on to explain to the viewers that 
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these ice caps act as a mirror and reflect 90% of the rays back into space.  
He informs us that when these rays hit the water, the water absorbs 90% 
of the heat.  The water, therefore, heats up and speeds up the melting of 
the ice caps until they gradually disappear under water.  We discover that 
there is a faster build-up of heat in the Arctic Ocean than anywhere else 
on the planet.  We then see an animation of a polar bear swimming 
towards an ice floe.  As the polar bear approaches the ice floe, it tries to 
climb on but the ice breaks into pieces as it is too thin to hold any weight.  
We discover that scientists are beginning to find polar bears that have 
actually drowned after swimming up to 60 miles in search of ice but 
without finding any.  
 
Clip 6: Population Growth (emotion and information) 
In this particular clip, Gore shows a graph of the rise in population 
growth from over the years.  He demonstrates that during the Baby 
Boomer generation in 1945, population crossed the 2.3 billion mark.  In 
2005 (just forty years later), the population reached 6.4 billion and by 
2050 population it is expected to rise to 9.1 billion.  He explains that it 
took 10,000 generations to reach 2 billion, yet in just one lifetime it jumps 
by 7 billion.  He also explains how population growth is already placing 
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extra pressure on the earth, putting more demands on food, more demand 
for water, and pressure on vulnerable natural resources such as forests.   
6.2.3. Explicit attitude measures  
Participants were asked to complete the same basic explicit measures 
used in the previous chapters (Chapter 2, 3 and 4).  These measures 
included the Likert scale and the Feeling Thermometer.  See section 
2.2.3 for a detailed description. 
6.2.4. Implicit attitude measure 
Implicit Association Test 
Participants were also asked to complete a carbon footprint 
Implicit Association Test to assess their implicit attitudes to high and low 
carbon footprint products (all three measures have been used extensively 
in Beattie & Sale, 2009; Beattie & Sale, 2011; Beattie & McGuire, 2012; 
Beattie & McGuire, 2015; Beattie & McGuire, 2016).  A detailed 
description of this particular Implicit Association Test can be found in 
section 2.2.4.  
6.2.5. Behavioural choice task  
Eighty images representative of everyday behaviour were selected 
for the behavioural choice task.  These images included food items, modes 
of transport, sources of energy etc.  Forty images were used on trial 1 
(before participants watched the film clips), and forty were used on trial 2 
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(after participants had watched the film clips).  The image sets were 
randomised between conditions and tasks throughout the experiment.  For 
each set of forty images there were twenty matched pairs with a high 
carbon and a low carbon alternative.  For example, one matched pair was 
an image of an energy saving lightbulb versus an image of a standard 
bayonet cap lightbulb, another matched pair was an image of wind 
turbines versus an image of electricity pylons and another set was an 
image of a local British holiday versus a luxury holiday abroad.  The 
behavioural choice task before, and immediately after, were matched in 
terms of number of stimuli which represented transport, energy, food etc.  
The matched pairs were displayed on a computer screen.  The side of the 
screen where the high carbon and low carbon alternatives were placed 
alternated throughout the experiment.  Beneath each pair, there was a 
letter ‘A’ under one image and a letter ‘B’ under the other image.  
Participants were required to select their preferred item by pressing either 
‘A’ or ‘B’ on the keyboard.  Once they had selected their preferred item, 
the next set of matched pairs was displayed on the computer screen.  This 
was repeated until the participant had selected 20 items in total on trial 1 
and 20 items on trial 2. 
6.2.6. Participants 
One hundred and twenty participants were recruited to take part in 
this study.  Participants included staff and students from Edge Hill 
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University and members of the public both male (n=34) and female 
(n=86) between the ages of 18 and 68 (M = 23.6, SD = 11.06).  There were 
four conditions comprising this study.  Condition 1 was an information 
condition where participants watched two clips giving them new 
information about climate change.  In condition 2, participants watched 
two clips aimed at targeting their emotions.  In condition 3, participants 
were required to watch 2 clips which were both highly emotional but also 
contained new information about climate change.  Finally, condition 4 
was the control condition where participants watched two short clips not 
connected to climate change.  Instead, they were clips that informed 
participants how to thread cotton through a needle, the second clip 
instructed participants how to construct a flute.  Thirty participants were 
assigned to each of the three experimental conditions and thirty in the 
control condition.  In order to test the longer-term effectiveness of the film 
clips in terms of explicit attitudes, implicit attitudes and behaviour, 
participants were invited back between 4 and 6 weeks later to complete 
the explicit measures, the IAT and the behavioural choice task.  
Participants were recruited using opportunity sampling and also notified 
in lecture theatres of the experiment.  Participants were rewarded with 
£3.00 for the initial experiment and £2.00 for the follow-up experiment.  
Alternatively, students had the option of receiving 2 course credits for 
taking part in the experiment.  
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Ethical approval was obtained from the Edge Hill University 
Research Ethics Committee (UREC).  Participants were fully informed 
about the test procedure and told that they could withdraw at any point 
during the experiment and that their data could be removed from the study 
and destroyed at any point up to three weeks after they had taken part in 
the experiment (either after Trial 1 or after Trial 2).  No participant asked 
for their data to be removed and destroyed).  Participants were fully 
debriefed at the end of the study.   
 
Trial 1 and Trial 2: 
Upon arrival in the experimental lab, participants were given a 
raffle ticket which they were required to hand back once they had 
completed trial 1 and 2.  The number on the raffle ticket represented their 
participant number.  On the back of the raffle ticket participants were 
asked to write down their student number or email address so that they 
could be contacted for the follow-up study and so that they could be 
reminded of their participant number for trial 3 (the follow-up to the 
study). 
 Participants were seated behind a desktop computer monitor and 
asked to complete the Likert scale and the Feeling Thermometer.  Once 
they had completed the explicit attitudes measures, they were then asked 
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to complete the IAT.  Once the initial attitude measures were complete, 
participants were then asked to take part in a behavioural choice task.  
Here they were shown a total of 40 images including food items, methods 
of transport, sources of energy and household items – 20 of these images 
were high carbon items which were matched with 20 low carbon items.  
The images were shown in pairs on a computer screen displaying the high 
carbon option alongside the low carbon alternative and the letters ‘A’ 
under the image to the left of the computer screen and ‘B’ under the image 
on the right of the screen.  Participants had to select their preference by 
pressing the letters ‘A’ or ‘B’ on the keyboard before moving on to the 
next set of paired items.  Only two images were displayed on the computer 
screen at any one time.  Once they had selected their preferred item, 
participants clicked on the ‘next’ button on the screen and they were then 
shown another set of paired items where they were required to select ‘A’ 
or ‘B’.  There were 20 pairs in total.  When participants had completed 
the first choice task, they were then asked to watch two short film clips 
(each clip lasting approximately 2 minutes).  Participants were assigned 
to either the ‘emotion’ condition, the ‘information’ condition, the 
‘information and emotion’ condition or the control condition.  There were 
30 participants in each condition.  Once participants had watched both 
clips they were then asked to complete the explicit attitude measures again 
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(Likert and Feeling Thermometer) and the IAT plus another behavioural 
choice task.  
Trial 3: 
Participants returned 4-6 weeks after completion of trial 1 and 2.  
Upon arrival, participants were given the same raffle ticket that they were 
issued with at the start of part 1 in order to be reminded of their participant 
number.  Each participant was asked to check that the student ID/contact 
email address was theirs and then once they had completed trial 3 they 
were required to keep hold of their raffle ticket and quote the number if 
they wished to withdraw their data.  Participants were then seated behind 
a desktop computer and asked to complete the explicit attitude measures 
(Likert and TD) and the IAT again.  Once they had completed the attitude 
measures they were then asked to complete a second behavioural choice 
task.  This time, participants were presented with a series of 40 high and 
40 low carbon matched items.  The stimuli used in the behavioural choice 
task were the same images used in trial 1 and trial 2 of this experiment. 
6.3. Results6  
In this first analysis, the effects of the film as a whole is considered 
- that is to say, the three experimental groups (watching either the 
                                            
6 In this chapter, there were 120 participants who were asked to make a set of 20 dichotomised 
behavioural choices before and after watching a film clip yielding 2,400 choices before and after 
watching the clips (distributed across four conditions – control, emotion, emotion and information 
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‘information’ extracts, ‘emotion’ extracts or the ‘emotion and 
information’ extracts) are combined and compared with the control group 
on each of the attitudinal measures (Likert, Thermometer Difference and 
D score) and on the behavioural measures (number of low carbon 
choices).  Table 6.1 shows the effects of film on Likert scores.  There is 
very little difference in terms of mean Likert score before watching the 
film (M = 3.50) compared to the mean Likert scores after watching the 
film (M = 3.72).  The control group stays constant with a mean of 3.73 
(both before and after).  See Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Mean Likert scores for the experimental groups versus the 
control group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) watching the film. 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Experimental (all extracts) 3.50 3.72 3.61 
Control 3.73 3.73 3.73 
Total 3.56 3.73 3.64 
 
A series of 2 x 2 ANOVAs were used to test for possible main 
effects of groups (experimental versus control), trials (pre-film and post-
film), and a possible interaction effect between groups x trials.  The 
analysis revealed that in the case of the Likert score there were no 
                                            
combined).  Given the distribution of the data, parametric statistics were employed, principally 





significant main effects and no significant interaction effect (see Table 
6.2).    
Table 6.2: ANOVA summary of Likert scores for all three experimental 
groups combined versus the control group. 
ANOVA Summary (Likert) 
All films v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 0.67 1 0.67 0.89 0.3464 
Trials 1.67 1 1.67 2.21 0.1385 
Groups x Trials 0.55 1 0.55 0.73 0.3938 
Error 178.29 236 0.76   
Total 181.18 239    
 
Thermometer Difference 
Table 6.3 shows the means for all three experimental groups 
combined (‘information’, ‘emotion’ and ‘emotion and information’) 
versus the control group on the Thermometer Difference scale (TD).  
Participants felt warmer to ‘low carbon’ on ‘trial 2’ than on ‘trial 1’ in the 
case of the experimental group, but not for the control group.  In terms of 
TD score, there was a significant ‘trials’ effect (see Table 6.4).  In other 
words, participants said that they felt significantly ‘warmer’ about low 
carbon items on trial 2.  The mean Thermometer Difference score rose 
from 1.68 on ‘trial 1’ to 2.21 on ‘trial 2’.  There was no significant effect 
for groups, and the interaction effect (groups x trials) approached, but did 
not reach significance (F= 3.53, d.f. = 1, p = 0.0615).  What is striking 
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here is that the experimental group increased in TD score by 0.72, whereas 
the control group decreased by 0.03.   
Table 6.3: Mean Thermometer Difference scores for the experimental 
groups versus the control group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) 
watching film. 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Experimental (all extracts) 1.52 2.24 1.88 
Control 2.13 2.10 2.12 
Total 1.68 2.21 1.94 
 
Table 6.4: ANOVA summary of Thermometer Difference scores for all 
three experimental groups versus the control group. 
ANOVA Summary (TD) 
All films v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 2.45 1 2.45 1.35 0.2465 
Trials 17.07 1 17.07 9.39 0.0024 
Groups x Trials 6.42 1 6.42 3.53 0.0615 
Error 429.24 236 1.82   
Total 455.18 239    
 
 
6.3.1. IAT scores before and after film 
Table 6.5 shows the mean IAT scores for the experimental versus 
the control group.  Table 6.5 reveals that film did not appear to elevate D 
score for the experimental group (indeed it went down from 1.17 to 0.95), 
similarly the D score of the control group also decreased.  What is also 
striking from Table 6.5 is that the D scores for both the experimental and 
the control group were already very high on ‘trial 1’.  In other words, the 
participants were already (implicitly) strongly preferring low carbon, so 
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there is an issue about whether any experimental manipulation could 
elevate this even further.  It is also important to note that when the D 
scores decreased on ‘trial 2’, it still meant that participants remained 
within the band of strongly preferring low carbon - i.e. they did not change 
category.  There were no significant main effects, nor was there a 
significant interaction effect (see Table 6.6).  This decrease in D score was 
not significant. 
Table 6.5: Mean D scores for the experimental groups versus the control 
group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) watching film. 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Experimental (all extracts) 1.17 0.95 1.06 
Control 1.15 1.08 1.11 
Total 1.16 0.98 1.07 
 
 
Table 6.6: ANOVA summary of D scores for all three experimental 
groups versus the control group. 
ANOVA Summary (D score) 
All films v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 0.13 1 0.13 0.18 0.6718 
Trials 1.97 1 1.97 2.74 0.0992 
Groups x Trials 0.22 1 0.22 0.31 0.5782 
Error 169.85 236 0.72   
Total 172.17 239    
6.3.2. Behaviour (low carbon choices) 
From Table 6.7 it should be noted that the experimental group 
made a mean of 12.02 low carbon choices in ‘trial 1’, with the control 
group making a mean of 13.30 low carbon choices.  In other words, in the 
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case of the experimental group, approximately 60% of the choices were 
low carbon.  The ANOVA revealed that there was a significant main effect 
for trials (F=9.48, d.f.=1, p < 0.002), and a significant interaction 
(F=18.04, d.f.=1, p < 0.0001).  In other words, the experimental group 
made significantly more low carbon choices on trial 2, whereas the control 
group actually made fewer low carbon choices on trial 2.  There was no 
significant groups effect.  In other words, the experimental group and the 
control group did not significantly differ. 
Table 6.7: Mean behavioural choices (low carbon) for the experimental 
groups versus the control group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) 
watching film. 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Experimental (all extracts) 12.02 14.18 13.10 
Control 13.30 11.63 12.47 
Total 12.34 13.54 12.94 
 
Table 6.8: ANOVA summary of behavioural choice (low carbon) for all 
three experimental groups versus the control group. 
ANOVA Summary (Behaviour – Low Carbon choices) 
All films v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 18.05 1 18.05 1.98 0.1607 
Trials 86.4 1 86.4 9.48 0.0023 
Groups x Trials 164.35 1 164.35 18.04 <.0001 
Error 2150.38 236 9.11   






6.3.3. Information v control 
Likert score 
The next set of analyses focuses exclusively on a comparison of 
the experimental group exposed to the ‘information’ films compared with 
the control group in terms of their impact on Likert scores (see Table 6.9).  
What is apparent from Table 6.9 is that the Likert scores of the 
experimental group decreased from ‘trial 1’ to ‘trial 2’, whereas the 
control group stayed at exactly the same level (M = 3.73).  Table 6.10 
shows that there are no significant main effects nor is there a significant 
interaction effect.   
Table 6.9: Mean Likert scores for the Information group versus the 
Control group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) watching film. 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Information 3.53 3.47 3.50 
Control 3.73 3.73 3.73 
Total 3.63 3.60 3.62 
 
Table 6.10: ANOVA summary of Likert scores for the Information 
group versus the Control group. 
ANOVA Summary (Likert) 
Information v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 1.63 1 1.63 2.09 0.151 
Trials 0.03 1 0.03 0.04 0.8418 
Groups x Trials 0.04 1 0.04 0.05 0.8235 
Error 90.67 116 0.78   






In terms of Thermometer Difference scores, participants in the 
experimental group did feel warmer towards ‘low carbon’ on ‘trial 2’, this 
did not occur in the case of the control group.  However, the ANOVA 
revealed that there were no significant main effects, nor was there a 
significant interaction effect. 
Table 6.11: Mean Thermometer Difference scores for the Information 
group versus the Control group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) 
watching film. 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Information 1.53 2.17 1.85 
Control 2.13 2.10 2.12 
Total 1.83 2.13 1.98 
 
Table 6.12: ANOVA summary of Thermometer Difference scores for 
the Information group versus the Control group. 
ANOVA Summary (TD) 
Information v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 2.13 1 2.13 1.20 0.2756 
Trials 2.7 1 2.7 1.52 0.2201 
Groups x Trials 3.34 1 3.34 1.88 0.173 
Error 205.8 116 1.77   
Total 213.97 119    
 
IAT 
Table 6.13 reveals that in the case of the D scores, the D score of 
the experimental group decreased from trial 1 (M = 1.47) to trial 2 (M = 
0.88).  There was also a decrease in the case of the control group.  
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However, the ANOVA revealed that the only significant effect was a trials 
effect, but there was no significant interaction effect.  Again, it is 
important to note that the D scores of the participants in both the 
experimental and the control groups (but particularly in the experimental 
group) were very high to begin with.  Even when there was a decrease in 
D score after watching the film, the D scores were still in the band higher 
than 0.80, in other words, still strongly pro-low carbon.   
Table 6.13: Mean D scores for the Information group versus the Control 
group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) watching film. 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Information 1.47 0.88 1.18 
Control 1.15 1.08 1.11 
Total 1.31 0.98 1.15 
 
Table 6.14: ANOVA summary of D scores for the Information group 
versus the Control group. 
ANOVA Summary (D score) 
Information v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 0.11 1 0.11 0.17 0.6809 
Trials 3.29 1 3.29 4.96 0.0279 
Groups x Trials 1.93 1 1.93 2.91 0.0907 
Error 77.01 116 0.66   
Total 82.34 119    
 
Behaviour (low carbon choices) 
In terms of actual low carbon choices, Table 6.15 reveals that in 
the case of the experimental group, the number of low carbon choices 
increased from 11.61 on ‘trial 1’ to 13.43 on ‘trial 2’.  In the control group, 
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the number of low carbon choices actually decreased between ‘trial 1’ and 
‘trial 2’.  The ANOVA revealed a very significant groups x trials 
interaction effect.  In other words, the ‘information’ film had a significant 
effect on the number of low carbon choices by the experimental group, 
but not for the control group.  None of the main effects were significant.   
Table 6.15: Mean behavioural choices (low carbon) for the Information 
group versus the Control group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) 
watching film. 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Information 11.67 13.43 12.55 
Control 13.30 11.63 12.47 
Total 12.48 12.53 12.51 
 
 
Table 6.16: ANOVA summary of behavioural choice (low carbon) for 
the experimental group versus the control group. 
ANOVA Summary (Behaviour – Low Carbon choices) 
Information v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 0.21 1 0.21 0.02 0.8878 
Trials 0.08 1 0.08 0.01 0.9205 
Groups x Trials 88.4 1 88.4 9.00 0.0033 
Error 1139.3 116 9.82   
Total 1227.99 119    
 
6.3.4. Emotion v Control 
Likert score 
The next set of analyses focused on the effects of the ‘emotion’ 
films on both attitudinal and behavioural measures. Table 6.17 shows that 
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the mean Likert score went up in the case of the experimental group from 
3.43 to 3.93, but stayed constant at 3.73 for the control group.  However, 
the ANOVA revealed that there were no significant main effects nor was 
there a significant interaction effect. 
Table 6.17: Mean Likert scores for the Emotion group versus the Control 






Emotion  3.43 3.93 3.68 
Control 3.73 3.73 3.73 
Total 3.58 3.83 3.71 
 
 
Table 6.18: ANOVA summary of Likert scores for the Emotion group 
versus the Control group. 
ANOVA Summary (Likert) 
Emotion v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 0.08 1 0.08 0.13 0.7191 
Trials 1.88 1 1.88 2.99 0.0864 
Groups x Trials 1.86 1 1.86 2.96 0.088 
Error 72.97 116 0.63   
Total 76.79 119    
 
Thermometer Difference 
In the case of the Thermometer Difference scores, there is an 
increase in the mean Thermometer Difference score for the experimental 
group from 1.53 to 2.50, but a slight decrease in the case of the control 
group.  The ANOVA revealed that there was a significant interaction 
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effect, in that ‘emotion’ films did significantly increase how warm 
participants felt about low carbon.  There was also a significant trials 
effect (this was totally driven by the change in TD score in the 
experimental group). 
Table 6.19: Mean Thermometer Difference scores for the Emotion group 







Emotion  1.53 2.50 2.02 
Control 2.13 2.10 2.12 




Table 6.20: ANOVA summary of Thermometer Difference scores for 
the experimental group versus the control group. 
 
ANOVA Summary (TD) 
Emotion v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 0.3 1 0.3 0.20 0.6556 
Trials 6.53 1 6.53 4.38 0.0385 
Groups x Trials 7.51 1 7.51 5.03 0.0268 
Error 173.13 116 1.49   
Total 187.47 119    
 
IAT 
In the case of the IAT scores, the effects of the film are contrary 
to the theoretical prediction in that there is a decrease in D scores from 
‘trial 1’ to ‘trial 2’ (but not a significant drop) in the case of the 
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experimental group the drop was 0.33, in the case of the control group the 
drop was 0.07.  Again, it should be noted that the D scores were already 
very high in ‘trial 1’ i.e. in the most pro-low carbon band (greater than 
0.80). The ANOVA (Table 6.22) revealed that none of the effects were 
significant.   
Table 6.21: Mean D scores for the Emotion group versus the Control 
group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) watching film. 
 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Emotion 1.15 0.82 0.99 
Control 1.15 1.08 1.11 
Total 1.15 0.95 1.05 
 
 
Table 6.22: ANOVA summary of D scores for the Emotion group versus 
the Control group. 
 
ANOVA Summary (D score) 
Emotion v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 0.49 1 0.49 0.84 0.3613 
Trials 1.25 1 1.25 2.13 0.1471 
Groups x Trials 0.48 1 0.48 0.82 0.3671 
Error 67.93 116 0.59   
Total 70.15 119    
 
 
Behaviour (low carbon choices) 
In terms of the behavioural measure, when participants were 
exposed to the ‘emotion’ films, there is an increase in the number of low 
carbon choices of 3.76.  In the case of the control group, there were fewer 
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low carbon items chosen on ‘trial 2’.  The ANOVA revealed that there 
was a very significant interaction effect (p < 0.001) which shows that 
‘emotion’ films do have a significant impact on people’s choices of low 
carbon items.  There was also a significant trials effect (p < 0.05) but this, 
of course, was entirely attributable to the increase in the choice of low 
carbon items by the experimental group across trials.   
Table 6.23: Mean behavioural choices (low carbon) for the Emotion 
group versus the Control group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) 
watching film. 
 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Emotion 11.57 15.33 13.45 
Control 13.30 11.63 12.47 
Total 12.43 13.48 12.96 
 
 
Table 6.24: ANOVA summary of behavioural choice (low carbon) for 
the Emotion group versus the Control group. 
 
ANOVA Summary (Behaviour – Low Carbon choices) 
Emotion v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 29.01 1 29.01 3.57 0.0613 
Trials 33.08 1 33.08 4.07 0.046 
Groups x Trials 221.4 1 221.4 27.23 <.0001 
Error 943.3 116 8.13   






6.3.5. Information and emotion v Control 
Likert 
The next set of analyses focused on those films high in both 
information content and emotion on the various attitudinal measures and 
the behavioural choice task.  In terms of Likert score, there was a slight 
increase for the experimental group, with the control group staying 
constant.  But the ANOVA revealed that none of the main effects were 
significant, nor was the interaction effect.   
Table 6.25: Mean Likert scores for the Information and Emotion group 
versus the Control group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) watching film. 
 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Information and Emotion 3.53 3.77 3.65 
Control 3.73 3.73 3.73 




Table 6.26: ANOVA summary of Likert scores for the Information and 
Emotion group versus the Control group. 
 
ANOVA Summary (Likert) 
Information and Emotion v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 0.21 1 0.21 0.31 0.5788 
Trials 0.41 1 0.41 0.61 0.4364 
Groups x Trials 0.4 1 0.4 0.59 0.444 
Error 78.57 116 0.68   







In terms of Thermometer Difference scores, again, there was a 
slight increase in the case of the experimental group (up by 0.57) and a 
slight diminution in the case of the control group.  However, none of the 
effects were significant.   
Table 6.27: Mean Thermometer Difference scores for the Information 
and Emotion group versus the Control group before (trial 1) and after 
(trial 2) watching film. 
 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Information and Emotion 1.50 2.07 1.78 
Control 2.13 2.10 2.12 
Total 1.82 2.08 1.95 
 
 
Table 6.28: ANOVA summary of Thermometer Difference scores for 
the Information and Emotion group versus the Control group. 
 
ANOVA Summary (TD) 
Information and Emotion v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 3.33 1 3.33 1.94 0.1663 
Trials 2.13 1 2.13 1.24 0.2678 
Groups x Trials 2.71 1 2.71 1.58 0.2113 
Error 199.53 116 1.72   
Total 207.7 119    
 
IAT 
In the case of the IAT scores, there was an apparent increase in the 
D scores from ‘trial 1’ to ‘trial 2’ for the experimental group from 0.89 to 
1.15 (an increase of 0.26), and a slight decrease in the case of the control 
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group of 0.07.  None of the main effects were significant and this apparent 
interactional trend was also not significant.   
 
Table 6.29: Mean D scores for the Information and Emotion group 
versus the Control group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) watching film. 
 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Information and Emotion 0.89 1.15 1.02 
Control 1.15 1.08 1.11 
Total 1.02 1.11 1.07 
 
 
Table 6.30: ANOVA summary of D scores for the Information and 
Emotion group versus the Control group. 
 
ANOVA Summary (D score) 
Information and Emotion v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 0.27 1 0.27 0.42 0.5182 
Trials 0.27 1 0.27 0.42 0.5182 
Groups x Trials 0.9 1 0.9 1.41 0.2375 
Error 73.91 116 0.64   
Total 75.35 119    
 
Behaviour (low carbon choices) 
In the case of the behaviour measure, the experimental group did 
make more low carbon choices on trial 2 compared to trial 1, an increase 
of 0.94.  What was also interesting here was that the control group made 
fewer low carbon choices in ‘trial 2’ compared to ‘trial 1’ – a decrease of 
1.67.  The ANOVA revealed that there was a significant interaction effect 
(p < 0.05).  In other words, those films, which combined information and 
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emotion, did have a significant effect on the selection of more low carbon 
items.   
Table 6.31: Mean behavioural choices (low carbon) for the Information 
and Emotion group versus the Control group before (trial 1) and after 
(trial 2) watching film. 
 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Information and Emotions 12.83 13.77 13.30 
Control 13.30 11.63 12.47 




Table 6.32: ANOVA summary of behavioural choice (low carbon) for 
the Information group versus the Control group. 
 
ANOVA Summary (Behaviour – Low Carbon choices) 
Information and Emotion v Control  
 SS d.f. MS F P 
Groups 20.83 1 20.83 2.17 0.1434 
Trial 4.03 1 4.03 0.42 0.5182 
Groups x Trial 50.71 1 50.71 5.28 0.0234 
Error 1114.8 116 9.61   
Total 1190.37 119    
 
The next set of analyses investigates whether the different types of 
film (‘Emotion’, ‘Information’ and ‘Information and Emotion’) had 
differential effects on the measures of both explicit and implicit attitudes, 
and on the behavioural measure, namely the number of low carbon 
choices made.  There were twelve comparisons made in all and these are 





Table 6.33: A comparison of different types of film on explicit and 
implicit attitudes and low carbon choices: Only the F ratios and p values 















F = 0.75 
p = 0.3833 
F = 0.64  
p = 0.4253 
F = 3.61 
p = 0.0599 
F = 7.60  





F = 0.78 
p = 0.379 
F = 0.02  
p = 0.8878 
F = 6.66 
p =0.0111* 
F = 0.54  
p = 0.4639 
‘Emotion’ v 
‘Information’ 
F = 2.89 
p = 0.0918 
F = 0.43  
p = 0.5133 
F = 0.64 
p = 0.4253 
F = 3.69  
p = 0.0572 
 
The results displayed in Table 6.33 reveal that, in the case of the measures 
of explicit attitude (the Likert scores and the Thermometer Difference 
scores), there were no significant effects comparing the various types of 
film against each other.  However, in the case of the D score (measure of 
implicit attitudes), there was one significant effect when comparing 
‘Information’ films to the ‘Information and Emotion’ films (p = 0.0111), 
and one effect which was bordering on significance when comparing the 
‘Emotion’ films with the ‘Information and Emotion’ films (p = 0.0599).  
Table 6.34 shows that the ‘Information and Emotion’ films produced an 
increase in D score in the right direction (that is to say the D score 
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increased after watching the films).  However, the ‘Information’ film did 
not produce the same effect.  The significant difference emerged from 
these two different trends.  As before, notice that the mean D scores in 
‘trial 1’ are all within the strong pro-low carbon group and none of the 
measures deviate from this group even after the change.   
Table 6.34: Mean D scores for the Information group versus the 
Information and Emotion group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) 
watching film. 
 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Information 1.47 0.88 1.18 
Information and Emotion 0.89 1.15 1.02 
Total 1.18 1.02 1.10 
 
 
A similar trend can be seen in Table 6.35, which compares the effects of 
the ‘Emotion’ films with the ‘Information and Emotion’ films.  Again, the 
D score in the ‘Information and Emotion’ condition goes up from ‘trial 1’ 
to ‘trial 2’, whereas after watching the ‘Emotion’ films the mean D score 
decreases.  This time the interaction effect borders on significance (p = 
0.0599). These results suggest that in terms of the production of change 






Table 6.35: Mean D scores for the Emotion group versus the Information 
and Emotion group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) watching film. 
 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Emotion  1.15 0.82 0.99 
Information and Emotion 0.89 1.15 1.02 
Total 1.02 0.99 1.00 
In terms of behavioural measures, one interaction effect was 
significant (‘Emotion’ versus ‘Information and Emotion’) and one was 
bordering on significance (‘Emotion’ versus ‘Information’).  What is clear 
from Tables 6.36 and 6.37 is that participants in the ‘Emotion’ condition 
chose significantly more low carbon items in ‘trial 2’ compared with 
either the ‘Information and Emotion’ films (see 6.36) or the ‘Information’ 
films (see 6.37).   
Table 6.36: Mean behavioural choices (low carbon) for the Emotion 
group versus the Information and Emotion group before (trial 1) and 
after (trial 2) watching film. 
 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Emotion 11.57 15.33 13.45 
Information and Emotion 12.83 13.77 13.30 




Table 6.37: Mean behavioural choices (low carbon) for the Emotion 
group versus the Information group before (trial 1) and after (trial 2) 
watching film. 
 
Groups Trial 1 Trial 2 Total 
Emotion 11.57 15.33 13.45 
Information 11.67 13.43 12.55 




In other words, this experiment not only demonstrates that film can 
significantly impact on behavioural choices and the number and 
proportion of low carbon items chosen, but certain types of film seem to 
be particularly influential, namely films which impact on emotional state.  
This study broke new ground in considering the possible effects of 
film on attitudes and on behaviour.  However, what was particularly 
innovative about this study was that it used an actual behavioural task 
where participants had to select from pairs of items where each pair had a 
high and low carbon alternative.  In addition to that, both implicit and 
explicit attitudes were measured, which made the study unique.  The 
results were informative in many ways.  The first thing that the study 
demonstrated conclusively was that even relatively short climate change 
films (of whatever type) can impact on actual low carbon choices (see 
Table 6.38).  A comparison of the effects of any type of film (p < 0.0001), 
‘Information’ films (p = 0.0033), ‘Emotion’ films (p < 0.0001) and 
‘Information and Emotion’ films (p = 0.0234) all yielded significant 







Table 6.38: A comparison of experimental versus control condition on 
explicit and implicit attitudes and low carbon choices: The F ratios and p 














(all extracts)  
v Control 
F = 0.73 
p = 0.3938 
F = 3.53  
p = 0.615 
F = 0.31 
p =0.5782 
F = 18.04 
p = < 0.0001* 
‘Information’ 
v Control 
F = 0.05 
p = 0.8235 
F = 1.88 
p = 0.173 
F = 2.91 
p =0.0907 
F = 9.00 
p = 0.0033* 
‘Emotion’ v 
Control 
F = 2.96 
p = 0.088 
F = 5.03 
p = 0.0268* 
F = 0.82 
p =0.3671 
F = 27.23 




F = 0.59 
p = 0.444 
F = 1.58  
p = 0.2113 
F = 1.41 
p =0.2375 
F = 5.28 
p = 0.0234* 
 
In other words, low carbon choices were more common after watching 
any film.  This is an important result because it suggests that, 
notwithstanding issues about attention to climate change stimuli (see 
Chapter 2), that both emotional messages and informational messages can 
have an impact on behaviour.  However, there was only one significant 
interaction effect for any of the attitude measures and that was the effect 
of the ‘Emotion’ films on Thermometer Difference scores (p = 0.0268).  
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This means that having watched the ‘Emotion’ films, people felt warmer 
towards low carbon items.  In other words, the films seem to be affecting 
behaviour without the same types of effects on measures of attitude.   
However, as has already been discussed, there is one issue that 
needs to be addressed - the majority of participants used in this study all 
expressed strong explicit attitudes (and held strong implicit attitudes) to 
low carbon even before watching any of the films.  This raises the question 
as to whether we can ever elevate attitudes with simple interventions when 
they are already so high to begin with.  One way of checking this is to 
identify those participants who began the experiment with either lower 
explicit, or lower implicit attitudes to low carbon, and then to investigate 
the effects of the films on their attitudes and on their behaviour.   
 
6.4. The identification of participants with weaker pro-low 
carbon attitudes on the attitudinal measures on trial 1 
 
The next set of analyses focuses on those participants who began 
the experiment with lower scores on both explicit and implicit measures. 
In the case of the D scores of those participants assigned to the 
experimental conditions on ‘trial 1’, the vast majority of participants had 
scores higher than 0.80 on the IAT (67.78% of this group), which is 
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traditionally taken to be the criterion for identifying people with strong 
pro-low carbon implicit attitudes.  There were a total of 29 participants 
from the experimental groups identified as having D scores 0.79 or lower.  
The following analyses will look at the effects of film on these 29 
participants.  Given that the numbers were therefore smaller, it seemed 
appropriate to look at the effects of any type of film on this set of 
participants.  In the case of the Likert, the analyses focuses on those 
individuals who had a score of 3 or less on ‘trial 1’ (3 = ‘I like products 
with a high carbon footprint or a low carbon footprint equally’; 2 = ‘I 
moderately prefer products with a high carbon footprint’ or 1 = ‘I strongly 
prefer products with a high carbon footprint’) which identified a set of 43 
(47.78 % of the group).  In the case of the Feeling Thermometer, the focus 
is exclusively on one dimension of the scale (low carbon) - participants 
who selected 3 or less on the scale (‘neutral’), which identified 29 
participants (32.22% of the group) to be used in the next analyses.  A 
paired t test was used to compare the Likert scores on ‘trial 1’ and ‘trial 
2’ for these participants.  This yielded a t value of 5.257 (t (42) = 5.257, p 
< 0.00001).  In other words, the Likert scores were sufficiently elevated 
by the climate change films.  The next analysis revealed that the number 
of low carbon choices made by this group also increased from 11.00 to 
13.23, and again using a paired t test this yielded a t value of 5.357 (t (42) 




Table 6.39: The effects of film on Likert score and low carbon choices 
for those participants with a weaker initial pro-low carbon explicit 
attitudes. 
 Trial 1 Trial 2 
Likert score 2.74 3.28 




The Feeling Thermometer (low carbon) scores also significantly increased 
after watching the climate change films.  On ‘trial 1’, the mean Feeling 
Thermometer score was 2.97 compared to 3.59 on ‘trial 2’ and this was a 
significant increase (t (28) = 4.3116, p = 0.000181).  Watching the films 
also impacted upon the number of low carbon choices made by this group, 
which increased from 10.66 on ‘trial 1’ compared to 12.62 on ‘trial 2’ (t 
(28) = 3.365, p = 0.002233) see Table 6.40. 
Table 6.40: The effects of film on Feeling Thermometer low score and 
low carbon choices for those participants with a weaker pro-low carbon 
explicit attitudes. 




(low carbon) score 
2.97 3.59 






The next analyses focused on the D scores of the particular set of 
participants with an initial D score of 0.79 or below.  The mean D score 
for these individuals was 0.28 on ‘trial 1’ and the films elevated this mean 
D score to 0.86 (t (28) = 3.523, p = 0.001485).  There was also a significant 
rise in the number of low carbon choices made by this set of participants 
from ‘trial 1’ (M = 12.69) to ‘trial 2’ (M = 15.07) t (28) = 5.099, p = 
0.000021.  
Table 6.41: The effects of film on D score and low carbon choices for 
those participants with a weaker pro-low carbon implicit attitude. 
 Trial 1 
 
Trial 2 
D score 0.28 
 
0.86 




In the case of the overall results there did not appear to be a connection 
between attitude change and the significant changes in behaviour.  
However, when we focus our attention exclusively on those participants 
who have lower initial levels of either explicit or implicit attitudes, there 
is a significant increase in pro-low carbon attitudes and this seems to be 
associated with a significant increase in pro-low carbon behaviour. 
 The overall conclusion from this study is that when film is 
sufficiently informative and sufficiently emotional (as many extracts from 
the Al Gore film ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ are), then this can have a major 
361 
 
effect, not just on social cognitions and mood, which was demonstrated in 
earlier research, but it also impacts on attitudes (both implicit and explicit) 
and on behaviour. 
However, the question still remains as to what extent any such 
changes are maintained across time.  This formed the basis for the next 
set of analyses. 
6.5. Are any differences maintained across time from trial 2 
to trial 3 for those not approaching celling level on the 
initial measures? 
 
In the next stage of the study, it should be noted that only 29 out of the 
original 90 participants from the experimental conditions returned to take 
part on trial 3, which took place between four and six weeks after the 
initial experiment.  As in ‘trial 1’ and ‘trial 2’, participants completed a 
Likert scale, a Feeling Thermometer and an IAT.  A behavioural measure 
was also taken where participants had to choose between the 40 high 
carbon and 40 low carbon stimuli (in matched pairs), originally used in 
‘trial 1’ and ‘trial 2’.  Therefore, for the next analyses, the numbers of low 
carbon choices made at each trial (‘trial 1’, ‘trial 2’ and ‘trial 3’) are 
expressed as a percentage of total choices made.  The theoretical questions 
asked here is whether any changes in explicit or implicit attitudes are 
maintained across time, and whether any behavioural changes are 
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maintained for the subset of these participants that were not approaching 
ceiling level on the initial measures (‘3’ or less on the Likert: n = 20; ‘3’ 
or less on the Feeling Thermometer: n = 13; 0.79 or less on D score: n = 
16).   
The effects of the film on explicit attitudes across the three trials 
for those participants who scored 3 or less on the Likert are displayed in 
Figures 6.1.  The percentages of low carbon choices (over all choices) 
across the 3 trials made by these individuals are shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Mean Likert scores on trial 1 (T1), trial 2 (T2) and trial 3 
























Figure 6.2: Percentages of low carbon choices on trial 1 (T1), trial 2 (T2) 
and trial 3 (T3) for those participants with an initial Likert score of 3 or 
below. 
 
Figure 6.3 show the effects of film across the three trials on the Feeling 
Thermometer (low carbon) for those participants who scored 3 or below.  
Figure 6.4 shows the effects of the films on percentage of low carbon 



























Figure 6.3: Mean Feeling Thermometer (low carbon) scores on trial 1 
(T1), trial 2 (T2) and trial 3 (T3) for those participants with an initial 




Figure 6.4: Percentages of low carbon choices on trial 1 (T1), trial 2 (T2) 
and trial 3 (T3) for those participants with an initial Feeling 












































Figure 6.5 show the effects of the films on D score across the three trials 
for those participants who had a D score of 0.79 or below on trial 1.  Figure 
6.6 shows the effects the films had on percentage of low carbon choices 
for this set of participants.   
 
 
Figure 6.5: Mean D score on trial 1(T1), trial 2 (T2) and trial 3 (T3) for 






















Figure 6.6: Percentages of low carbon choices on trial 1 (T1), trial 2(T2) 
and trial 3 (T3) for those participants with an initial D score of 0.79 or 
below. 
 
So how did the attitudes and behaviour of those participants with weaker 
pro-low carbon attitudes, at the outset of the study, vary across trials?  The 
first analysis focuses on the comparison of attitudes and behaviour in ‘trial 
1’ and ‘trial 2’ for this smaller set of participants.  In the case of the Likert 
scores, the mean Likert score for this set of participants increased after 
watching the films from 2.75 to 3.15; this result was significant (t (19) = 
2.990, p = 0.008).  Interestingly, there was also a significant rise in 
percentage of low carbon choices made for this particular group from a 

























Table 6.42: Likert scores and behavioural choice at trial 1 and trial 2 for 
those participants who reported 3 or below on the Likert scale on trial 1. 









 In the case of the Feeling Thermometer (low carbon), the mean score for 
these participants went up from 2.92 on ‘trial 1’ to 3.46 on ‘trial 2’ (t (12) 
= 2.942, p = 0.012).  The percentage of low carbon choices also increased 
from 54.23 in ‘trial 1’ to 66.16 in ‘trial 2’.  However, this was not 
significant (t (12) = 2.143, p = 0.053).   
Table 6.43: Feeling Thermometer scores and behavioural choice on trial 
1 and trial 2 for those participants who reported 3 or below on the 
Feeling Thermometer (low carbon) scale on trial 1. 










The mean D score for this set of participants increased from 0.70 on ‘trial 
1’ to 1.12 on ‘trial 2’, which was the most dramatic result in this particular 
set of analyses.  This rise was highly significant (t (15) = 4.527, p = 
0.0004).  In terms of the behaviour of this group, the mean percentage of 
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low carbon choices more than doubled from 33.75 on ‘trial 1’ to 76.88 on 
‘trial 2’ (t (15) = 4.189, p = 0.00079). 
Table 6.44: D scores and behavioural choice on trial 1 and trial 2 for 
those participants who held a D score of 0.79 or below on trial 1. 
 Trial 1 
 
Trial 2 
D score 0.17 
 
1.12 




The next set of analyses focuses on what happens to these attitudinal and 
behavioural measures from ‘trial 2’ to ‘trial 3’.  In the case of the Likert 
scores, the mean for these participants decreased slightly from 3.15 on 
‘trial 2’ to 3.00 on ‘trial 3’, which was not a significant fall (t (19) = -
0.567, p = 0.577).  There was also an associated drop of 13.5% in 
percentage of low carbon choices.  This again, was not significant (t (19) 
= -1.548, p = 0.138).   
Table 6.45: Likert scores and behavioural choice on trial 2 and trial 3 for 
those participants who reported 3 or below on the Likert scale on trial 1. 












In the case of the Feeling Thermometer (low carbon) score, there was no 
change as to how warm or cold the participants in this group felt towards 
low carbon on ‘trial 2’ compared to ‘trial 3’ (t (12) = 0.000, p =1.000).  
There was a very small drop in terms of the in percentage of low carbon 
choices made from 66.15 on ‘trial 1’ to 62.50 on ‘trial 2’, again this was 
not significant ( t (12) = -1.185, p = 0.259).   
Table 6.46: Feeling Thermometer scores and percentage of low carbon 
choices on trials 2 and 3 for those participants who reported 3 or below 
on the Feeling Thermometer (low carbon) scale on trial 1. 










Interestingly, the D score was more positive on ‘trial 3’ (M = 1.43) 
compared to ‘trial 2’ (M = 1.12), but this rise of 0.31 was not significant 
(t (15) = 1.177, p = 0.257).  There was, however, a drop in terms of 
percentage of low carbon items chosen from ‘trial 2’ (M = 76.88) to ‘trial 
3’ (M = 71.09).  Again, this was not significant (t (15) = -1.906, p = 0.076). 
Table 6.47: D scores and behavioural choice on trial 1 and trial 2 for 
those participants who held a D score of 0.79 or below on trial 1. 











The final set of comparisons considers the measures of attitudes and 
behaviours on ‘trial 3’ compared with the baseline trial (trial 1) for the set 
of participants with weaker pro-low carbon attitudes at initial testing.  In 
the case of the Likert score, the mean did rise from 2.75 on ‘trial 1’ to 3.00 
on ‘trial 3’, but this difference was not significant (t (19) = 1.09, p = 
0.287).  However, when it came to the behavioural choices made by this 
particular group, there was a significant change, however, this was in the 
opposite direction to that anticipated, and the percentage of low carbon 
choices made actually decreased from 54.75 on ‘trial 1’ to 53.00 on ‘trial 
3’ (t (19) = 2.689, p = 0.015).   
Table 6.48: Likert scores and behavioural choice on trial 1 and trial 3 for 
those participants who reported 3 or below on the Likert scale on trial 1. 








In terms of Feeling Thermometer, there was an increase from ‘trial 1’ (M 
= 2.92) to ‘trial 3’ (M = 3.46) for this set of participants, and this difference 
was significant (t (12) = 2.501, p = 0.028).  There was also an increase in 
the percentage of low carbon choices made from ‘trial 1’ (M = 54.23) to 
‘trial 3’ (M = 62.50), a mean rise of 8.27%, but this was not significant (t 
(12) = 1.807, p = 0.096).   
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Table 6.49: Feeling Thermometer scores and behavioural choice on trial 
1 and trial 3 for those participants who reported 3 or below on the on the 
Feeling Thermometer (low carbon) scale on trial 1. 










In the case of the D score, there was a dramatic increase from ‘trial 1’ (M 
= 0.17) to ‘trial 3’ (M = 1.43), and this increase was highly significant (t 
(15) = 4.623, p = 0.0003).  There was also an associated rise in the 
percentage of low carbon choices made rising from ‘trial 1’ (M = 66.25) 
to ‘trial 3’ (M = 77.09), but this difference was not significant (t (15) = 
1.488, p = 0.157). 
Table 6.50: D scores and behavioural choice on trial 1 and trial 3 for 
those participants who held a D score of 0.79 or below on trial 1. 
 Trial 1 
 
Trial 3 
D score 0.17 
 
1.43 





The analyses reported in this chapter sought to investigate the 
effects of different types of climate change film on both explicit and 
implicit attitudes and behavioural choices.  It differed from previous 
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research by considering the possibility of film influencing implicit as well 
as explicit attitudes, as well as the effects on behaviour (participants were 
required to make a series of choices between high and low carbon 
alternatives).  Previous research has suggested that film can significantly 
influence explicit attitudes to climate change and environmental features 
(Howell, 2011), but here it was found that there was no significant impact 
of climate change film excerpts (of whatever type) on explicit attitudes to 
carbon, as measured by the Likert scale.  Specifically, there were no 
significant interaction effects between groups and trials on the Likert 
scores in any of the particular comparisons made.  In terms of the other 
explicit measure of attitudes to high and low carbon, the Thermometer 
Difference, one significant interaction effect did emerge - the climate 
change film clips high in emotion did have a significant effect on how 
‘warm’ participants felt towards low carbon items. 
In the case of the measure of implicit attitudes, the climate change 
film clips had no statistically significant influence on underlying implicit 
attitudes.  However, there were a number of interaction effects here that 
approached significance, which suggested that climate change films 
containing both information and emotion together seem to have a greater 
effect on underlying implicit attitudes, than those clips focusing on just 
emotion or information. 
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However, this study also showed that climate change film clips 
can change the preponderance of low carbon choices.  In the case of all 
the climate change films combined, when compared with the control 
group who watched the neutral film, there was a highly significant 
interaction effect (at the 0.0001 level), with significantly more low carbon 
items chosen on trial 2 (i.e. immediately after watching the film clips), 
compared to trial 1.  The number of low carbon choices went up from 
12.02 on trial 1 to 14.18 on trial 2 for the experimental group, and down 
from 13.30 to 11.63 for the control group (see Table 6.7).  The analyses 
revealed that the climate change ‘information’ film clips considered 
separately also produced a significant interaction effect for the number of 
low carbon choices (see Table 6.16), as did the ‘emotion’ films (see Table 
6.24) and the ‘information and emotion’ films (see Table 6.32).  In other 
words, each of the different types of climate change film clips, although 
they had little or no statistical effect on underlying attitudes (except in 
very particular cases), seem nevertheless to be having a major impact on 
behaviour.   
However, there is an important additional consideration 
underpinning these results.  Given the nature of the sample used 
throughout this research and throughout the vast majority of research on 
this topic (mainly university staff and students), the baseline attitudes to 
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low carbon were very positive to begin with, so this does make the job of 
elevating these scores, through whatever means, much harder.  That was 
why there needed to be a focus on a subset of participants who were not 
approaching ceiling level (operationally defined as ‘3’ or less on the Likert 
and Feeling Thermometer; 0.79 and less in D score) for a separate analysis 
and a follow-up six weeks later on trial 3).  These criteria (including the 
criterion of returning for trial 3, given that less than a third of the 
experimental group returned) identified subsets of 20 (for the Likert), 13 
for the Feeling Thermometer and 16 for the D score.  Given the low 
numbers, all of the climate change film clips were combined into a single 
category.  So how did climate change film clips influence these 
participants?  The answer is that there was now a very significant trials 
effect for both explicit and implicit attitudes and behaviour, with 
significant rises from trial 1 to trial 2 for all attitudinal measures and for 
percentage of low carbon choices (except in the case of the Feeling 
Thermometer comparison).  The Likert scores fell after a six-week 
interval but not quite back to baseline, but the Feeling Thermometer and 
D scores remained significantly higher (in the case of the trial 1 versus 
trial 3 comparisons).  The behavioural changes, however, did not endure 
and the percentage of low carbon choices were not significantly higher 
after the climate change film intervention, after the approximate six-week 
delay (trial 3 versus trial 1). 
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In other words, climate change film clips can significantly impact 
on explicit and implicit attitudes and carbon choice behaviour, but only in 
the short-term.  How we make such an intervention more long lasting in 
the future is of enormous theoretical and practical concern to us all, and 















Chapter 7: General discussion 
 
In this thesis, an attempted has been made to investigate a 
fundamental and major global issue, and that is why we, the public, are 
not doing more as consumers to change our underlying patterns of 
consumption, in the face of the threat posed by climate change.  Despite 
numerous attempt by various government and multinationals to change 
our patterns of consumption through various initiatives (including carbon 
labelling) in order to make our consumption more sustainable, our 
patterns of consumption have seemed to change in only very limited ways 
(see Beattie, 2010).  This has been somewhat puzzling and unexpected to 
many agencies (including both retailers and government organisations 
like Defra), given that numerous market research surveys, some 
commissioned by these same government departments and retailers, have 
consistently indicated that the public have very positive attitudes to 
sustainable products (British Social Attitudes survey, 2012; Downing & 
Ballantyne, 2007; Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2016; 
Ipsos MORI, 2008).  In addition, these market research surveys have 
concluded that the public consistently report that they are prepared to 
change their behaviour to ameliorate the effects of climate change.  In 
their response to the various questions put to them, the public have (in 
many people’s eyes) effectively ‘requested’ carbon footprint information 
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to be included on products to allow them to choose between consumer 
products on the basis of their environmental impact.  But these initiatives 
have not had the desired effects, which is even more surprising given that 
there are a number of precedents for this kind of product labelling 
(especially food labelling) having a direct and fairly immediate impact on 
behaviour.  The most obvious of these is the inclusion of nutritional 
information on food products (including calories and fat content), which 
led to dramatic shifts in consumer preference on a timescale of months 
rather than years (see, for example, Beattie, 2012).  Various governments 
and retailers then worked in conjunction to provide the public with carbon 
information to allow them to make the same sorts of informed and 
appropriate choices with respect to environmental issues.  But clearly 
there was a problem, and this issue has been the subject of the research 
reported here. 
Background research in this area had demonstrated that there is 
actually minimal visual attention to carbon labels on certain products, 
where eye-tracking was used to monitor the moment-by-moment gaze 
fixations of participants in the laboratory (Beattie, McGuire & Sale, 
2010).  This is obviously a potentially serious issue that unfortunately (and 
rather surprisingly) had not been explored before the various carbon 
labelling initiatives were introduced in the U.K. in 2008.  But there still 
were a number of uncontrolled variables in the ‘naturalistic’ study in 
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Beattie, McGuire and Sale (2010), including the size and positioning of 
the carbon labels that would need to be rectified to allow firmer 
conclusions.  However, the question remained in the light of this earlier 
research as to whether this kind of scheme might work with certain 
sections of the population, and if so, how might we identify them?  
Furthermore, could we identify what proportion of the general population 
such receptive individual might constitute, and could measures of attitude 
(‘predispositions to act’), however defined, help us predict who they 
might be?  These were some of the issues that this thesis sought to address. 
A starting assumption for this PhD was that self-reported attitudes 
to carbon footprint alone were unlikely to hold the key here because that 
was what the numerous market research surveys had measured, and, of 
course, they did seem to suggest a very positive general attitude to the 
environment/carbon footprint across a wide range of sampling 
populations.  But these measures often highlighted the ‘value-action’ gap 
that people were not behaving in accordance with their underlying values.  
Therefore, following the pioneering work of Anthony Greenwald and 
others, the concept of implicit attitude was considered in terms of whether 
this might be a more useful measure to prove some insight into consumer 
behaviour, where an ‘implicit’ attitude was considered to be ‘evaluations 
that occur without conscious awareness towards an object or construct’.  
Implicit attitudes seem to be formed on the basis of an underlying patterns 
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of associations, rooted in System 1 (Kahneman, 2011), and not based on 
‘conscious, reflexive, rational and slow decision-making’ (see Beattie, 
2010, p.56).  The possible relationship between attitudes to carbon 
footprint (both implicit and explicit) and different forms of behaviour was 
explored in this thesis, the behaviours included visual attention to carbon 
labels, choice between different products based on environmental features 
compared with brand information, price, value etc. in a simulated 
shopping task, simulated consumer choice when ‘shopping’ in the 
presence of others and alone, choice between alternative products and 
services differing in carbon footprint (food items, energy sources, modes 
of transportation etc.).  Self-reports of behaviour were also considered to 
allow some understanding of the extant literature on this subject.  In 
addition, the question of how we might change both types of attitudes was 
explored, on the understanding that both implicit and explicit attitudes 
could potentially be important in this broad quest.  
7.1. Review and discussion of findings 
Thus, in Chapter 2, the possible relationship between implicit 
attitudes and explicit attitudes, and how these attitudes may or may not 
direct visual attention to carbon labels, was explored using eye-tracking.  
Four different non-branded packages were created which included muesli, 
cake mix, ice lollies and detergent.  On each product there were six 
380 
 
features including product name, product image, carbon footprint, price, 
energy value and a bar code.  The information labels for three attributes 
(carbon footprint, price, energy/calories) were always the same size and 
colour.  Price and carbon footprint information were systematically varied 
yielding four combinations of price and carbon footprint per product.  
Other information such as energy value, bar code, product name and 
image were all kept constant. 
It was discovered that participants spent significantly more time 
looking at carbon footprint than they did at price across the sixteen stimuli, 
but not significantly more time looking at carbon footprint than energy 
value.  These were promising results, in some ways, suggesting that 
carbon footprint is intrinsically salient when the size of the label is 
carefully matched with other labels and when the information is 
represented on the front of the product.  However, the value of the carbon 
footprint, and specifically whether it was high or low, had no significant 
effect on level of fixation. 
Next, the predictive validity of the various measures of attitude for 
behaviour was tested.  When comparing those participants with a strong 
positive explicit attitude and those with neutral or negative explicit 
attitude, there was no significant difference in time spent looking at the 
carbon label on these products.  There was also no significant relationship 
between implicit attitudes and level of fixation on carbon footprint.  
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However, when comparing those participants with the most positive 
implicit attitude to participants with the least positive implicit attitude to 
low carbon - those with the highest positive implicit attitudes were more 
likely to fixate first on carbon footprint information than those with more 
negative implicit attitudes.  This did not occur with explicit attitude.  
These results suggested that implicit attitude do impact upon unconscious 
gaze fixation and that carbon footprint information might have some 
effect on those individuals who hold the right underlying attitude to the 
environment.   
Of course, there are limitations to this study - in a real shopping 
scenario price is likely to be significantly more important than it was in 
this particular experiment where no actual purchase had to be made.  All 
participants were required to do was to look at products without even 
having to choose one (let alone buy one!).  In addition, in real products in 
supermarkets, not all labels are the same size or similar in how they look.  
Food labels are not always displayed on the front of packages (as they 
were in this study; this might well be a critical issue going forward) and 
are usually on the back or the sides.  Carbon footprint information is not 
always as obvious on the packaging of items in real consumer contexts, 
as they were in this study. 
With some of these issues in mind, Chapter 3 explored the 
relationship between attitudes (both explicit and implicit), self-reported 
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environmental behaviour (as is typically measured in research in this 
area), as well as actual behaviour in a shopping task (an attempt to 
simulated real life shopping in the lab).  Time pressure was also 
systematically varied to simulate the time constraints of much of everyday 
supermarket shopping.  The stimuli used in this study were somewhat 
different to those used in Chapter 2 in that the images in this experiment 
were images of real products available in supermarkets.  These images 
were displayed on laminated flash cards.  The amount of information 
provided on each item varied across each product which is typical of 
products sold in supermarkets.  There were four variants of each product 
– luxury brand, well-known brand, organic/Eco brand and value brand.  
The actual price of the individual items and the carbon footprint value of 
the items were superimposed onto the front of the product.  Unlike the 
study in Chapter 2, the carbon footprint was colour coded in green 
(representing low carbon) and black (representing high carbon) as well as 
having the numerical value of the carbon footprint in the centre of the 
footprint.  Participants’ explicit attitudes to carbon footprint were 
measured using a Likert scale and Thermometer Difference scale and 
implicit attitudes were measured using the Implicit Association Test 
pioneered by Greenwald.  
The results revealed that there does appear to be a significant 
relationship between self-reported attitudes and self-reported behaviours 
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(in line with much of the previous research).  However, there was no 
significant relationship between implicit attitudes and self-reported 
behaviours.  When it came to behavioural choice, there was a tendency 
for people with a positive explicit attitude towards low carbon to select 
more low carbon items when not under time pressure, but this was not 
significant.  In terms of implicit attitudes there was also a tendency for 
people with a positive implicit attitude towards low carbon to select more 
low carbon items, but again, this failed to reach significance either under 
no time pressure or time pressure.  In this study, colour-coded carbon 
labels were competing with a whole series of other product features such 
as brand and price, as would happen in any regular visit to the 
supermarket.  It was found that these other features were significant in 
guiding the choice of the experimental participants.  It was also found that 
the choices of the low carbon alternatives were more frequent than the 
choice of the high carbon alternatives, but this was not reliably associated 
with either measure of attitude.   
In Chapter 4 the issue of attitudes and choice of low carbon 
footprint items was considered in much finer detail, focusing on the 
frequency of choice of low carbon products when competing with 
different brands consumers are faced with in supermarkets.  The issue of 
time constraints was also considered in detail (shopping under time 
pressure versus no time pressure) and the extent to which implicit attitudes 
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influence the choice of low carbon footprint products under both time 
conditions was also considered.  The stimuli used in this study was 
identical to those products used in Chapter 3, with the price superimposed 
on the front of the products along with the colour-coded carbon footprint.  
The results from this study revealed that under time pressure people were 
more likely to choose well-known brands compared to organic/eco 
brands.  Participants were also significantly more likely to choose luxury 
brands and significantly less likely to choose organic/eco brands.  
Participants with a positive implicit attitude to carbon footprint were 
guided to some extent by the colour-coded carbon footprints but not by 
the numerical values within the carbon footprints themselves.  In the case 
of the measures of explicit attitude, for example, the Likert scale, both 
under no time pressure and under time pressure, there was little 
discriminatory power for predicting actual behaviour.  When under no 
time pressure, the weak explicit attitude group did display a low carbon 
preference; the strong group did not.  However, in the case of the implicit 
IAT measure, when participants were under time pressure those with a 
strong implicit attitude to low carbon were more likely to shop in a 
sustainable way (at least in terms of the proportion of low carbon choices).  
Measures of both types of attitude to low carbon also significantly 
predicted the choice of organic/eco products, but here only when choices 
were made with no time pressure suggesting that people may need more 
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time to process the label and/or reflect on the nature of their choices.  
These results give us some insight into the variables that affect consumer 
choice and point towards the attitudinal measures that may help us predict 
consumer behaviour that is more sustainable.  Organic/eco brands are 
clearly not the first choice option, particularly under time pressure.  Some 
individuals, however, with a strong positive explicit or implicit attitude 
towards low carbon are more sensitive to these brands, but only those with 
a strong positive implicit attitude are sensitive to carbon footprint 
information in choices under time pressure.  This latter observation is 
consonant with previous research which suggests that the IAT is indeed a 
better predictor of behaviour when under time pressure (Beattie, 2010; 
2012; Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner, 2002; Dovidio, Kawakami, 
Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton & Williams, 
1995).  The advantage of this implicit measure is that it is not subject to 
social desirability biases unlike self-report measures where ‘green’ 
responses may be exaggerated somewhat in order for respondents to 
appear greener than they really are.  The results from this study also 
highlight the impact advertising has on our consumer choices.  People do 
seem to be influenced by advertising and tend choose products that they 
have been taught to value, for example, the big brands that signal status 
and economical brands that we are told save money, rather than 
environmental brands.   
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Chapter 5 sought to investigate whether environmentally-friendly 
products could perhaps have the similar impact on consumer choices 
when shopping with friends and family, where more social considerations 
come into play.  For example, to signal to others that they care for the 
environment thus having all of the characteristics that go with this – 
‘considerate’, ‘caring’, ‘thoughtful’ etc.  In this chapter, the effects of the 
presence of others, whilst shopping, on the choice of more sustainable 
products (when products are labelled in terms of their environmental 
consequences) was investigated.  Previous research had suggested that 
selecting environmentally-friendly options or low carbon products, whilst 
in the presence of others, allows people to present their concerns about the 
environment and climate change, and potentially elevate their social status 
in the group through this public display of ‘environmental awareness’ 
(Griskevicius, Tybur & Van den Bergh, 2010).  However, ‘costly 
signalling theory’ (from evolutionary psychology) would suggest that big 
brands might be more significant in the presence of others.   
Using the same basic stimuli used in Chapters 3 and 4, participants 
were asked to choose ten items under two different conditions – shopping 
alone and shopping with friends.  This study found that shopping with 
friends has a significant effect on consumer choice.  When shopping 
alone, well-known branded products were the most popular (like Heinz, 
Kelloggs), followed by the value brand, followed by the organic/eco brand 
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and lastly the luxury brand.  When shopping with friends, the well-known 
brands became even more popular.  Organic/eco and luxury brands were 
also selected significantly more frequently when shopping with friends.  
Value brands were, however, selected much less frequently when 
shopping with friends compared to when shopping alone.   
 
These results emphasised, again, the power of advertising for well-
known brands in that these brands are immediately recognisable and 
accessible under both conditions.  It also demonstrated that value brands 
are selected much less frequently when shopping with friends.  However, 
the luxury, the well-known and the organic/eco brands were all selected 
more frequently when shopping with friends compared to when shopping 
alone, suggesting that when we change the social context of consumer 
choice, it does influence consumer behaviour and that some brands 
become more popular and some, (particularly the value brand in this 
experiment), become much less popular, which makes sense from a 
‘costly signalling theory’ perspective – by purchasing these well-known 
and luxury brands we signal to our friends/family that we have the 
resource to purchase these kinds of items.  By choosing organic/eco 
brands we signal our pro-social orientation.  
However, the choice of low carbon items showed the reverse 
pattern to that shown by organic/eco products in that low carbon items 
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were selected more often when shopping alone whereas the high carbon 
footprint products were chosen less frequently than when shopping with 
friends.  These results raise the (difficult) issue that perhaps carbon labels 
are not obvious enough to allow for social signalling, or perhaps people 
think that others around them will not be able to evaluate carbon footprint 
properly (Upham et al., 2011).  Therefore, the individual consumer 
selecting low carbon products whilst shopping with friends will not 
acquire the elevation in social status that they desire.  This social 
dimension is clearly an issue for the future in terms of both public policy 
and cultural awareness when it comes to carbon labels. 
If carbon labels do work to some extent with those with a positive 
implicit attitude towards low carbon (as in Chapter 4), the next obvious 
question is whether we can change people’s implicit attitudes.  This was 
the focus of Chapter 6.  In this chapter, the effects of different types of 
film on both explicit and implicit attitudes to high and low carbon and on 
behavioural choices linked to carbon footprint was investigated.  Previous 
research has suggested that film can influence some explicit attitudes to 
climate change and other environmental features (Beattie, Sale & 
McGuire, 2011; Howell, 2011, 2014), although attitudes specifically to 
carbon had not been tested.  In addition, no previous study had set out to 
test the impact of such films on implicit attitudes, or actual behaviour in 
this domain.  By selecting clips from the Nobel Prize-winning film on 
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climate change (Al Gore’s ‘An Inconvenient Truth’), based on their 
emotion content or information content (or both), it was possible to test 
whether film could influence attitudes, and, in addition, which type of film 
would have the most significant effect in terms of changes in attitudes 
(implicit and explicit) and carbon behaviour.  Six clips were selected for 
the experimental groups (two ‘emotion’ clips, two ‘information’ clips and 
two clips which were both highly emotional and rich in information).  
There was also a control group to allow for a comparison.  Measures were 
taken immediately after watching the film excerpts and also four to six 
weeks later.   
This study found that in terms of the Likert score, there was a 
slight increase in mean Likert scores immediately after participants had 
watched the ‘emotion’ film clips and after watching the 
‘information/emotion’ film clips, but none of the increases here were 
significant.  The information excerpts had even less effect on Likert 
scores.  In terms of the second self-report attitudinal measure, the Feeling 
Thermometer, there was one significant effect.  The ‘emotion’ film clips 
did have an effect on how warm participants felt towards low carbon items 
- the ratings increased having watched the clips.  However, none of the 
film clips had any significant effect on the IAT scores.  In terms of the 
measures of actual behaviour (choice from matched pairs of high and low 
carbon items, which included products, sources of energy, means of 
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transportation etc.), the film clips did have a significant impact on 
behaviour in all conditions, compared to the control condition.  When 
individual comparisons between types of film was carried out, the results 
suggested that the ‘emotion’ clips were particularly powerful in 
influencing behaviour. 
So this presents something of a conundrum.  Various measures of 
attitude to low carbon have been taken, but there was little systematic 
change in any of these measures, despite the demonstrable impact of the 
films on carbon choice.  How might this be explained?  Are the attitudinal 
measures simply of no value in this domain?  Or is there some other issue?  
One possibility is that the participants in this study (mainly university 
students, as in the vast majority of psychological studies, see Sears, 1986) 
had very positive explicit and implicit attitudinal scores on the baseline 
trial, and perhaps were approaching something of a ceiling effect.  So the 
question remains - what would happen if you considered separately those 
participants who were not above 3 on the Likert scores (n=43), not above 
3 on the Feeling Thermometer on the low carbon sub-scale (n=29) and 
0.79 or below on the IAT, i.e. not strong pro-low carbon (n=29)?  It should 
be noted that the specific criteria used were identified on the basis of 
partitioning a certain proportion of the sample.  There was a significant 
rise in explicit attitudes when focussing on those participants with lower 
Likert scores in the baseline trial (scoring 3 or less).  The mean Likert 
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score for this group increased from 2.74 on ‘trial 1’ to 3.28 on ‘trial 2’.  
This was accompanied by a significant increase in the number of low 
carbon choices from 11.00 on ‘trial 1’ to 13.32 on ‘trial 2’.  The Feeling 
Thermometer scores for those participants who scored 3 or below in initial 
testing, similarly significantly increased after watching the film clips 
rising from 2.97 on ‘trial 1’ to 3.59 on ‘trial 2’.  Again, there was a 
significant increase in low carbon choices made from 10.66 on ‘trial 1’ to 
12.62 on ‘trial 2’.  When focussing solely on those participants with D 
scores of 0.79 or below, the film clips did have a significant effect on the 
D scores (the films were not separated by category because the Ns in each 
group would have been too small: 29/3 film types etc.).  Indeed, for this 
sample, the mean D score increased from 0.28 on ‘trial 1’ to 0.86 on ‘trial 
2’, having watched the film clips. This elevation was accompanied by a 
significant rise in the number of low carbon choices made from ‘trial 1’ 
(M = 12.69) to ‘trial 2’ (M = 15.07).  These results demonstrate quite 
clearly that film can have a major impact on both explicit and implicit 
attitudes as well as on behaviour, when we restrict our analyses to those 
not approaching ceiling level. 
In terms of longer-term impact of the film clips on attitudes and 
behaviour (i.e. 6 weeks after the film clips were viewed), the analyses 
revealed that in the case of the Likert (n=20), the mean score dropped 
from 3.15 in ‘trial 2’ to 3.00 in ‘trial 3’ which was accompanied by a fall 
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in the percentage of low carbon choices from 66.50% on ‘trial 2’ to 
53.00% on ‘trial 3’. Neither the decrease in Likert score nor the decrease 
in behaviour was significant. When it came to the Feeling Thermometer 
(low carbon) score (n=13), there was no change from ‘trial 2’ to ‘trial 3’; 
the mean score remained at 3.46.  There was a slight decrease in the 
percentage of low carbon choices made from ‘trial 2’ (M = 66.15%) to 
‘trial 3’ (M = 62.50%), but this was not a significant decrease.  There was 
a slight non-significant increase in D score (n=16) from ‘trial 2’ (M = 
1.12) to ‘trial 3’ (M = 1.43), but accompanied by a non-significant drop in 
percentage of low carbon choices made from ‘trial 2’ (M = 76.88) to ‘trial 
3’ (M = 71.09).  
When considering the various measures of attitudes and behaviours 
on ‘trial 3’ and comparing them with the baseline trial (trial 1), again just 
for those not approaching ceiling level at initial testing, the analyses 
revealed that in the case of the Likert score, the mean did rise from 2.75 
on ‘trial 1’ to 3.00 on ‘trial 3’, but this difference was not significant.  
However, when it came to the behavioural choices made by this particular 
group, there was a significant change, but in the opposite direction to that 
predicted, with the percentage of low carbon choices actually decreasing 
from 54.75% on ‘trial 1’ to 53.00% on ‘trial 3’. 
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In terms of Feeling Thermometer, there was a significant increase 
from ‘trial 1’ (M = 2.92) to ‘trial 3’ (M = 3.46).  There was also an increase 
in the percentage of low carbon choices made from ‘trial 1’ to ‘trial 3’ by 
8.27% but this was not significant.  Finally, in terms of D score, there was 
a dramatic and significant increase from ‘trial 1’ (M = 0.17) to ‘trial 3’ (M 
= 1.43) which was accompanied by a rise in the percentage of low carbon 
choices made, rising from ‘trial 1’ (M = 66.25) to ‘trial 3’ (M = 77.09), 
although this increase in low carbon behavioural choice failed to reach 
significance. 
This final study in the thesis thus presents a slightly more optimistic 
view of how we might encourage low carbon behaviour.  Climate change 
films can affect behavioural choices across the range of participants (and 
irrespective of their baseline attitudinal measures) but these film clips 
have little impact on the attitudinal scores partly because many are already 
very high.  When we focus exclusively on those participants with lower 
baseline attitudinal scores, we find that climate change films can affect 
both attitudes and behaviour, making them significantly more pro-low 
carbon, at least immediately after watching the film.  The longer-term 
effects, on behaviour even six weeks after initial testing, do not, however, 




7.2. Some core considerations going forward 
What this thesis as a whole has demonstrated is that if we are to 
genuinely do something about climate change, then we need to refine and 
develop our measures of attitudes and the public’s ‘pre-disposition to act’.  
For too long psychologists have been reporting significant ‘value-action’ 
gaps but continuing on the same basic course with the same basic 
measures.  This thesis suggests that self-report measures may not just be 
inadequate in certain domains like sustainability (subject to intense social 
desirability pressures), they may actually lull us into a false sense of 
security as they do predict self-reports of behaviour, but they predict little 
else.  Some attempt to measure implicit attitudes, not subject to social 
desirability issues to the same extent, could well be important going 
forward, but clearly, the current IAT needs to be developed in many ways.  
It is perhaps naive to assume that we can develop an IAT to ‘low carbon’, 
which, after all is an incredibly broad category, which could predict 
behaviour towards each instantiation of the construct (low carbon food 
products versus modes of travel versus energy sources versus recycling 
etc.).  When it comes to sustainability, people often tend to be inconsistent 
in their behaviours, for example, somebody may be conscientious when it 
comes to recycling waste products but when it comes to transport they 
may choose to drive a fast car with a huge engine that uses a lot of petrol 
(Steg & Vlek, 2009).  Some people may like to buy locally sourced fruit 
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and vegetables, but when it comes to holidays, they may like to travel 
abroad every year to a hotter climate.  Some psychologists and economists 
have developed a hypothesis of ‘moral licensing’ to explain this (Panzone, 
Wossink & Southerton, 2012).  The fact that you do recycle means that 
you think that the very high carbon holiday is not just appropriate, but 
morally justified.  We may well need to develop separate and specific 
IATs to measure implicit attitudes to low carbon products/travel/energy 
in each of these different domains, in order to understand how they 
correlate, and whether the concept of ‘moral licensing’ is justified.  
Alternatively, the disparity in different behaviours may reflect a genuine 
divergence in more specific implicit attitudes.  More specific attitudinal 
measures (when properly developed) may predict behaviour better within 
each of these different domains.   
Throughout this thesis, the goal has been to test some hypotheses 
about the possible role of different measures and types of attitudes in 
predicting low carbon behaviour.  The behavioural focus has been in 
particular on visual attention to carbon labels and ‘consumer choice’.  The 
method for measuring the latter behaviour was to use a ‘simulation’ of 
actual everyday consumer choice in contexts like supermarkets, where 
consumers have to choose between competing products varying on a 
number of relevant dimensions including brand, price, value, 
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environmental labels, and carbon information.  There was an attempt to 
simulate this process in the lab.  This simulation does offer a considerable 
simplification of some of the processes involved, whilst maintaining some 
of the complexities in actual decision-making.  An obvious extension of 
this research is to test the relationship between scores on this behavioural 
simulation task and actual everyday consumer behaviour.  This would be 
possible in the future by developing new research links with retailers like 
Tesco who use a club-card scheme to record all of the purchases made by 
their customers.  We could then attempt to validate any of our lab-based 
measures.  However, to investigate this properly, as indicated in Chapter 
3, one would have to contact a sample of the individual consumers to 
determine where else they bought their groceries, fuel etc. in order to 
obtain a more accurate and complete picture of their weekly shop.  There 
is always the possibility that they buy their greener products in local 
markets etc.  This would, of course,  need to be empirically verified, but 
this is clearly something that could be of significant value in future 
research. 
The attempt in the present thesis to change both attitudes and 
behaviour in many ways worked much better than anticipated, despite the 
fact that any changes produced in the short-term (in the case of those who 
were not approaching ceiling level on the baseline trial), were not 
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maintained across time.  Film clips can significantly impact on both 
attitudes and behaviour, but the effects, as demonstrated in this thesis, are 
short-lived.  My own personal understanding, based on this research 
programme, is that longer-term implicit attitude change will be necessary 
to produce a change in underlying values to low carbon and this will 
necessitate a much more sustained intervention programme aimed at 
young children.  This will be essential because it can be assumed that 
implicit attitudes develop when we are young and over a much longer 
period (Baron and Banaji, 2006; Bryant & Hungerford, 1977).  In the final 
part of this discussion, a systematic programme of activity will be mapped 
out.  This is being done for one simple reason - this is the next urgent step 
in this most difficult of global challenges.  
7.3. The development of an intervention aimed at school-
children 
7.3.1. Background research 
In the past, environmental education has focused on communicating 
information about the problem and rather less on the identification and 
encouragement of specific pro-environmental behaviours (Tsevreni, 
2011).  However, there is little correlation between abstract environmental 
knowledge, scientific knowledge and pro-environmental behaviour 
(Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Finger, 1994).  A possible mechanism to 
encourage pro-environmental behaviour is to focus on the empowerment 
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of children, informing them of what actions they can personally take to 
assist in this process.  Tsevreni (2011) took such an approach in educating 
children in Athens about the environment, putting emphasis on children’s 
willingness to engage and participate in a pro-environmental community.  
The participants consisted of 60 children aged between 9 and 12.  He used 
methods such as storytelling, photography and drama as a way to explore 
pro-environmental behaviour in order for children to communicate their 
own experiences and perceptions with regard to the environment.  In 
doing this, children were encouraged to address issues partly through the 
expression of emotion in storytelling.  At the start of the study, the 
children did not display much concern for the environment nor did they 
display significant motivation to engage in such pro-environmental 
behaviour.  However, after taking part in these activities, children were 
able to express more concerns with regard to future plans for their own 
environment.  The intervention increased their feelings of self-efficacy.  
Many of the children expressed negative thoughts about their environment 
and pessimism about what the future may hold for their home town.  Many 
of them referred to pollution coming from cars and that they would like to 
see ‘less cars and more flowers and trees’.  The main conclusions, and 
perhaps the most optimistic results to come out of this study, were that it 
is indeed possible to increase self-efficacy and empowerment in children 
when it comes to issues to do with the environment. 
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But there is another important point - if children feel a sense of 
empowerment and are more confident in expressing their opinions 
regarding their environment, they can then influence the people around 
them and encourage change at home ‘As children learn about 
sustainability at school, they sometimes bring new ideas and actions to 
live more sustainably at home’ (Desjardins & Wakkary, 2011, p.3).  
Damerell, Howe and Milner-Gulland (2013) found that children who were 
educated about the environment went on to share their knowledge with 
others, which successfully encouraged positive changes in pro-
environmental behaviour in the home.  The researchers collected data 
from seven schools, all of which had undertaken environmental education 
learning activities outdoors on wetlands in the Seychelles.  They 
compared data to eight other schools who had undertaken work on 
alternative projects.  All sets of pupils completed questionnaires, as did 
the parents of pupils from both groups.  The children completed their 
questionnaires, addressing issues regarding ‘wetlands’ whilst they were in 
school and then took a slightly different version of the questionnaire home 
to their parents.  Children who had been involved in the environmental 
education programme scored higher on the questionnaire than those 
children who had studied alternative subjects.  Parents whose children had 
engaged in the environmental education programme also scored higher 
than the parents of the children who studied alternative subjects.  
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Interestingly, when interviewed, parents were not necessarily aware that 
they had acquired this knowledge from their children.  However, the most 
surprising result was that the children who had undertaken the 
environmental education course had a positive influence on water use at 
home.   
However, both of these educational initiatives have only measured 
change through self-reported questionnaires whereby people ‘report’ on 
their behaviour or on their explicitly held attitudes.  All such reports are 
subject to issues of social desirability.  What about implicit attitudes – 
attitudes that people are not necessarily consciously aware of?  
As previously mentioned, the IAT has now been adapted to 
measure the implicit attitudes of children (Baron & Banaji, 2006; 
Cvencek, Meltzoff & Greenwald, 2011; Dunham, Baron & Banaji, 2006; 
Rutland, Cameron, Milne & McGeorge, 2005;  Steffens, Jelenec & 
Noack, 2010).  Bruni and Schultz (2010) developed FlexiTwins (a game 
version of the IAT) to measure children’s implicit connectedness to 
nature, which was described in detail in the introduction.  FlexiTwins is a 
colourful, animated game designed to be fun and easily used across a wide 
range of ages.   Bruni, Winter, Schultz, Omoto and Tabanico (2015) used 
the FlexiTwins game to measure children’s implicit connectedness to 
nature before and after children engaged in a creative arts contest.  They 
401 
 
formed a Creative Arts Contest designed to encourage children to be more 
connected with nature through the use of creative arts.  Children were 
required to ‘gather inspiration from the outdoors…and incorporate them 
into mixed media projects’ (2015, p.4).  The children’s creations included 
photographs, drawing, collages, and stories.  The idea behind the contest 
was to determine if using the arts to explore nature, and participating in a 
Creative Arts Contest, had an effect on children’s implicit connectedness 
to nature.  Bruni and colleagues recruited students aged between 8 and 11 
to take part in the study. All students were pre- and post-tested on the 
game FlexiTwins to measure their implicit connectedness to nature.  
 There was a 30-day gap between the pre- and post-test where all of 
the children attended nature trips.  Only some students took part in the 
Creative Arts Contest (n= 65). The other 74 students did not engage in the 
contest.  They found that those who engaged in the Creative Arts Contest 
significantly increased their implicit connectedness to nature compared to 
those who did not engage in the contest.  However, it was only implicit 
attitudes that were measured and only immediately after the contest was 
over.  It would have been interesting to return to the school two or three 
months later and assess their attitudes to determine if engaging on such 
programme had a lasting effect on their implicit connectedness to nature. 
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7.4. The development of a new approach 
In the future, an urgent goal is to devise an education intervention 
aimed at school-children.  The idea is to provide all pupils with more 
background as to what high and low carbon lifestyles consist of through 
different initiatives.  The children will be taught about the effects of high 
carbon lifestyles on the environment and what the future will be like if 
people do not start to change their behaviour.  It will be stressed that they 
are the generation that can make a difference, and that they are the future 
and that it is not too late to save the planet.  There will be three conditions 
- a structured education condition where the sessions will focus on 
educating the pupils, providing them with information about how they can 
change their behaviour and the behaviour of others 
(parents/guardians/siblings).  There will be a second condition where 
drama and the arts will be used to target pupils’ implicit attitudes through 
exploration and experience.  The goal is to get pupils to feel a sense of 
pride in their environment, to feel a responsibility to care for the 
environment and to nurture it.  The pupils will explore different scenarios, 
for example, what the future of the planet might be like if people do not 
change their behaviour and start to care for the planet.  Pupils will also be 
given various tasks to do, for example, design a poster to encourage pro-
environmental behaviour around the school, write a short poem about 
climate change.  The third condition will combine the educational 
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programme and the arts-based initiative. It is important to note that each 
of the initiatives will last for the same period of time. 
7.5. Educational Campaign 
There will be three different conditions to the initiative (condition 1 and 
2 will consist of four 1- hour lessons over the period of four weeks with 
approximately 1 week in between each lesson, condition 3 is a control 
condition with testing to take place approximately 4 - 6 weeks apart). 
Condition 1: This will be a very structured knowledge-based condition 
where the sessions will focus on educating the pupils about climate change 
in a classroom setting, providing them with information about how they 
can change their behaviour and the behaviour of others 
(parents/guardians/siblings). 
Condition 2: In this condition, a creative arts programme will be used to 
educate the pupils.  For example, the pupils will explore different 
scenarios through drama.  They will also be given various tasks to do, 
such as design a poster to encourage pro-environmental behaviour around 
the school or write a short poem about climate change. 
Condition 3: This condition is the control condition.  Pupils will just 
complete the pre-test and post-test procedures with no initiative in 
between (see below for details).  The basic structure is as follows:  
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Pre-test: (to be completed by pupils in conditions 1, 2 and 3) 
Pupils will be required to complete 2 short questionnaires, along with a 
behavioural choice task and a computerised sustainability game.  They 
will also be asked to take two short questionnaires home for their 
parent/guardian to complete.  The pre-test should take approximately 30 
minutes and can be completed immediately before Lesson 1.  
Questionnaire 1a: This will be a short multiple-choice questionnaire 
assessing general knowledge about climate change before starting the 
initiative.  There will be approximately 10 questions including:  What is 
renewable energy? How can you help to slow climate change? What is a 
carbon footprint?  
Questionnaire 2a: This questionnaire is designed to assess the child’s 
sustainable behaviour in everyday life.  Children will be asked to report 
their behaviour on a scale of ‘always’, ‘often’, ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’ or 
‘never’.  Items on this questionnaire will include: Do you usually walk or 
cycle to school? Do you recycle as much as you can? Do you turn off the 
lights when you leave a room? Again, there will be approximately 10 
questions. 
Behavioural choice task: Here pupils will be presented with various 
behavioural choice tasks.  These choices will consist of scenarios and 
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product choices where the pupil has to make a decision between ‘A’ or 
‘B’ (high carbon versus low carbon). 
Implicit attitude measure: Pupils will be asked to play a fun computerised 
sustainability sorting game.  This game is adapted from FlexiTwins (Bruni 
& Schultz, 2010).  
Questionnaire 3a: This short questionnaire is for the pupil to take home 
to their parent or guardian.  The parent/guardian will be required to report 
their own personal sustainable behaviour at home.  This questionnaire will 
include items such as: Do you turn off the TV when you are not using it? 
Do you only boil the amount of water you need in the kettle? When it is 
cold, do you put on a jumper instead of turning the heating up? 
Questionnaire 4a: Again, this will be a short questionnaire where the 
parent or guardian will report on their child’s sustainable behaviour 
around the home. 
The following lessons are to be completed by pupils in condition 1 and 2. 
The aims of the lessons for both conditions will be the same.  However, 
in condition 1 pupils will be learning in a very structured environment.  In 





Lesson 1: Climate Change  
The aim of this lesson is to build awareness of climate change.  Pupils will 
be taught about the effects of climate change and the consequences 
climate change is having on our planet.  The focus will be on the adverse 
weather conditions threatening different countries and its consequences.  
Pupils will also consider how climate change is affecting people in 
different parts of the worlds. 
Lesson 2: Energy. 
The aim of this lesson is for the pupils to gain a better understanding of 
what energy is, where energy comes from, how we use energy and how 
we waste energy (especially at home).  By the end of the lesson, pupils 
will be able to recognise the link between energy and climate change, how 
they can save energy themselves and how they can encourage others to 
save energy. 
Lesson 3: Carbon footprint.   
The aim of this lesson is to explain what a carbon footprint actually is.  By 
the end of this lesson pupils will have a better understanding of how their 
individual carbon footprint contributes to climate change.  They will have 
a better understanding of how they can reduce their carbon footprint and 
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how reducing carbon footprint has other benefits such as a healthier 
lifestyle. 
Lesson 4: Reduce, Reuse, Recycle. 
By the end of this session, pupils will understand what recycling is and 
how they can ‘reduce’, ‘reuse’ and ‘recycle’.  They will have a better 
understanding of the benefits of ‘reducing’ ‘reusing’ and ‘recycling’.  
Post-test: (to be completed by pupils in conditions 1, 2 and 3) 
As in the pre-test, pupils will complete 2 short questionnaires along with 
a behavioural choice task and the computerised sustainability game.  They 
will also be asked to take two more questionnaires home for their 
parent/guardian to complete. 
Questionnaire 1b: This questionnaire will the same as 1a.  Once the pupils 
have completed this questionnaire a comparison to questionnaire 1a will 
be made in order to assess the impact this initiative has had on their 
knowledge about climate change. 
Questionnaire 2b: This questionnaire will be exactly the same as 
questionnaire 2a.  Once questionnaire 2b has been completed a 
comparison to questionnaire 2a will be made to compare reported 
sustainable behaviour before and after the initiative in order to assess 
whether it actually had an impact on their reported sustainable behaviour. 
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Behavioural choice task:  Like before, pupils will be presented with 
various behavioural choices (high carbon versus low carbon).  By 
comparing choices made before the pupils took part in the initiative to the 
choices they make once they have completed the initiative an assessment 
can be made to determine which condition had more of an impact on their 
behavioural choices. 
Implicit measure: Pupils will play the sustainability sorting game.  By 
comparing their scores from before they started the initiative and once 
they completed the initiative, an assessment can be made as to whether 
this initiative had an impact on their underlying attitudes to climate 
change. 
Questionnaire 3b: This questionnaire is for the parent or guardian to 
report their own sustainable behaviour at home.  The items in this 
questionnaire will be the same as in questionnaire 3a.  Once the 
parent/guardian has completed this, an assessment can be made to see if, 
by having their child engage in an environmental initiative, it has 
impacted upon sustainable behaviour at home.  
Questionnaire 4b: Here the parent or guardian will report on their child’s 
sustainable behaviour around the home.  This will determine if the 
initiative had an effect on their child’s behaviour. 
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My view is that it will only be campaigns of this type which, when 
properly evaluated, will allow us to determine the efficacy of initiatives 
that are capable of changing behaviour by influencing both knowledge 
and attitudes, both explicit and implicit. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the research reported in this thesis suggests that we 
need new and radical approaches if we are ever to overcome the ‘value-
action’ gap when it comes to sustainability.  A broader consideration of 
the concept of attitudes, to include the measurement and assessment of 
implicit attitudes in addition to explicit attitudes, has been proposed.  The 
thesis has highlighted the critical importance of measuring actual 
behaviour (or actual consumer choice), as well as mere self-reports of 
behaviour or choice.  The predominant focus on self-reports of behaviour 
in the past may have lulled us into a false sense of security when it comes 
to the environment, sustainability and climate change.  Self-reports of 
behaviour may be easy to obtain but they are subject to all of the biases of 
the conscious mind through the processes of social desirability.  The thesis 
has suggested how this research on consumer choice could be expanded 
into a broader consideration of more everyday consumer habits.  The 
research reported in this thesis has also suggested that attitudes and 
behaviour, including implicit attitudes, can be changed using film extracts 
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of specific types.  To produce enduring attitudinal and behavioural 
change, however, we will need new initiatives aimed at children because 
it has been shown that implicit attitudes develop slowly over time, and 
they develop early on in our lives.  It is clear that we need to target the 
young in new and creative ways, if we are ever to promote genuine, long-
lasting behavioural change in this area, with the development of new 
consumer habits and preferences with much lower carbon footprints. 
  I want to finish this thesis on a personal note, by reiterating my 
strong belief that new initiatives and new approaches to the question of 
attitudes and behaviour, are extremely urgent in this area of climate 
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